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Zusammenfassung der kumulativen Dissertation  
Assessment of Innovation Effects of Mergers 
Benjamin René Kern 
 
-Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache- 
 
 
Die adäquate Berücksichtigung von Innovationswirkungen in der Folge von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen in der Fusionskontrolle war und ist eines der am 
kontroversesten diskutierten Themen in der Wettbewerbspolitik. In diesem Zusammenhang 
wurde die Frage aufgeworfen, ob die traditionellen Kategorien des Wettbewerbsrechts für den 
Umgang mit Innovationsaspekten ausreichend geeignet sind, oder ob neue Konzepte für die 
Analyse von Innovationseffekten von Fusionen nötig sind. Dies wiederum hängt mit der 
Frage zusammen, ob die Unternehmen, die auf bestehenden Produktmärkten miteinander in 
Konkurrenz stehen, auch unweigerlich Innovationswettbewerber sind. Ebenso kann man 
umgekehrt fragen ob es, neben den sich aktuell auf einem Produktmarkt im Wettbewerb 
befindlichen Firmen, nicht vielleicht noch weitere Unternehmen gibt, die miteinander im 
Bereich der Innovation im Wettbewerb stehen. Obwohl die Verwendung von Produktmärkten 
als ein theoretisches Konstrukt zur Identifizierung der relevanten Wettbewerber ein bewährtes 
Instrument zum Schutz von statischem Preis und nicht über den Preis ausgetragenen 
Wettbewerbs ist, so wird der ausschließliche Fokus auf Produktmärkte höchst wahrscheinlich 
nicht die wahre Situation in Bezug auf den stattfindenden Innovationswettbewerb abbilden. 
Entsprechend liegt jedem der fünf Beiträge dieser Dissertation die Annahme zugrunde, dass 
die relevanten Wettbewerber im Hinblick auf Innovationen nicht zwangsläufig den relevanten 
Wettbewerbern auf bestehenden Produktmärkten gleichen. Aus ökonomischer Sicht waren 
Produktmärkte seit je her lediglich ein Vehikel um diejenigen Firmen zu identifizieren, die 
sich miteinander im Wettbewerb befinden. Zum Schutz eines statischen Preiswettbewerbs war 
es somit auch nur folgerichtig die aktuell offerierten Produkte heranzuziehen und 
anschließend die Substitutionsbedingungen der Nachfrage- und Angebotsseite zur 
Bestimmung des relevanten Wettbewerbers zu analysieren. Allerdings ist der Versuch dieses 
Vorgehen auch auf die Identifizierung der relevanten Innovationswettbewerber anzuwenden, 
äußerst fragwürdig. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass die Herstellung und der Vertrieb von 
bestehenden Produkten nicht die gleichen Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten erfordert wie die 
Generierung von Innovation, ist die Behauptung eines Zusammenfallens der Identität von 
Produktmarkt- und Innovationswettbewerbern nur schwer zu verteidigen. Diese Diskussion 
führte in den USA in den 1990er Jahren zur Entstehung der sogenannten "Innovation Market 
Analysis" (IMA), welche als ein erstes, innovationsspezifisches Analyseverfahren angesehen 
werden kann. Allerdings wurde die IMA, trotz der Tatsache, dass ihre Grundidee in einer 
signifikanten Zahl von US-Fusionsfällen angewandt wurde, stark kritisiert. Vor dem 
Hintergrund dieses mangelnden Zuspruchs für die "Innovation Market Analysis" und dem 
Fehlen eines alternativen, innovationsspezifischen Analyserahmens ist es bis heute immer 
noch unklar, wie die Kartellbehörden im Rahmen der Prüfung von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen Innovationsaspekte berücksichtigen sollten. 
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Dieses Forschungsprojekt untersucht daher, wie und in welchem Ausmaß die US-
Wettbewerbsbehörden in ihrer Fallpraxis Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse auf negative 
Innovationswirkungen hin geprüft haben und ob die verwendeten Prüfverfahren für diesen 
Zweck geeignet sind oder weiterentwickelt werden müssen. Besonders relevant ist in diesem 
Zusammenhang (1) wie die Firmen, die miteinander im Innovationswettbewerb stehen, 
identifiziert werden sollten. Hierbei stellt sich die Frage ob zur Identifikation der relevanten 
Wettbewerber weiterhin die traditionelle Definition des Produktmarktes verwendet werden 
sollte, oder ob vielmehr die Notwendigkeit besteht, anstatt dessen alternative Ansätze, wie 
z.B. die "Innovation Market Analysis", heranzuziehen / zu entwickeln. (2) Dabei soll zudem 
untersucht werden, welche Argumentationslinien im Hinblick auf die vorgebrachten 
wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Innovationswirkungen von den Behörden verwendet wurden. 
Sollten sich die Wettbewerbsbehörden hierbei vorwiegend auf die etablierten Argumente der 
neoklassischen Industrieökonomik zu Innovationsanreizen stützen, oder sollten auch die 
Erkenntnisse der eher heterodoxen Evolutionsökonomik mit einbezogen werden? (3) Wie 
sollte ein geeignetes Prüfschema, das den Wettbewerbsbehörden hilft die 
Innovationswirkungen von Fusionen zu untersuchen, ausgestaltet sein? Ist es möglich, dass 
solch ein Prüfschema einerseits die komplexen und oft divergierenden Effekte zwischen 
Wettbewerb und Innovation adäquat berücksichtigt und trotzdem gleichzeitig 
Rechtssicherheit stiftet? 
Diesen Forschungsfragen widmet sich die vorliegende Dissertation sowohl von einer 
theoretisch/konzeptionellen Perspektive (Beiträge 1-3), wie auch von empirischer Seite 
(Beiträge 4-5). Insbesondere der im Zusammenhang mit dem empirischen Teil der 
vorliegenden Arbeit generierte Datensatz ist einzigartig und liefert die Basis für die bislang 
einzige ökonometrische Analyse der U.S.-Fusionskontrollpraxis im Hinblick auf die 
Berücksichtigung von Innovationsaspekten. 
 
1. Benjamin R. Kern (2014): Innovation Markets, Future Markets, or Potential Competition: 
How should Competition Authorities account for Innovation Competition in Merger 
Reviews?, WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW, 37, pp. 137-206. 
 (Geleistete Beiträge: Benjamin R. Kern: 100%) 
 
Der erste Artikel der vorliegenden Dissertation befasst sich daher zunächst mit der Frage, 
wie die Unternehmen, die miteinander im Innovationswettbewerb stehen, identifiziert werden 
sollten und ob die entsprechenden Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse mit Hilfe der Theorie der 
„Innovation Markets“, „Future Markets“ oder des potenziellen Wettbewerbs aufgegriffen 
werden sollten. Traditionell konzentrieren sich die Wettbewerbsbehörden im Rahmen der 
Zusammenschlusskontrolle auf die Analyse von relevanten Produktmärkten. Hierbei werden 
die relevanten Firmen, die sich miteinander im Wettbewerb befinden, identifiziert und 
mögliche wettbewerbswidrige Effekte aufgedeckt. Im Gegensatz zu Wettbewerb in Hinblick 
auf Preise, Mengen, oder Produktqualität, findet der Wettbewerb im Bereich der Innovation 
allerdings nicht zwangsläufig auf bestehenden Produktmärkten statt. Dieser erste Aufsatz 
untersucht daher die (bestehenden) theoretischen Ansätze, die grundsätzlich für die 
Überprüfung von wettbewerbswidrigen Innovationseffekten in der Zusammenschlusskontrolle 
verwendet werden können, anhand ausgewählter Fusionsfälle aus der Fusionskontrollpraxis. 
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In diesem Zusammenhang werden in diesem Beitrag sechs Gruppen von Fusionsfällen, in 
denen Innovationsaspekte eine Rolle gespielt haben, entwickelt. Auf Basis dieser Fallgruppen 
zeigt das Papier, dass die etablierten Ansätze des "potenziellen Wettbewerbs" wie auch der 
"Future Markets" nicht immer in der Lage sind, den stattfindenden Innovationswettbewerb zu 
erfassen. Darüber hinaus ist es fraglich, ob das Konzept der "Future Markets", auch in jenen 
Fällen, in denen der Ansatz grundsätzlich angewandt werden kann, tatsächlich dazu geeignet 
ist, den Innovationswettbewerb mit all seinen Facetten abzubilden. Auf der anderen Seite hat 
aber auch die "Innovation Market Analysis", bis heute der einzige Ansatz der speziell zur 
Analyse des Innovationswettbewerbs entwickelt wurde, mehrere Schwachstellen. Vor diesem 
Hintergrund kommt der Beitrag zu dem Ergebnis, dass aktuell kein allgemein akzeptierter 
Ansatz existiert, welchen die Kartellbehörden in den USA wie auch in der EU als 
Analyserahmen zum Schutz des Innovationswettbewerbs in der Fusionskontrolle heranziehen 
könnten. Die Entwicklung eines neuen bzw. überarbeiteten Analyseansatzes scheint somit 
dringend geboten. Nichts desto trotz stellt die "IMA" einen guten Ausgangspunkt für die 
Entwicklung eines solchen Analyserahmens dar. Insbesondere die Eigenschaft der 
"Innovation Market Analysis", dass diese zum ersten Mal die relevanten 
Innovationswettbewerber unabhängig von deren Rolle und Bedeutung auf existierenden 
Produktmärkten berücksichtigt, sollte auch Teil eines neuen / überarbeiteten Ansatzes sein. 
 
2. Benjamin R. Kern & Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras (2014): Mergers and the Incentives 
to Undertake Product Innovation Oriented R&D: First Steps Towards an Assessment 
Approach, MAGKS - JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.17-2014, 
available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/17-
2014_kern.pdf. 
 (Geleistete Beiträge: Benjamin R. Kern: 60%, Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras: 40%) 
 
Der zweite Artikel baut anschließend auf den Ergebnissen des ersten Artikels auf. Hierbei 
zielt das Papier darauf ab einen ersten Beitrag zur Entwicklung eines neuen / überarbeiteten 
Analyserahmens für die Überprüfung von Innovationswirkungen im Rahmen der 
Fusionskontrolle zu liefern. Daneben soll mit diesem Papier aber auch der unzureichenden 
Berücksichtigung der Implikationen Rechnung getragen werden, die sich aus der separaten 
Betrachtung des Innovationswettbewerbs vom Produktmarktwettbewerb für den 
Zusammenhang zwischen Wettbewerb, Konzentration und Innovation ergeben. Entscheidend 
ist hierfür, dass die Unterscheidung in Produktmarkt- und Innovationswettbewerb nicht nur 
Konsequenzen für die Identifizierung der relevanten Wettbewerber hat, sondern zudem 
entscheidend für die Beurteilung der antikompetitiven Innovationseffekte von Fusionen ist. 
Im Falle einer Fusion von zwei Firmen, die ausschließlich miteinander in Bezug auf 
Innovation konkurrieren, würde der aktuell stattfindende Produktmarktwettbewerb unberührt 
bleiben. Dies würde jedoch bedeuten, dass nur ein Bruchteil der Erkenntnisse, welche die 
Vielzahl der modelltheoretischen Beiträge insgesamt beisteuert, in einem solchen Fusionsfall 
herangezogen werden kann. Anstatt dessen erfordert die Beurteilung solcher Fusionen eine 
Fokussierung auf die Erkenntnisse, die auf Basis von ökonomischen Modellen gewonnen 
wurden, die diesem Sachverhalt ebenfalls Rechnung tragen. Hierbei handelt es sich jedoch in 
vielen Fällen um gänzlich andere Modelle als jene, deren Ergebnisse bei der Beurteilung der 
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Innovationswirkungen einer Fusion zwischen zwei Produktmarktwettbewerbern Anwendung 
finden sollten. In Folge dessen ist es äußerst fraglich, ob die Kritik hinsichtlich des 
ambivalenten Zusammenhangs zwischen Produktmarktwettbewerb und Innovation in 
gleichem Maße für den Zusammenhang zwischen Innovationswettbewerb und Innovation 
zutreffend ist. 
Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Unterscheidung in Innovationswettbewerb auf der einen Seite 
und Produktmarktwettbewerb auf der anderen Seite, analysiert der vorliegende Aufsatz den 
Zusammenhang zwischen dem vorherrschenden „Wettbewerb“ und den Anreizen der 
Unternehmen in Produktinnovationen zu investieren. Im Zuge dessen wird die umfangreiche 
modelltheoretische Industrieökonomik-Literatur dahingehend untersucht, ob die 
Wirkungsmechanismen, welche den jeweiligen Modellen zugrunde liegen, in einem auf 
Produktmärkten stattfindenden Wettbewerb verankert sind oder nicht. In Folge dessen werden 
in diesem Papier zwei Gruppen von möglichen Innovationseffekten von Fusionen 
identifiziert. Während die erste Gruppe solche Effekte beinhaltet, die durch eine Veränderung 
des aktuellen Produktmarktwettbewerbs hervorgerufen werden, umfasst die zweite Gruppe 
jene Innovationseffekte, welche auch dann eine Wirkung auf die Innovationsanreize der 
Firmen haben, wenn die Fusion keine Auswirkungen auf bestehende Produktmärkte hat.  
Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass in einem konkreten Fusionsfall nicht zwangsläufig jeder der 
identifizierten Innovationseffekt relevant ist und diese, je nach Beschaffenheit der 
entsprechenden Branchen- / Wettbewerbscharakteristika, zudem unterschiedliche 
Wirkungsrichtungen entfalten können, ist es notwendig die Innovationswirkungen innerhalb 
bestimmter Fallgruppen zu überprüfen. Zur Bildung dieser Fallgruppen müssen jedoch 
zunächst Unterscheidungskriterien entwickelt werden. Zu diesem Zweck versucht dieser 
Artikel die Determinanten zu identifizieren, die in einem konkreten Fall entscheidend dafür 
sind, wie sich ein bestimmter Innovationseffekt (z.B. der „escape competition effect“ oder der 
„replacement effect“) auf die Innovationsanreize auswirkt. Die Identifizierung und 
Kategorisierung der Innovationseffekte zuzüglich der relevanten Determinanten bietet damit 
(1) eine Checkliste von Beurteilungskriterien, die Wettbewerbsbehörden bei der Analyse der 
Innovationswirkungen von Fusionen berücksichtigen sollten. (2) Darüber hinaus wird in 
diesem Beitrag beispielhaft gezeigt, wie die Entwicklung eines entscheidungstheoretischen 
Analyserahmens zur Beurteilung von Innovationswirkungen von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen erfolgen kann. Solch ein Analyserahmen würde es 
ermöglichen, die Notwendigkeit einer fallspezifischen Prüfung von Fusionen mit der 
Forderung nach einem konsistenten und transparenten Prüfverfahren in Einklang zu bringen. 
Ein solches Verfahren wäre somit im Geiste einer regelgeleiteten Wettbewerbspolitik die, von 
der „Law and Economics“ Perspektive aus betrachtet, Fehlerkosten minimieren und 
Rechtssicherheit stiften könnte. 
Des Weiteren zeigt das Papier, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen dem vorherrschenden 
„Wettbewerb“ und den hierdurch hervorgerufenen Innovationsanreizen nicht immer so 
ambivalent ist, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Insbesondere im Hinblick auf Fusionen 
zwischen Unternehmen, die miteinander ausschließlich im Innovationswettbewerb und nicht 
im Produktmarktwettbewerb stehen, ist dieser Zusammenhang deutlich stabiler.  
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3.  Benjamin R. Kern & Malte Ackermann (2014): Shedding Some Light on the Dark Matter 
of Competition: Insights from the Strategic Management & Organizational Science 
Literature for the Consideration of Diversity Aspects in Merger Review, MAGKS - JOINT 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.05-2014, available at http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/05-2014_ackermann.pdf. 
 (Geleistete Beiträge: Benjamin R. Kern: 80%, Malte Ackermann: 20%) 
 
Der dritte Artikel beschäftigt sich daraufhin mit der Frage nach den zu erwartenden 
wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Innovationswirkungen von Fusionen. Traditionell hat sich diese 
Diskussion mit der Frage beschäftigt, ob eine wettbewerbliche - oder vielmehr eine hoch 
konzentrierte Marktstruktur (meist die Marktstruktur eines Produktmarkts) für Innovationen 
förderlich ist. Die Gesamtschau der hierzu verfassten theoretischen und empirischen Beiträge 
lieferte jedoch äußerst widersprüchliche Ergebnisse, sodass man grundsätzlich davon 
ausgehen muss, dass in hohem Maße wettbewerbliche - ebenso wie hoch konzentrierte Märkte 
prinzipiell dazu geeignet sind, Innovationen zu fördern. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es somit 
unklar, ob eine Fusion, die zu einer höheren Marktkonzentration führt, tatsächlich 
innovationsschädlich oder doch innovationsfördernd ist.  
Im Gegensatz zur Mainstream-Ökonomie, welche sich fast ausschließlich mit den 
Auswirkungen einer geänderten Marktstruktur auf die Anreize der Unternehmen in Forschung 
und Entwicklung zu investieren befasst, kann eine Änderung der Marktstruktur jedoch 
zusätzliche Wirkungen auf Innovationen haben. Beispielsweise kann eine Fusion, welche eine 
Reduzierung der Anzahl der Wettbewerber nach sich zieht, auch insofern 
innovationsschädlich sein, dass hierdurch die Anzahl der Unternehmen, die derzeit bestimmte  
F&E Projekte verfolgen (oder entsprechende Projekte prinzipiell verfolgen könnten), 
reduziert wird. Gesetzt den Fall, dass sich Unternehmen nicht nur bezüglich ihrer 
Kostenfunktionen, sondern auch hinsichtlich ihrer Ressourcen, Organisationsstruktur, 
Unternehmenskultur, sowie ihrer Erwartungen in Hinblick auf erfolgsversprechende 
Geschäftsfelder und Forschungsprojekte unterscheiden, kann sich bereits die Reduktion der 
Anzahl der Wettbewerber nachteilig auf die Innovationskraft einer Branche auswirken. Vor 
diesem Hintergrund kann die "Diversität" als eine weitere Dimension des 
Innovationswettbewerbs angesehen werden - eine Dimension die neben den Überlegungen zu 
Innovationsanreizen und -fähigkeiten von Unternehmen, ebenfalls schützenswert sein kann.  
Diese Eigenschaft des Wettbewerbs wird in der wettbewerbspolitischen Literatur jedoch nur 
am Rande berücksichtigt. Die geringe Beachtung könnte dem Umstand geschuldet sein, dass 
die Mainstream-Ökonomie und vor allem die moderne Industrieökonomik grundlegende 
Schwierigkeiten haben, diese Dimension des Wettbewerbs, welche Joseph Farrell anschaulich 
die „dunkle Materie des Wettbewerbs" nannte, zu erfassen. Abgesehen davon wird zudem 
oftmals das Argument angeführt, dass die Unternehmen selbst, wenn "Diversität" tatsächlich 
eine positive Wirkung auf die Innovationsfähigkeit von Unternehmen hat, auch nach einer 
Fusion einen Anreiz haben sollten, solch ein innovationsförderndes Umfeld „in-house“ zu 
bewahren. Sollte dieses Argument zutreffend sein, so könnte eine mögliche Verringerung der 
"Diversität" zwischen den verschiedenen Firmen (inter-firm) dadurch kompensiert werden, 
dass solch einer Reduktion der „Diversität“ eine entsprechende Erhöhung der „Diversität“ 
innerhalb der verbleibenden Firmen ("intra-firm") gegenüber steht. Wenn man solch einen 
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Effekt zu erwarten hätte, bestünde folglich keine Veranlassung, dass die Kartellbehörden der 
„Diversität“ im Rahmen der Zusammenschlusskontrolle eine besondere Bedeutung 
beimessen.  
Unter Berücksichtigung der Management- und organisationstheoretischen Literatur zielt 
dieser erste Artikel daher auf die Klärung der Forschungsfrage ab, ob und in wie weit, 
Unternehmen nach einer Fusion zur Aufrechterhaltung der „Diversität“ beitragen. Dies kann 
entweder durch eine neu geschaffene „intra-firm Diversität“ oder im Rahmen einer Wahrung 
der bestehenden „Diversität“ in Folge der Fortführung der Autonomie des erworbenen 
Unternehmens erfolgen. Zu diesem Zweck werden in dem Beitrag zunächst die Erkenntnisse 
der "Corporate Entrepreneurship" (CE) Literatur untersucht. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass dieser 
Forschungsbereich die Schaffung von unabhängigen Unternehmenseinheiten und damit die 
Erzeugung von "Diversität" innerhalb der Firma tatsächlich als einen wichtigen Faktor für die 
Innovationskraft und allgemeine Performance von Unternehmen anerkennt. Es stellt sich 
jedoch heraus, dass Unternehmen die eine CE-Strategie verfolgen, in den meisten Fällen auf 
erhebliche Umsetzungsprobleme und verschiedene Zielkonflikte stoßen. Gleiches gilt für die 
Aufrechterhaltung von "Diversität" in Folge einer Fortführung der Autonomie nach einer 
Fusion. Obwohl die „post-merger-integration“ Literatur starke Argumente für eine 
Aufrechterhaltung der Unabhängigkeit von erworbenen Unternehmen zur Wahrung ihrer 
Innovationsfähigkeit liefert, wird dennoch deutlich, dass auch in diesem Fall ein „Trade-off“ 
zwischen dem Ziel der Wahrung der Innovationsfähigkeit und der Realisierung von statischen 
Effizienzgewinnen durch Integration, besteht. Auf der einen Seite verdeutlicht die 
umfangreiche Management- und organisationstheoretische Literatur somit auf anschauliche 
Art und Weise, dass die Unternehmen tatsächlich einen starken Anreiz zur Wahrung der 
„Diversität“ innerhalb des eigenen Unternehmens haben sollten. Auf der anderen Seite 
demonstriert das Papier aber auch, dass sich Konsumenten und Wettbewerbsbehörden nicht 
ohne weiteres darauf verlassen können. 
 
4.  Benjamin R. Kern, Ralf Dewenter, Wolfgang Kerber (2014): Empirical Analysis of the 
Assessment of Innovation Effects in U.S. Merger Cases, MAGKS - JOINT DISCUSSION 
PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.50-2014 (2014), available at http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/50-2014_kerber.pdf. 
(Geleistete Beiträge: Benjamin R. Kern: 70%, Ralf Dewenter: 15%, Wolfgang Kerber: 
15%) 
 
Während sich die ersten drei Artikel eher mit theoretisch / konzeptionellen Fragestellungen 
beschäftigen, untersucht der vierte Beitrag empirisch wie die US-Kartellbehörden in der 
angewandten Fusionskontrolle Innovationseffekte berücksichtigt haben. Die Entscheidung zur 
Analyse der US-amerikanischen Fusionskontrollpraxis rührt daher, dass die US Behörden, im 
Gegensatz zur Europäischen Kommission, eine weitaus größere Anzahl von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen auf Innovationswirkungen hin überprüft haben.  
Auf Basis der "Complaints" sowie der „Decision and Orders“ analysiert das vorliegende 
Papier daher im Rahmen einer Vollerhebung alle 399 Zusammenschlüsse die durch das 
Department of Justice (DOJ) oder die Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in der Zeit zwischen 
1995 und 2008 aufgegriffen wurden. Unter Verwendung der Probit-Methode beschäftigt sich 
die ökonometrische Studie insbesondere mit der Frage, auf welche Weise und in welchem 
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Umfang die US-amerikanischen Wettbewerbsbehörden Fusionen auf Innovationseffekte hin 
überprüft haben. Darüber hinaus untersucht der Beitrag ob die beiden Behörden identische 
oder unterschiedliche Ansätze für die Überprüfung der Innovationswirkungen von Fusionen 
verwendet haben und ob sich im Laufe der Zeit möglicherweise Änderungen in der Fallpraxis 
beobachten lassen. Wichtige Fragen sind in diesem Zusammenhang, (1) ob die US-Behörden 
überwiegend einen traditionellen, auf dem Produktmarkt-Konzept basierenden 
Analyserahmen verwendeten, oder ob sie auch innovationsspezifischere Ansätze, wie z.B. die 
"Innovation Market Analysis", herangezogen haben. (2) Daneben ist es von Bedeutung 
welche Argumentationslinien im Hinblick auf die vorgebrachten wettbewerbsbeschränkenden 
Innovationswirkungen von den Behörden verwendet wurden.  
Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Fragestellungen kommt der Beitrag zu folgenden Ergebnissen. 
Es zeigt sich, dass in 135 der 399 Fälle die Behörden antikompetitive Innovationseffekte 
erwarteten und, dass  während des gesamten Zeitraums beide Behörden in circa einem Drittel 
der Fälle (auch) auf antikompetitive Innovationswirkungen abgestellt hatten. Auf Basis der 
analysierten 323 relevanten Märkte mit Innovationsaspekten offenbart die durchgeführte 
Studie allerdings auch, dass die beiden Behörden über keinen einheitlichen Analyserahmen 
verfügen, und sie sich insbesondere hinsichtlich der Frage, ob eher ein traditioneller 
Produktmarkt-Ansatz oder doch eher ein innovationsspezifischer Ansatz angewendet werden 
sollte, signifikant unterscheiden. Ein kritisches Ergebnis ist zudem, dass in den meisten 
Fällen, in denen die Behörden negative Innovationswirkungen befürchteten, keine genaue 
Begründung, weshalb die Fusion möglicherweise wettbewerbswidrige Innovationswirkungen 
haben könnte, abgegeben wurde. Lediglich eine Minderheit der Fälle liefert Argumente im 
Zusammenhang mit negativen Innovationsanreizen oder beinhaltet solche Argumente die den 
Schutz der „Diversität“ für Innovation hervorheben. Ein weiteres äußerst überraschendes und 
durchaus auch rätselhaftes Ergebnis ist, dass die Behörden in den Fällen in denen 
innovationsschädliche Effekte erwartet wurden, zunehmend auch statische Preiseffekte ins 
Feld führten. Vor dem Hintergrund der Differenzierung in Innovationswettbewerb und 
Produktmarktwettbewerb gibt diese beobachtete Zunahme der simultan vorgebrachten 
Innovations- und Preiseffekte jedoch Rätsel auf. Dieses Phänomen kann dahingehend 
gedeutet werden, dass die U.S.-Wettbewerbsbehörden in Folge der kritischen Diskussion um 
die „Innovation Market Analysis“ versucht haben, die von ihnen befürchteten 
Innovationseffekte zusätzlich mit traditionellen und besser etablierten Argumenten im 
Zusammenhang mit wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Preiseffekten abzusichern. 
Der Beitrag zeigt damit, dass die Berücksichtigung von Innovationswirkungen zwar stets ein 
fester Bestandteil der U.S.-amerikanischen Fusionskontrollpraxis war. Dieser Praxis lag 
allerdings weder ein konsistenter Ansatz zugrunde, noch scheinen sich die damit verbundenen 
konzeptionellen Fragen zum geeigneten Analyserahmen, oder der Argumentationslinie 
hinsichtlich der erwarteten wettbewerbswidrigen Innovationswirkungen im Laufe der Zeit 
geklärt zu haben. 
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5.  Wolfgang Kerber / Benjamin R. Kern (2014): Assessing Innovation Effects in US Merger 
Policy: Theory, Practice, Recent Discussions, and Perspectives, MIMEO. 
(Geleistete Beiträge: Benjamin R. Kern: 50%, Wolfgang Kerber: 50%) 
 
Der fünfte und letzte Beitrag dieser Dissertation baut vorwiegend auf den empirischen 
Ergebnissen des vierten Artikels auf und zielt darauf ab, diese Ergebnisse unter Einbeziehung 
der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse aus den ersten drei theoretisch/konzeptionellen Papieren in 
einen größeren Rahmen zu setzen. Zu diesem Zweck wird zu Beginn dieses Artikels 
nochmals ein detaillierter Überblick über die umfangreiche modelltheoretische und 
empirische Literatur zum Thema Wettbewerb und Innovation gegeben. In diesem 
Zusammenhang werden die verschiedenen theoretischen Modelle und Argumente, vor dem 
Hintergrund der im Rahmen des zweiten Papiers vorgeschlagenen Differenzierung zwischen 
denjenigen Modellen, die ausschließlich den Wettbewerb im Hinblick auf Innovation 
betrachten und solchen die auch aktuelle Produktmärkte einbeziehen, vorgestellt. Dieser 
strukturierte Überblick ist gefolgt von einer Analyse der empirischen Studien zum 
Zusammenhang zwischen Branchenstrukturen und Innovation, Marktstruktur und Innovation 
und Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen und Innovation.  
Nachdem daraufhin die existierenden Analyserahmen für die Überprüfung von 
Innovationswirkungen im Rahmen der Fusionskontrolle vorgestellt wurden, werden die 
empirischen Ergebnisse des vierten Beitrags nochmals vorgestellt und aus 
wettbewerbspolitischer Perspektive analysiert. Daneben wird in diesem Artikel zudem eine 
(qualitative) Analyse der wichtigsten Innovationsfusionsfälle nach 2008 vorgenommen sowie 
ein Überblick über die Diskussion im Zuge der Überarbeitung der aktuellen US-
Fusionskontrollrichtlinien gegeben. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt der Beitrag, (1) dass die 
Unsicherheiten bei der Berücksichtigung von Innovationseffekten auch unter der Obama-
Administration nicht verschwunden sind und, (2) dass trotz des allgemeinen Konsens 
hinsichtlich der enormen Bedeutung von Innovationen für die Konsumentenwohlfahrt die 
Verwendung von innovationsspezifischen Prüfverfahren in der US-Diskussion immer noch 
sehr kritisch gesehen wird.  
Dies zeigt sich auch bei Betrachtung der neuen US-Fusionskontrollrichtlinien, die sich 
weiterhin ganz auf den traditionellen Produktmarktansatz stützen. Insofern tragen die 
Leitlinien auch nicht der bereits etablierten Fusionskontrollpraxis der US-Kartellbehörden 
Rechnung, welche in den vergangenen Jahren bereits innovationsspezifische Ansätze in nicht 
unerheblichen Umfang anwendeten. Anstatt dessen scheint auch diese Zurückhaltung bei der 
Aufnahme eines innovationsspezifischen Analyserahmens in die Fusionskontrollrichtlinien 
das Ergebnis einer nicht zu unterschätzenden Unsicherheit im Umgang mit 
Innovationswirkungen zu sein. Wie schon die Ergebnisse der empirischen Analyse im vierten 
Beitrags dieser Dissertation zeigte, scheint diese Unsicherheit in der Uneinigkeit darüber 
begründet zu sein, wie die Wettbewerbsbehörden die Innovationswirkungen einer Fusion 
richtig erfassen und beurteilen sollten.  
Dieser Artikel schließt daraufhin indem zukünftige Forschungsfragen aufgezeigt werden. In 
diesem Zusammenhang wird (1) vorgeschlagen, dass sich die Argumente hinsichtlich der 
wettbewerbswidrigen Innovationswirkungen von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen nicht 
ausschließlich auf die neoklassische Industrieökonomik stützen sollte, sondern auch die 
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Erkenntnisse der Evolutionsökonomik mit einbeziehen sollten, welche sich ohnehin besser zur 
Analyse von dynamischen Innovationseffekten eignet. (2) Des Weiteren sollte sich die 
zukünftige Forschung mit der Frage beschäftige, wie die relevanten Innovationwettbewerber 
am zuverlässigsten identifiziert werden können. Der erste Beitrag dieser Dissertation hat 
gezeigt, dass die "Innovation Market Analysis" bereits die richtigen Fragen im Hinblick auf 
sich überlappende Forschungsprojekte und die Existenz von "specialized assets", welche als 
Eintrittsbarrieren in den Innovationswettbewerb verstanden werden können, gestellt hat. (3) 
Last but not least, kommt dieses fünfte Papier auf die zentrale Frage des zweiten Artikels 
dieser Dissertation zurück in welchem bereits die Notwendigkeit der Entwicklung eines 
strukturierten Analyserahmens zur Beurteilung von Innovationseffekten von Fusionen 
diskutiert wurde. Solch ein Analyserahmen sollte mit dem Problem umgehen können, dass 
Innovationseffekte unter verschiedenen Umständen sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen können. 
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Summary of Doctoral Dissertation 
Assessment of Innovation Effects of Mergers 
Benjamin René Kern 
 
-Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache- 
 
 
The adequate consideration of innovation effects of mergers in merger review was, and still 
is, one of the most controversially discussed issues between antitrust scholars. In this 
connection the question has been raised whether the traditional categories in competition law 
are sufficiently suitable for dealing with innovation aspects or whether new concepts for the 
assessment of innovation effects of mergers are needed. This argument relates to the question 
whether the firms who compete in regard to existing products necessarily play a role in regard 
to innovation competition. Or, by asking the opposite question, whether there are perhaps 
additional firms (by also accounting for firms outside the current product market) that actually 
compete with one another in the sphere of innovation. Thus, although the assessment of 
product markets as a device to identify the relevant competitors is a well-founded step to 
protect static price and non-price competition, the sole assessment of the respective product 
market will probably not reflect the true situation regarding innovation competition.  
Accordingly, each of the five articles of this thesis builds on the idea that the relevant 
competitors in terms of innovation do not necessarily correspond to the relevant competitors 
on existing product markets. From an economic perspective the definition of “markets” was 
always only a vehicle for identifying the set of relevant competing firms. In a concept of static 
competition, it was logical to use the set of current products, and analyze their substitutability 
conditions from the demand and the supply side in order to determine the set of relevant 
competitors. However, the attempt to stick to the product market concept for defining the 
relevant competitors for innovation is theoretically deeply flawed. Since the production and 
sale of products does not require the same resources and capabilities as the generation of 
innovations, a general assumption of such an identity cannot be defended. This discussion led 
to the development of the so-called "Innovation Market Analysis" (IMA), an innovation-
specific assessment approach, in the 1990s. Even though the IMA was also applied to a 
significant number of U.S. merger cases in the years thereafter, it was heavily criticized by 
many lawyers and economists. Hence, it is still not clear how antitrust agencies should deal 
with innovation aspects in the review process of mergers.  
This research project assesses how and to what extent the U.S. antitrust authorities in their 
case practice investigated mergers on possible negative effects on innovation and whether the 
investigation concepts are appropriate or need to be developed. Particular relevant questions 
which arise in this connection are: (1) how the firms, which compete with one another in the 
sphere of innovation, should be identified. This raises the question whether the identification 
of the relevant competitors should be carried out by relying on the traditional product market 
concept, or whether there is a need to use/develop alternative approaches, such as the 
"Innovation Market Analysis". (2) In this connection it is also necessary to consider the theory 
of harm behind the claimed negative effects of mergers on innovation. Should competition 
authorities rely predominantly on well-established arguments about innovation incentives, 
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provided by the neoclassical industrial organization literature, or is it instead advisable to also 
include the insights provided by other strains of literature, e.g. the evolutionary economics 
literature? (3) How should an adequate assessment framework, which would help competition 
authorities to deal with innovation effects of mergers look like? How can it account for the 
complex and often divergent effects between competition and innovation while providing 
legal guidance at the same time?  
These research questions are addressed by this dissertation, both from a 
theoretical/conceptual (articles 1-3), as well as from an empirical perspective (articles 4-5). It 
is remarkable, that the data set which was generated in connection with the empirical part of 
the present work is unique and provides the basis for the only econometric analysis of the 
U.S. merger control practice with respect to the consideration of innovation aspects which 
exists so far. 
 
1. Benjamin R. Kern (2014): Innovation Markets, Future Markets, or Potential Competition: 
How should Competition Authorities account for Innovation Competition in Merger 
Reviews?, WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW, 37, pp. 137-206. 
 (Contributions: Benjamin R. Kern: 100%) 
 
The first article deals with the question of how the firms which compete with one another in 
the sphere of innovation should be identified and whether these mergers should be assessed 
under the theory of Innovation Markets, Future Markets or Potential Competition. 
Traditionally, competition authorities tend to focus on the assessment of competition on 
relevant product markets. Hereby, the relevant firms that compete with one another are 
identified, and possible anticompetitive effects are revealed. But, in contrast to competition 
concerning prices, quantities, or product quality, competition in the sphere of innovation is 
not necessarily tied to existing product markets. The same holds true for the counterexample. 
Competition authorities might find that a certain product market is highly concentrated. 
However, by also accounting for innovation competitors outside the current product market 
(e.g., firms that are well situated to undertake R&D in a particular field or firms that are 
already undertaking R&D), the merger could appear less anticompetitive, at least in respect to 
innovation. 
Hence, this first article reviews the (existing) approaches that can generally be used for the 
assessment of anticompetitive innovation effects in merger control and explores these 
approaches through exemplary merger cases. In this connection the paper develops six case 
groups of merger cases in which innovation aspects play a role. Based on these case groups, 
the paper demonstrates that the traditional approaches of ‘potential competition’ and ‘future 
markets’ cannot account for all aspects of innovation competition. In addition, the article also 
shows that it is furthermore questionable whether the ‘future market’ concept can capture 
innovation competition to its full extent, even in those merger cases in which it can generally 
be applied. However, the ‘Innovation Market Analysis’, the only tool especially designed to 
account for innovation competition so far, also has several shortcomings. Hence, at present 
there is no clear-cut approach which the antitrust agencies in the U.S. as well as in the E.U. 
could utilize as reference for an intervention aimed at the protection of innovation 
competition. The development of a revised approach for the assessment of potential 
anticompetitive innovation effects in merger reviews is therefore required. Nevertheless, the 
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‘IMA’ might still serve as a good starting point for the development of such a revised 
framework. Specifically, the framework should incorporate the concept of assessing relevant 
innovation competitors independently of their role on current product markets – a 
breakthrough idea that was introduced in the ‘IMA’.  
 
2. Benjamin R. Kern & Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras (2014): Mergers and the Incentives 
to Undertake Product Innovation Oriented R&D: First Steps Towards an Assessment 
Approach, MAGKS - JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.17-2014, 
available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/17-
2014_kern.pdf. 
 (Contributions: Benjamin R. Kern: 60%, Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras: 40%) 
 
The second article builds on the results of the first article. Hereby the paper aims to develop 
the basic outlines for an assessment framework which could help competition authorities to 
deal with innovation effects of mergers and which could furthermore provide legal guidance. 
In addition, this contribution will specially cater for the implications which result from the 
separate consideration of innovation competition from actual product markets for the 
relationship between competition, concentration and innovation. These implications arise 
from the fact that the differentiation into product market competition on the one hand and 
innovation competition on the other, does not only have consequences for the identification of 
the relevant competitors, but is also crucial for assessing the anticompetitive effects of 
mergers on innovation.  
Consider for instance a merger which takes place between firms that compete with one 
another only in terms of innovation (leaving product market competition unaffected). This 
would imply that only a fraction of the insights, provided by the vast array of theoretical 
models, matters in this concrete merger review. Hence, these types of mergers require 
focusing on different models in order to gain insights for the assessment of possible 
anticompetitive innovation effects, than a merger taking place between two firms that do also 
compete with one another on pre-innovation product markets. As a consequence, since 
mergers of firms that compete with one another in the sphere of innovation could leave 
product market concentration unaffected, it is very questionable whether the findings about 
the ambiguous interrelationship between product market competition and innovation can be 
transferred one-to-one to the assessment of those mergers.  
Therefore, this paper analyzes the model-theoretic industrial organization literature and its 
findings about competition and the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D 
against the background of this distinction into innovation competition on the one hand and 
product market competition on the other. For this purpose, we firstly reviewed the broad 
range of theoretical models, provided by the industrial organization literature. Hereby we 
particularly examined the underlying mechanisms of the models with respect to the question 
whether they rely on pre-innovation product market competition, or not. As a consequence, 
we received two distinct groups of potential innovation effects of mergers. The first group 
consists of effects which hinge on a change of current product market concentration, while the 
second group encompasses those kinds of effect which come into play even though pre-
innovation product market competition is unaffected. Consequently, the effects of the first 
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group are only relevant, if pre-innovation product market structure is affected by a certain 
merger, while the effects of the second group have to be considered even in those situations in 
which mergers do only affect innovation competition.  
Due to the fact that not every innovation effect is always relevant and since these 
innovation effects can furthermore have different impacts due to prevailing industry- and 
competition characteristics, it is helpful to assess the effects of mergers on innovation within 
certain case groups. However, in order to build these case groups, it is necessary to find the 
appropriate differentiation criteria. For this purpose, this article aims at identifying the 
relevant determinants, which are decisive for how a certain effect (e.g. the escape competition 
effect or the replacement effect) acts on the incentives to innovate. The identification and 
categorization of the innovation effects and relevant determinants thereby provides (1) a 
checklist of assessment criteria which antitrust authorities should take into account when 
analyzing innovation effects of mergers. (2) Besides this, this paper furthermore demonstrates 
how the development of such a decision theoretic assessment framework could be achieved. 
Such an assessment approach would allow combining the objective of a case-specific analysis 
with the requirement that this analysis is carried out in a consistent and transparent manner. It 
would therefore be in the spirit of a rule-based competition policy which is, from a law and 
economics perspective, ought to reduce error costs, give legal guidance and reduce legal 
uncertainty.  
Apart from that, the paper aims to demonstrate that the link between competition and the 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D, which can be derived from the 
industrial organization literature, is not always that unclear as it seems on the first sight. 
Especially with respect to mergers between firms that compete with one another in terms of 
innovation, absent/detached from actual product markets, the relationship appears to be far 
less cloudy.  
 
3.  Benjamin R. Kern & Malte Ackermann (2014): Shedding Some Light on the Dark Matter 
of Competition: Insights from the Strategic Management & Organizational Science 
Literature for the Consideration of Diversity Aspects in Merger Review, MAGKS - JOINT 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.05-2014, available at http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/05-2014_ackermann.pdf. 
 (Contributions: Benjamin R. Kern: 80%, Malte Ackermann: 20%) 
 
The third article then focuses on the question about the appropriate theory of harm behind the 
claimed negative effects of mergers on innovation. Traditionally, the discussion about 
anticompetitive innovation effects of mergers focused on the question whether a more or 
rather a less concentrated market structure (mostly narrowed to product market structure) is 
beneficial to innovation. However, until to date, theoretical as well as empirical contributions 
delivered rather contradictory results in the sense that they support the proposition that highly 
competitive just as much as more concentrated markets can basically spur innovation. Hence, 
from this perspective, it is not clear whether a merger, which leads to a higher market 
concentration, is detrimental or maybe even beneficial to innovation.  
However, while mainstream economics focuses almost exclusively on the likely effects of a 
change of market structure on the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D and their ability to 
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innovate, a change of the market structure can also have an additional effect on innovation. 
This effect originates from the fact that a merger, which causes a reduction of the number of 
innovation competitors, can also harm innovation because it reduces the variety of 
heterogeneous entities which are currently undertaking R&D or which are well situated to 
undertake R&D in a certain field. Assuming that companies differ not only with respect to 
their cost functions, but also in terms of their resources, organizational structure, corporate 
culture, as well as with respect to their expectations about promising areas of business and 
research projects, then the reduction of the number of competitors may already be detrimental 
to the overall innovativeness of an industry. Against this background, "diversity" can be 
considered as another dimension of the process of innovation competition - a dimension 
which, in addition to the firms’ incentives and capabilities to innovate, might be worth 
protecting.  
However, this property of competition is much less recognized in the respective antitrust 
literature. One explanation for this phenomenon might be the fact that mainstream economics 
and especially the modern industrial organization literature have fundamental difficulties to 
capture this dimension of competition, which Joseph Farrell therefore called vividly “the dark 
matter of competition”. Apart from that it is also argued that, if “diversity” indeed has a 
noticeable effect on innovation, a merged entity should have an incentive to preserve such a 
fruitful environment in-house. Hence, a reduction of “diversity” among different firms (“inter-
firm diversity”) might get balanced by an increase of the diversity within the remaining firms 
(“intra-firm diversity”) by itself. As a consequence, if one had to expect such an effect, 
antitrust authorities would have no reason to further consider this issue.   
By assessing the management and organizational science literature, this first article aims to 
bring to light whether and how firms consider the preservation of “diversity”, (1) either as a 
consequence of a newly created “intra-firm diversity”, or (2) because of a direct maintenance 
of an acquired firm’s autonomy, after a merger. For this purpose this contribution firstly 
investigates the “Corporate Entrepreneurship” (CE) literature which highlights the creation of 
independent subunits and spinoffs within a corporation. It is thereby demonstrated that the 
idea of a creation of independent entities in-house is indeed considered as an important 
determinant for the innovativeness and general performance of firms. However, it is also 
shown that firms, pursuing a CE strategy, will most likely face several grave implementation 
problems and trade-offs. The same holds true for a direct maintenance of “diversity” after a 
merger. Although the examined literature on post-merger integration presents strong 
arguments in favor of securing an acquired firm’s independence and autonomy in order to 
keep its innovation capacity, it also indicates that there will emerge a trade-off between this 
objective and the realization of efficiency gains through integration.    
Hence, on the one hand, the extensive management and organizational science literature 
suggests that considerations about the preservation of “diversity” in merger review might be 
exaggerated because firms should indeed have a strong incentive to preserve “diversity” in-
house. On the other hand the analysis also shows that antitrust authorities cannot trust in the 
creation/maintenance of such an “intra-firm diversity” after a merger, since the merged entity 
will most likely face grave implementation problems and trade-offs.  
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4.  Benjamin R. Kern, Ralf Dewenter, Wolfgang Kerber (2014): Empirical Analysis of the 
Assessment of Innovation Effects in U.S. Merger Cases, MAGKS - JOINT DISCUSSION 
PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS, NO.50-2014 (2014), available at http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/50-2014_kerber.pdf. 
(Contributions: Benjamin R. Kern: 70%, Ralf Dewenter: 15%, Wolfgang Kerber: 15%) 
 
Whilst the first three articles focus on theoretical/conceptual questions, the forth article 
analyses empirically how the applied U.S. antitrust dealt with these issues in connection with 
the assessment of innovation effects in merger reviews. The decision to analyse the U.S. 
merger control practice stems from the fact that the U.S. authorities have examined a far 
greater number of mergers also towards innovation effects, than the European Commission. 
 In this respect the paper analyzes the "complaints" and "decision and orders" in the course 
of an exhaustive survey from all 399 mergers, challenged by the DOJ or FTC in the period 
between 1995 and 2008. By using probit techniques, the econometric study tackles the 
question of how and to what extent the U.S. agencies have assessed innovation effects of 
mergers. Additionally, it is also asked whether the two agencies have used the same or 
different approaches in regard to innovation effects of mergers, and whether we can observe 
developments during this period 1995 until 2008 in regard to these assessments. Important 
questions in that regard were (1) whether the U.S. authorities used predominantly a traditional 
assessment approach based upon the product market concept or whether they also used more 
innovation-specific assessment approaches, e.g. the "Innovation Market Analysis". (2) In 
addition, it is important what theory of harm was brought forward in connection with the 
claimed anticompetitive innovation effects. 
Overall, the results about the practice of the assessment of innovation effects of mergers by 
the two U.S. antitrust authorities are very mixed and ambivalent. It is shown, that the agencies 
had innovation concerns in 135 mergers and that both agencies did consider for innovation 
effects in a third of all cases. However, on the basis of the 323 relevant markets with 
innovation aspects, the study also reveals that the two agencies did not have a clear and 
consistent assessment approach, and that both of them differed significantly also in regard to 
the question whether a more traditional product market approach should be used (mainly the 
DOJ) or whether a more innovation-specific approach should be applied, in which innovation 
is already considered in the market definition. A problematic outcome of our investigation is 
that in most cases the agencies gave no specific reasoning why the merger should lead to 
negative effects on innovation. Only in a minority of cases innovation incentive arguments 
and in some cases diversity arguments were mentioned. Another surprising and puzzling 
result is that the agencies increasingly have claimed simultaneously negative innovation and 
static price effects which can be interpreted as a sign of insecurity of the agencies, leading 
them to backing up their innovation concerns with more traditional and well-established 
claims about price effects. As a result, the article demonstrates that, on the one hand, 
assessing innovation effects is a well-established practice in U.S. merger policy, but, on the 
other hand, there are also a lot of inconsistencies and open conceptual questions in regard to 
the assessment approach, which also have not diminished over time. 
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5.  Wolfgang Kerber / Benjamin R. Kern (2014): Assessing Innovation Effects in US Merger 
Policy: Theory, Practice, Recent Discussions, and Perspectives, MIMEO. 
(Contributions: Benjamin R. Kern: 50%, Wolfgang Kerber: 50%) 
 
The fifth and last paper of the dissertation builds mainly on the empirical results of the forth 
paper and aims to put the observations into a wider picture by also incorporating the findings 
of the three theoretical/conceptual articles. For this purpose, the paper starts with reviewing 
the rich theoretical and empirical literature on competition and innovation. Hereby the 
theoretical models and reasonings get examined against the background of the differentiation 
into models which rely solely on innovation competition and those which do also incorporate 
current product market competition, proposed in the second paper of this dissertation. This 
structured overview is followed by an investigation of the vast array of the empirical studies 
on industry structure and innovation, market structure and innovation, and mergers and 
innovation.  
After introducing the existing assessment concepts for innovation effects of mergers, the 
empirical results of the forth article are introduced and subsequently assessed from a high-
level competition policy perspective. Besides this, the article also provides a qualitative 
analysis of important merger cases after 2008 as well as an analysis of the U.S. Merger Policy 
under the Obama Administration and the reform discussion leading to the revision of the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010. Hereby it is shown (1) that the cautious approach of 
assessing innovation effects has not changed under the Obama Administration, and (2) that 
despite the general consensus about the importance of innovation effects, the U.S. discussion 
is still very critical to more innovation-specific approaches in merger reviews.  
This can also be seen in the revised U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which stick entirely 
to the traditional product market approach. In that respect, the guidelines also do not seem to 
reflect the already well-established practice of the U.S. antitrust agencies of using innovation-
specific assessment approaches to a considerable extent. Instead, the results provided by the 
empirical analysis of the fourth paper of this dissertation offer good reasons to assume that 
this reluctance to consider innovation effects in the Guidelines lies to a large extent in the 
uncertainty about how competition authorities should assess the impact of a merger on 
innovation. This uncertainty appears to be the consequence of the disagreement about how 
competition authorities should grasp and assess the innovation effects of mergers properly. 
Finally the article concludes by proposing different perspectives for future research. In this 
connection it is proposed to (1) base the theory of harm regarding mergers and innovation not 
exclusively on neoclassical economics, but to also include the evolutionary economics 
literature which is generally more suited to deal with dynamic innovation effects. (2) Besides 
this, future research should focus on the question of how the relevant innovation competitors 
should be identified most reliable. The first article of this dissertation showed that the 
"Innovation Market Analysis" started to ask the right questions about "overlapping R&D" and 
about the existence of "specialized assets", which can be interpreted as barriers to entry into 
innovation competition. (3) Last but not least, this paper establishes reference to the second 
article of this dissertation which already discussed the necessity of developing a structured 
investigation and assessment approach, capable of dealing with the problem that the 
innovation effects of mergers might be very different under different circumstances.  
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MERGERS AND THE INCENTIVES TO UNDERTAKE PRODUCT INNOVATION ORIENTED 
R&D: FIRST STEPS TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT APPROACH   
 
 
Benjamin René Kern*, Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras+ 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The firms that compete with one another in terms of innovation do not necessarily coincide with 
the relevant competitors on pre-innovation product markets. As a consequence, the findings 
about the ambiguous interrelation between (product) market concentration and innovation cannot 
be transferred one-to-one to the interrelationship between innovation competition and 
innovation. By identifying and classifying the most relevant effects, which are decisive for the 
impact of mergers on the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D, we will 
demonstrate that the interrelation between innovation competition and innovation is not always 
as unclear as it seems. Hence, by analyzing the model-theoretic industrial organization literature, 
this article aims to contribute to the discussion about the development of a decision theoretic 
assessment framework for analyzing the impact of mergers on innovation. It is therefore in the 
spirit of a rule-based competition policy which is, from a law and economics perspective, ought 
to reduce error costs, give legal guidance and reduce legal uncertainty. 
JEL: K21; L12; L41; O31 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The outstanding relevance of innovation for economic growth and consumer welfare is 
relatively undisputed among lawyers and economists.1 Therefore, it is only coherent that the 
2010 U.S. ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’, in comparison to its predecessor, explicitly 
contain the objective of the protection of ‘innovation competition’ as well as the consideration 
for innovation related efficiency gains.2 However, until today there is no adequate and widely 
accepted theoretical framework for the assessment of these aspects in merger review.3 Hence, 
 
*   Benjamin René Kern; Philipps-University Marburg, Department of Business Administration and Economics. 
Chair of Economic Policy, Email: kernb@wiwi.uni-marburg.de. 
+   Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras; Email: mantillajuan@gmail.com. 
1   See Solow (1957); Denison (1985); Graham (1979). 
2  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, rev. 1997); U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), § 6.4. 
3  See Kern (2014). 
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it is still not clear how antitrust agencies should actually comply with these objectives in a 
transparent and comprehensible manner.  
The only framework that was designed particularly for the consideration of innovation 
effects so far was the ‘Innovation Market Analysis’ (IMA) of Richard Gilbert and Steven 
Sunshine.4 However, after the ‘IMA’ was introduced in 1995, it was heavily criticized by 
many scholars.5 In this connection it was argued that the ‘Innovation Market Analysis’ would 
rely on a general presumption of harm, in the sense that a higher concentrated ‘Innovation 
Market’ is generally unfavourable for innovation, although a stable interrelationship between 
‘market structure’ and innovation was not identified.6 The latter argument was also central in 
the FTC’s recent decision to close the investigation of the Genzyme/Novazyme merger.7 In the 
course of this, Chaiman Muris defended the decision against the dissenting statements of 
Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson and Commissioner Pamela J. Harbour. Thereby, he 
relied on the findings of the ‘Global Marketplace Report’8, which revealed that there is no 
stable interrelation between ‘market concentration’ and innovation. Apart from ambiguous 
empirical observations9, the report relied particularly on the model-theoretic industrial 
organization literature which delivered very contradictory results, showing that very 
competitive as well as highly concentrated (product) markets can basically spur innovation 
(depending on the specific assumptions made in the corresponding models). However, it is 
remarkable that the discussion about competition, concentration and innovation did not fully 
account for the crucial implications, following from the separate consideration of innovation 
competition on the one hand and product market competition on the other. Since the 
competitors on product markets and the ones which compete with one another in the sphere of 
innovation do not necessarily coincide, the crucial novelty of the ‘IMA’ was that it aimed at 
identifying the relevant innovation competitors independently from their role on actual 
product markets.10 But, this distinction in innovation and product market competitors has, 
apart from its relevance for the identification of these competitors, also strong implications for 
the assessment of potential anticompetitive innovation effects of mergers. Consider for 
instance a merger which takes place between two firms that compete with one another only in 
 
4 See Gilbert & Sunshine (1995a). 
5  See Morse (2001), pp. 27; Hoerner (1995), pp. 49; Hay (1995), pp. 14; Rapp (1995), pp. 19; Gilbert & 
Sunshine (1995b), pp. 75; Landman (1999), pp. 728; Carlton & Gertner (2003), pp. 38; Davis (2003), pp. 
680. 
6  See Rapp (1995); Carlton & Gertner (2003); Davis (2003). 
7 See Muris (2004), pp. 18; Thompson (2004); Harbour (2004). 
8  See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy Planning (1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
REPORT], chapter 7, pp. 11. 
9  For an excellent overview see Gilbert (2006), pp. 187. 
10  See, Gilbert & Sunshine (1995a). 
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terms of innovation (leaving product market competition unaffected). This would imply that 
only a fraction of the insights, provided by the vast array of theoretical models, matters in this 
concrete merger review. Such a situation can, for example, occur when two research 
companies, which do only compete with one another in terms of innovation, merge. Another 
possible scenario, leading to such a situation, is that the firms are indeed producers of actual 
products, but they do not compete with one another on the same relevant product markets 
(pre-innovation product market competition is therefore not affected by the merger). Hence, 
these types of mergers require focusing on different models in order to gain insights for the 
assessment of possible anticompetitive innovation effects, than a merger taking place between 
two firms that do also compete with one another on pre-innovation product markets. As a 
consequence, since some mergers leave product market concentration unaffected, it is very 
questionable whether the findings about the ambiguous interrelationship between product 
market competition and innovation can be transferred one-to-one to the interrelation between 
innovation competition and innovation. 
Therefore, this paper analyzes the model-theoretic industrial organization literature and its 
findings about competition and the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D 
against the background of this distinction into innovation competition on the one hand and 
product market competition on the other. The decision to focus on product innovations was 
taken on the basis of the concerns about innovation effects, put forward in the applied merger 
reviews (in the U.S. as well as in the E.U.). Since, in both jurisdictions, explicit 
anticompetitive innovation effects were raised predominantly in connection with product 
innovations, we likewise focus on the effects of mergers on the incentives and abilities to 
undertake product innovation oriented R&D. For this purpose, we firstly reviewed the broad 
range of theoretical models, provided by the industrial organization literature. This step is 
carried out in analogy to the eminent works of Gilbert (2006)11, and Schulz (2007)12. 
However, in comparison to these previous works we did not systematize the literature 
primarily according to the underlying assumptions of the models (e.g., whether the models 
rely on perfect IPRs or not). Instead, we tried to reveal the concrete underlying mechanisms, 
which determine the innovation incentives in each of the examined models. By clustering 
these mechanisms, we received several effects, which we consider as the major impact factors 
for the firms’ innovation incentives. By doing this, our approach is close to the seminal work 
 
11   See Gilbert (2006).   
12   See Schulz (2007). 
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of Baker13, who also identified four important “principles” relating competition and 
innovation, which are particularly relevant for the assessment of innovation effects in 
antitrust. However, in comparison to Baker, we particularly examined the underlying 
mechanisms of the models with respect to the question whether they rely on pre-innovation 
product market competition, or not. As a consequence, we received two distinct groups of 
effects. The first group consists of effects which hinge on a change of current product market 
concentration. The second group encompasses those kinds of effect which come into play 
even though pre-innovation product market competition is unaffected. Consequently, the 
effects of the first group are only relevant, if pre-innovation product market structure is 
affected by a certain merger, while the effects of the second group have to be considered even 
in those situations in which mergers do only affect innovation competition.  
However, since the changes in the firm’s innovation incentives, stemming from the effects 
of both groups, hinge again on several determinants (e.g. the type of pre- and post-innovation 
competition, or the regime of IPRs), we again analyzed the underlying mechanisms of the 
models behind each effect in detail. As a consequence, we received a set of determinants 
which are critical for how the identified effects act on the incentives to innovate within each 
of the two groups. Finally, we matched the identified effects with six case groups in which 
mergers, affecting innovation competition, can basically take place.14 Since not every effect is 
always relevant, and because of the fact that the determinants, which are decisive for the 
impact of a certain effect, can moreover differ from case to case, we analyzed the potential 
effects of a certain merger separately for each of these case groups.  
Hence, we will demonstrate that the link between competition and the incentives to 
undertake product innovation oriented R&D, which can be derived from the industrial 
organization literature, is not always that unclear as it seems on the first sight. Especially with 
respect to mergers between firms that compete with one another in terms of innovation, 
absent/detached from actual product markets, the relationship appears to be far less cloudy. 
Besides this, we will also try to identify the most relevant effects, as well as the corresponding 
determinants, which have an impact on the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented 
R&D in a particular situation.  
As a consequence, this article aims to contribute to the discussion about the development 
of an assessment framework for analyzing the innovation effects of mergers. It is therefore in 
the spirit of a rule-based competition policy which is, from a law and economics perspective, 
 
13  See Baker (2007). 
14  See Kern (2014), pp. 9. 
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ought to reduce error costs, give legal guidance and reduce legal uncertainty.15 The 
identification and categorization of effects thereby provides (1) a checklist of assessment 
criteria which antitrust authorities should account for when analyzing the impact of mergers 
on the firms’ incentive to undertake product innovation oriented R&D and (2) these identified 
effects can furthermore serve as a starting point for the development of such a decision 
theoretic assessment framework.  
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we will give an overview on the most 
relevant innovation effects of mergers and assign them to the two different groups (effects 
which hinge on pre-innovation competition and those which do not). Thereby, we will also 
explain the economic theory behind the respective effects and introduce the relevant 
determinants which are decisive for how these effects influence the innovation incentives of 
the merging firms. Subsequently, in Chapter 3, we will evaluate the impact of a certain 
merger on the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D. This assessment is 
carried out by explicitly considering for the influence of the relevant determinants on the 
introduced effects under different situations. In Section 4 we will then link the insights, 
gained in Chapter 2 and 3, to the six case groups developed by Kern (2014)16. Thereby we 
will analyze how the characteristics of a particular case group, in the sense of relevant effects 
and corresponding determinants, influence the assessment of the incentives to invest in 
product innovation oriented R&D. Conclusions follow in Section 5.    
 
II.  EFFECTS OF MERGERS WHICH INFLUENCE THE INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN PRODUCT 
INNOVATION ORIENTED R&D  
Since the relevant competitors in terms of innovation do not necessarily coincide with the 
relevant competitors on product markets, it is possible that a particular merger has an impact 
on innovation competition, although product market competition is unaffected. Therefore, it is 
crucial to review the theoretical findings about competition and the incentives to innovate, 
provided by the industrial organization literature, and to analyze the corresponding theoretical 
models with respect to the question whether they rely on pre-innovation product market 
competition (group 1) or not (group 2).17 What is important for this approach is therefore the 
underlying mechanisms of the models which constitute the identified effects. Some of these 
effects are already well known because they are an integral part of the industrial organization 
 
15  See Easterbrook (2006); Christiansen & Kerber (2006). 
16  See Kern (2014), pp. 9. 
17  This analysis is based to a large extent on the overview about the industrial organization literature, provided 
by the Master Thesis of Juan Manuel Mantilla Contreras; See Mantilla Contreras (2013).  
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literature. Famous examples are, for instance, the “replacement effect”18 or the “escape 
competition effect”19. Others, however, are less prominent. Hence, in the following we will 
give an overview on the most relevant effects, which belong either to group 1, or group 2, and 
discuss how they basically influence the firms’ incentives and abilities to innovate. By doing 
this, we will not only give reason for the allocation of the effects towards the two groups. 
Furthermore we will also identify the relevant determinants which are decisive for the impact 
of each effect on the firms’ innovation incentives. These determinants are derived from the 
assumptions made in the different models (e.g. assumption about the type and characteristics 
of pre- and post-innovation competition, or about the regime of IPRs). As a consequence, we 
will subsequently analyze how these determinants influence the functioning, and thus also the 
impact of each effect on the incentives to innovate, under different situations.   
 
A.  Effects which come into play when Pre-Innovation Product Market Competition is 
affected 
Even though the identification of innovation competitors independently of the firms’ role on 
current product markets allows considering for innovation competition independently of pre-
innovation product market competition (since the pre-innovation product market competitors 
cannot be equated to innovation competitors), pre-innovation product markets can still have 
an effect on the firms’ incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D. Thus, we 
want to find out: (1) what are the relevant effects which have to be assessed in the review of a 
merger of two innovation competitors that do also compete with one another on the respective 
pre-innovation product market? (2) When and how are they triggered by mergers and 
acquisitions? 
 
1. Financial Base Effect 
A very popular argument why product market concentration affects the incentives and 
abilities to innovate is that firms, which possess market power, can finance their R&D 
projects more easily due to higher profit margins. This argument, which goes back to 
Schumpeter20, implies that firms, which operate under intense competition, generate merely 
little or even zero profits (in the extreme case of perfect competition), leaving no room for 
R&D investments. Hence, an increase in product market concentration might be beneficial to 
innovation in the sense that firms are enabled to undertake R&D in the first place. However, 
 
18  See Arrow (1962). 
19  See Aghion, et al. (2001); Aghion, et al. (2005); Bonanno & Haworth (1998); Boone (2001). 
20  See Schumpeter (1942); Evans & Hylton (2008). 
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critics also claimed that this argument has only limited relevance, because the firms, 
independent of their own financial base, have the alternative to finance their R&D 
investments by the capital market.21  
Nevertheless, if we consider capital markets as being imperfect, a merger, which increases 
a firms’ market power, can still be beneficial to innovation, because it improves the firms’ 
financial base. However, this requires that the type of competition is not close to a Bertrand 
like price-competition. In this case, the merger would have only a very limited effect on the 
firms’ profit margins. Similar considerations come into play if we consider the merging firms 
as competitors which indeed compete with one another on an actual product market, but with 
differentiated products. Hence, in analogy to the conventional assessment of static price 
effects, the diversion ratio, and thereby the question whether the products are close ore rather 
far substitutes, appears to be decisive.22 
 
2. The Escape Competition Effect 
Closely linked to the last effect is the so called “escape competition effect”.23 Even though 
arguing from the opposite direction, the idea behind this effect is that very intense pre-
innovation product market competition can also generate high innovation incentives, because 
the firms might wish to escape this competitive environment by inventing new products which 
create a new (less competitive) relevant product market.24  
How a certain merger will reduce this “escape competition effect” depends mainly on how 
competition intensity has to be characterized in a particular situation.25 If the number of 
competitors is the decisive factor, a merger will, by eliminating a competitor, most likely 
reduce the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D. If, however, competition 
is intense because of a Bertrand like price-competition, then mergers will probably not affect 
the “escape competition effect” (unless the merger leads to a monopoly).26 The same holds 
true for situations in which the merging parties compete with one another with differentiated 
products, which can furthermore be characterized by a low diversion ratio.27 Thus, in the case 
of differentiated products, the negative effect on innovation incentives via the “escape 
 
21   See Modigliani & Miller (1958). 
22  See Belleflamme & Vergari (2011). 
23  See Aghion, et al. (2001); Aghion, et al. (2005); Bonanno & Haworth (1998); Boone (2001); Belleflamme & 
Vergari (2011). 
24   See Aghion (2005). 
25  See Bonanno & Haworth (1998). 
26  See Delbono & Denicolo (1990). 
27  See Belleflamme & Vergari (2011). 
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competition effect” appears to be particularly relevant, whenever the merging parties are 
producers of close substitutes.  
 
3. Pre-Innovation Market Size and Appropriability Effect 
Another important effect which is also an inherent part of a vast amount of theoretical models, 
results from the size of a firm’s share of a certain pre-innovation product market. However, 
the role of the pre-innovation product market size for the incentives to innovate is twofold:  
It has been shown that firms, which have a high market share, have stronger incentives to 
invest in process innovations.28 This is due to the fact that process innovations, offering cost-
cutting potentials, are particularly profitable whenever these cost-cuttings come into place in 
combination with a large output. Consequently, the incentives to undertake R&D towards 
process innovations are higher for firms which possess a relatively high market share, while 
the incentives to strive for product innovations are often assumed to be particularly prevalent 
for fringe firms, which have solely a small market share.29 As a consequence, it can be 
assumed that an increase of the pre-innovation market share has a negative impact on the 
proportion of the overall R&D budget which is spend for product innovation oriented R&D.  
Nevertheless, the firms’ share of a pre-innovation product market might still have a 
positive impact on the appropriability of profits, even if these profits stem from product 
innovations. As a consequence, in such situations, the incentives to invest in product 
innovation oriented R&D can improve, even though the distribution of the overall R&D 
budget actually changes at the expense of these kinds of R&D expenditures. However, those 
situations require that the pre-innovation product market share has a strong connection to the 
post-innovation product market share and this condition is, in contrast to process innovation 
oriented R&D, less stable. In regard to product innovations, a high market share on a pre-
innovation product market has solely then a positive effect on the appropriability of 
innovation profits, as long as the pre-innovation product market share can be sufficiently 
transmitted to the post-innovation product market. In other words, a high market share on a 
pre-innovation product market has a positive effect on a firm’s incentives to invest in product 
innovations, as long as these innovations do not constitute an entirely new relevant product 
market. Otherwise it is rather the characteristics and the competition intensity of the post-
innovation product market (which has only a limited or no connection to the current pre-
innovation product market), which determines the incentives to innovate (“Schumpeterian 
 
28  See Bonanno & Haworth (1998); Boone (2000); Dutta, et al. (2005); Schmutzler (2010); Baker (1994); Yin 
& Zuscovitch (1998); Vives (2008). 
29  See Yin & Zuscovitch (1998). 
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Rents”)30. This implies that the incentives to invest in product innovations (via the “pre-
innovation market size and appropriability effect”) are only then positively influenced by the 
pre-innovation market share, when it comes to incremental product innovations.31 For radical 
product innovations, the pre-innovation market share has no positive effect (leaving the 
“financial base effect” aside). Moreover, as soon as we expect that firms can protect their 
innovations sufficiently by IPRs, granting them a temporal monopoly position, the role of pre-
innovation market shares additionally loses relevance. Hence, the findings that a higher 
market share generates higher innovation incentives because of a better appropriability cannot 
be transferred one-to-one to product innovations.  
Thus, how does a merger, which changes the firms’ market share on a pre-innovation 
product market, influence the firm’s incentives to invest in product innovations via the “pre-
innovation market size and appropriability effect”? If competition authorities can expect that 
firms can protect their innovations sufficiently by IPRs (by gaining a monopoly position after 
introducing an innovation), there are no arguments why this effect should have a positive 
impact on the firms’ incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D. If IPRs are, 
however, considered as insufficient (e.g. because inventing around is expected to be quite 
likely), there might appear a positive impact regarding the incentives to invest in R&D 
towards the generation of incremental product innovations as a result of the augmented 
market share. Nevertheless, with respect to radical product innovations, the effect should 
again be negligible. There is, however, a general negative impact on the incentives to invest in 
product innovations, since the merged entity has an incentive to spend a higher fraction of the 
overall R&D budget on process innovations.  
However, in analogy to the effects discussed before, also this effect loses its relevance, 
whenever the merger takes place between firms which compete with one another on pre-
innovation markets by offering differentiated products which can be characterized by a low 
diversion ratio.        
 
4. Increase in the Extent of a Replacement Effect 
The idea of a “replacement effect” goes back to Kenneth Arrow.32 In this connection he 
assumed that firms, which possess market power on pre-innovation markets, have lower 
incentives to invest in R&D, because the benefits from an innovation will be devoured to a 
large extent by the loss of previous profits. In terms of product innovations this would apply 
 
30  See Rumelt (1987); Chen & Schwartz (2010); Aghion, et al. (2005). 
31  See Greenstein & Ramey (1998); Shaked & Sutton (1982); Shaked & Sutton (1983). 
32  See Arrow (1962); See also Reinganum (1989).  
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when a newly invented product replaces the old one by, in an extreme case, making it entirely 
obsolete. If, however, the degree of replacement is merely little (e.g. because the firm can still 
sell both the new and old product simultaneously to different types of consumers) then this 
effect becomes less important. 
As a consequence, if the introduction of a new product is expected to have a significant 
replacement effect on existing products, a merger, which increases pre-innovation market 
power, will also increase the extent of the replacement effect. This is the case as long as the 
firms do not compete with one another in terms of a Bertrand like price-competition (pre-
innovation profits and thus the extent of the replacement effect would be virtually unaffected) 
and, in the case of differentiated products, as long as the firms’ products are close substitutes 
(otherwise the replacement effect will be less relevant).   
However, it is not clear how the increase of the replacement effect will affect the firm’s 
innovation incentives at the end of the day. It is possible that the merger will diminish the 
incentives to innovate because, due the increase in pre-innovation product market power (and 
thus pre-innovation profits), the firm has “less to win” after introducing a new product (the 
difference between pre-innovation and post-innovation profits declines). But, an increase in 
pre-innovation market power can also increase the firms’ incentives to innovate because the 
firm has simultaneously “more to lose”. This is the case, if another firm introduces a product 
innovation which has a replacement effect on the firm’s current product. Hence, the increase 
in pre-innovation market power can also increase the firms’ incentive to undertake R&D in 
order to defend its current market position.  
Therefore, in order to determine whether the increase in pre-innovation market power in- 
or decreases the firm’s innovation incentives via the replacement effect, it is decisive to find 
out whether the merged entity must fear that another firm could introduce a product which has 
a replacement effect on its current products (and profits), or not. It can be suggested that in 
analogy to the differentiation in the literature on potential competition there are two different 
types of the replacement threat.33 Firstly, one can think of a replacement threat because the 
entity “observes” that another firm is already undertaking R&D towards the generation of a 
product which would replace its own products and profits. Apart from this “actual 
replacement threat” one can secondly think of a “perceived replacement threat”. The idea 
behind this notion of the replacement effect is that even though the entity does not “observe” 
that another firm is already working on such a product innovation, there is still a reasonable 
risk that a replacement takes place. This risk hinges on the existence and relevance of entry 
 
33  See, e.g., Areeda & Turner (1980). 
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barriers, necessary to undertake R&D towards product innovations which will have a 
replacement effect on the incumbent firm’s products. As soon as these entry barriers are 
considered to be low, the firm’s innovation incentives would increase as a consequence of the 
increase in pre-innovation market power.34 However, whenever these entry barriers are 
considered to be high, the overall change of the innovation incentives via the “perceived 
replacement effect” will most likely be negative. 
Therefore, what is crucial for assessing the overall direction of an increase in the extent of 
a replacement effect on the firms’ incentives to innovate is (1) the investigation of the R&D 
projects which are already underway (“actual replacement threat”) and (2) the existence and 
relevance of entry barriers for entering the process of innovation competition (“perceived 
replacement threat”).  
 
B. Effects which come into play even though Pre-Innovation Product Market 
Competition is unaffected 
Besides the effects discussed within the previous section, there are also several effects which 
come into play because they are triggered by a change in innovation competition, even though 
pre-innovation product market structure is unaffected.  
 
1. Entry Barriers & the Monopolization of Critical Assets Effect 
The role of entry barriers is generally a decisive criterion for the assessment of innovation 
effects of mergers. This stems from the fact that already the identification of the relevant 
innovation competitors requires that the participation in the process of innovation competition 
prerequisites that the firms possess specific specialized assets.35 Otherwise, if these entry 
barriers cannot be defined, innovation competition has to be understood as a process which is 
quite open. However, whenever R&D in a certain field indeed requires specialized resources, 
mergers can lead to a further agglomeration of these assets (e.g. patents or specially trained 
staff). This can additionally hamper, and/or create disincentives for, potential innovation 
competitors to enter the process of innovation competition.36 This is particular critical in 
connection with the “perceived replacement threat effect”, because it could allow the firm to 
shield itself from potential innovation competition. However, it has to be acknowledged that 
this is only problematic in the case of substitutive assets/resources. In the case of 
complementary assets, a merger can be beneficial for innovation because it might enable 
 
34  See Greenstein & Ramey (1998). 
35  See Gilbert Sunshine (1995a); Kern (2014). 
36  See De Bondt (1977); Vives (2008). 
12 
 
firms to innovate more efficient/rapidly.37 These considerations should therefore be subject 
within the investigation of merger specific efficiency gains.      
 
2. Elimination of an Actual Replacement Threat Effect 
In the last section we have discussed how an increase in pre-innovation market power can 
influence the firms’ incentives to innovate by augmenting the extent of the replacement effect. 
Even though the replacement effects generally requires that a link between pre-innovation 
product markets and product innovations exists, the replacement effect can still play an 
important role even though pre-innovation product market structure and thus the extent of the 
replacement effect is unaffected by the merger. This is the case when the target firm is 
actually the main source for a menacing replacement of the acquiring firm’s products (e.g. 
because the target firm is the only firm currently undertaking R&D in this field or because 
other firms are way behind in the innovation process or lack crucial assets). Thus, even 
though pre-innovation product market structure is not affected by the merger, the replacement 
effect still plays an important role because the acquiring firm would practically eliminate the 
most relevant threat for its pre-innovation profits. As a consequence, even though also this 
feature of the replacement effect is closely linked to existing product markets, the 
“elimination of an actual replacement threat” affects the firms’ incentives to innovate by 
avoiding that the replacement takes place, irrespective of the fact whether the target firm is an 
actual pre-innovation product market competitor, or not.  
Therefore, what seems to be crucial for evaluating the “elimination of an actual 
replacement threat-effect” is to find out whether there are still enough other firms which are 
likewise planning to introduce a product innovation which is expected to have a replacement 
effect on the merging firms’ products.38 If this is not the case, it is again the relevance and 
existence of entry barriers which determines whether the elimination of an actual replacement 
threat has a negative impact. If entry barriers are high, the elimination will most likely have a 
negative effect on the firms’ innovation incentives. Hence, the assessment of these 
determinants (actual replacement threat and perceived replacement threat) again seems to be 
decisive for assessing the effect of the loss of a potential innovator (threatening current 
product market profits) for the firms’ incentives to innovate.  
 
 
 
37  See Cassiman, et al. (2005). 
38  See Gilbert (2006). 
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3. Post-Innovation Product Market Competition and Appropriability Effect 
The relevance of the characteristics of post-innovation product markets and the degree of 
competition on these markets is usually discussed in connection with the expected innovation 
profits after the innovation is introduced (Schumpeterian Rents).39 The “pre-innovation 
market size and appropriability effect”, introduced in the previous chapter, purposely captured 
only the effects, stemming from pre-innovation product market shares for the appropriability 
of innovation profits. Hence, the “post-innovation product market competition and 
appropriability effect” completes our considerations by accounting for the relevant innovation 
competition and its impact on post-innovation profits. Although the capability of the firms to 
appropriate their innovation profits was also decisive in connection with the “pre-innovation 
market size and appropriability effect”, this condition was exclusively affected by the firm’s 
pre-innovation market share. In comparison to these considerations, this effect directly 
accounts for the expected characteristics of post-innovation product market competition. 
Hence, in contrast to our considerations about pre-innovation product market competition, the 
decisive factor which determines the expected degree of competition on a post-innovation 
product market is not the distribution of current market shares and thus not the degree of 
current product market competition, but current innovation competition. What is crucial in 
this respect is therefore the innovator’s ability to exclude rivals from imitation, the number of 
firms which are likewise undertaking R&D and the size and characteristics of the post-
innovation product market (including the expected type of competition on post-innovation 
markets, e.g., Bertrand or Cournot, etc.). This becomes evident, if we consider that a large 
innovation reward will most likely attract many firms which likewise invest in R&D. As a 
consequence of this increase in innovation competition, the firms’ innovation efforts will most 
likely increase because each firm has an incentive to be the first to invent, either in order to 
file a patent or due to possible first mover advantages (stimulus effect).40 But, whenever the 
firms can protect their innovations only insufficiently by IPRs, too much competition might 
also lead to a decrease of the incentives to invest in R&D, because the profits of an innovation 
have to be shared with too many competitors (market room factor).41 In an extreme case, the 
whole R&D process might even break down, because the profits, which each single firm can 
capture, are so little that the R&D cost cannot be recouped.42 However, what should have 
become clear is that post-innovation product market competition hinges on today’s intensity 
 
39  See Loury (1979); Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980); Aghion, et al. (2005); Lee & Wilde (1980).  
40  See Scherer & Ross (1990); Kamien & Schwartz (1976); Fudenberg, et al. (1983). 
41  Ibid. 
42  See Scherer & Ross (1990). 
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of innovation competition and not necessarily on today’s pre-innovation product market 
competition.  
If the firms are, however, able to protect their innovations sufficiently by IPRs, this aspect 
becomes less relevant.43 Even though the patent race literature indeed suggests that the R&D 
expenditures per firm will decline as the number of competitors increases (because the 
probability that another firm wins the race is augmented), the aggregated R&D expenditures 
are still higher under intense competition and the probability that an innovation is achieved 
earlier is augmented.44 Hence, a crucial factor for the analysis of the “post-innovation product 
market competition and appropriability effect” is whether the firms can protect their 
innovations sufficiently by IPRs, or not. If IPRs are insufficient, competition authorities have 
to balance the “stimulus factor” against the “market room factor” in order to estimate the 
overall impact of this effect on the innovation incentives.      
Nevertheless, there is another theoretical argument why mergers between two innovation 
competitors might not have a negative (or maybe even a positive) effect on the firms’ 
incentives to innovate. This argument hinges on asymmetries between the competitors 
progresses regarding their attempt to achieve a certain innovation. In particular, the 
asymmetries among the research projects might have strong implications for the incentives to 
innovate if, for instance, the distance in progress between the firms’ R&D programs is so 
large, that the laggard firm is close to give up and stop its R&D efforts.45 Under such a setting 
(a leading firm and a laggard firm merge), a merger will most likely not diminish the firms’ 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D. In the case that two laggard firms 
merge, this event might even increase the firms’ incentives, if the merger allows them to catch 
up with the leader. If, however, the distance among the research projects is short and 
competition is intense, a merger will affect the firms’ innovation incentives as described 
before in connection with the “post-innovation product market competition and 
appropriability effect”. 
Besides the fact that differences the firms’ R&D programs matter, it is also important to 
consider for the circumstance whether the laggard firm can be expected to catch up with the 
leader via leapfrogging.46 If an innovation is expected to require knowledge accumulation or a 
certain “stock of knowledge”,47 leapfrogging is less likely to occur and the distance between 
 
43  See Reinganum ( 1989).  
44  See Loury (1979); Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980). 
45  See Fudenberg, et al. (1983); Harris & Vickers (1987); Lippman & McCardle (1987); Grossman & Shapiro 
(1987); Doraszelski (2003). 
46  See Vickers (1986); Harris & Vickers (1987); Harris & Vickers (1985). 
47   See Fudenberg, et al. (1983); Doraszelski (2003). 
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the firms’ R&D programs matters as described in the last paragraph. But, whenever 
leapfrogging is deemed as possible (either because an innovation is not expected to require 
knowledge accumulation/a certain stock of knowledge, or because it can be expected that 
knowledge can easily be acquired and adopted), even the acquisition of a laggard firm could 
be anticompetitive.  
 
4. Internalization of Spillovers Effect 
The argument about an increase of innovation incentives due to an internalization of R&D 
spillovers was most prominently captured by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin.48 Hereby the 
authors showed that the existence of these spillovers can lead to an underinvestment in R&D 
because an extensive part of the knowledge, generated by the entity which undertakes the 
R&D efforts, drains off and has to be shared with the firm’s competitors. As a consequence, a 
positive side effect of the merger might be the internalization of such spillovers, leading to an 
increase of innovation incentives.   
 
III. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON THE INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN PRODUCT 
INNOVATION ORIENTED R&D  
The previous chapter represents a synopsis of the most relevant effects of mergers on the 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D, provided by the industrial 
organization literature. But, how do the identified effects work under different situations? In 
the assessment above we have seen that the changes of the firms’ innovation incentives, 
stemming from the effects of both groups, hinge again on several determinants (e.g. the type 
of pre- and post-innovation competition, or the regime of IPRs). As a consequence, by 
looking through the introduced effects, we receive a set of determinants which are decisive for 
analyzing the impact of each of the identified effects on the incentives to innovate.  
For the effects of the first group (effects which stem from a change in pre-innovation 
product market competition) these decisive determinants were: 
- The type of pre-innovation product market competition (Bertrand, Cournot, etc.) 
- The relevance of IPRs as well as the differentiation of product innovations into radical (in 
the sense that a new product market is created) and incremental product innovations  
- The existence of an “actual replacement threat” as well as the existence and relevance of 
entry barriers for a “perceived replacement threat” 
 
 
48 See D'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988). 
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For the effects of the second group (effects which do not stem from a change in pre-
innovation product market competition) the decisive determinants were: 
- The distinction between a complete and incomplete elimination of an “actual replacement 
treat” and the existence and relevance of entry barriers for a “perceived replacement 
threat”       
- The relevance of IPRs, and, in the case of insufficient IPRs, the type of post-innovation 
product market competition (Bertrand, Cournot, etc) 
- The distinction between situations in which leapfrogging is expected to be likely or 
unlikely and, in the latter case, the differentiation into “neck and neck”, “leader and 
laggard” and “laggard and laggard” innovation competitors 
 
An overview on the effects of each of the two groups, as well as the corresponding relevant 
determinants, can be found in table 1 (for group 1) and table 2 (for group 2). The effects of 
table 2 have to be considered in any case in which the merging parties are considered as 
innovation competitors, while the effects of table 1 do only play a role when the merging 
parties do also compete with one another on the respective pre-innovation product markets. In 
both tables the relevant effects are listed on the y-axis. The determinants, which characterize 
either the type of current pre-innovation product market competition (table 1), or the type of 
post-innovation product market competition (table 2), are listed on the x-axis.     
Besides this, the two tables also provide a first evaluation of how a certain merger will, 
ceteris paribus, affect the innovation incentives of the merging parties via the identified 
effects under different situations (characterized by the respective determinants introduced 
above). In this connection we differentiated between three basic directions of how a certain 
effect can affect the innovation incentives of the merging parties; (1) Either the impact of the 
effect is approaching zero (0), (2) the effect is expected to be positive (+), or (3) the effect 
is expected to be negative (-). However, since the evaluation of the effects is carried out in a 
ceteris paribus analysis, which implies that each effect is evaluated isolated (holding all the 
other effects constant), the following tables provide solely a rough guidance. 
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Table 1: How does a merger between two innovation competitors change the merging firms’ 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D (caused by mergers which also 
affect Pre-Innovation Product Market Competition)? 
             Type of Pre-Innovation 
                            Product Market 
                                       Competition 
Effects 
homogeneous products  differentiated products  
competition 
in price 
competition 
in quantity 
close 
substitutes 
far  
substitutes 
Financial Base Effect 0 + + 0 
Escape Competition Effect 0 - - 0 
Pre-Innovation Market Size and 
Appropriability Effect 
 
 
- Perfect IPRs 0/- 0/- 0/- 0/- 
- Imperfect IPRs (radical) 0/- 0/- 0/- 0/- 
- Imperfect IPRs (incremental) +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Increase in the Extent of a Replacement 
Effect  
- No Actual Replacement Threat and High Entry 
Barriers 0 - - 0 
- Actual Replacement threat and/or Low Entry 
Barriers 0 + + 0 
“0” stands for: is approaching zero; “-“ stands for: negative impact; “+” stands for: positive impact   
Source: Authors  
 
The “financial base effect” has either a positive impact on the firms’ innovation incentives or 
its impact is approaching zero. This stems from the fact that a merger of two innovation 
competitors which do also compete with one another on pre-innovation product markets will 
increase the firms’ pre-innovation market power and thus also their profits, as long as the 
firms’ products are relatively close substitutes and the competition on this market is not 
characterized by a Bertrand like price competition. Hence, the firms’ financial base improves 
and the ability to invest in R&D will increase.  
The same (although with inverted sign) holds true for the “escape competition effect”. 
Once the merger increases the firms’ profits on a pre-innovation product market, the necessity 
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to escape the current product market competition is reduced and the impact on the firms’ 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D is therefore negative.  
     The “pre-innovation market size and appropriability effect” has generally either a negative 
impact on the firms’ incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D, or its impact is 
approaching zero. This stems from the fact that the pre-innovation product market share of the 
acquiring firm will increase due to the transaction. As a consequence of this increase in 
market share, the incentives to invest in process innovation oriented R&D are augmented. 
This can result in a shift of financial resources away from product innovation oriented R&D 
towards process innovation oriented R&D. The only possible impact of the “pre-innovation 
market size and appropriability effect” might occur with respect to the incentives to undertake 
R&D towards the development of incremental product innovations. In this connection an 
increase of the firm’s market share can increase the incentives to invest in product innovation 
oriented R&D, despite an eventual reallocation of the firm’s R&D budget.      
The last effect which has to be considered within this first group is the “increase in the 
extent of a replacement effect”. In analogy to the “financial base effect” and the “escape 
competition effect” the innovation incentives are only affected by the merger if it leads to 
increasing profits on the pre-innovation product market (as long as the firms’ products are 
relatively close substitutes and competition on this market is not characterized by a Bertrand 
like price competition). In dependence of the existence of an “actual” or a “perceived 
replacement threat”, the effect has either a positive or a negative impact on the firms’ 
innovation incentives. If an “actual replacement threat” exists and/or the entry barriers are 
considered to be low, the increase in profits on the pre-innovation product market leads to 
increased innovation incentives. This happens because the firm has “more to lose” after the 
merger. However, in a scenario of a missing “actual replacement threat” and high entry 
barriers, the firm would be well protected against a potential replacement but would 
simultaneously have “less to win” after the merger. This is the case because the profits, which 
can additionally be earned as a consequence of the introduction of a new product, are lower 
than before the merger.  
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Table 2: How does a merger between two innovation competitors change the merging firms’ 
incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D (caused by mergers which do not 
necessarily affect Pre-Innovation Product Market Competition)? 
              
            Type of Post-Innovation 
 
                         Product Market 
                                  Competition 
 
Effects 
perfect 
IPRs 
imperfect IPRs 
 homogeneous products differentiated products  
 
competition 
in price 
competition 
in quantity 
close 
substitutes 
far 
substitutes 
Entry Barriers & the Monopolization 
of Critical Assets Effect - - - - - 
Elimination of an Actual Replacement 
Threat Effect 
 
- Complete Elimination of the Actual 
Replacement Threat and High Entry 
Barriers - - - - - 
- Incomplete Elimination of the Actual 
Replacement threat and/or Low Entry 
Barriers 0 0 0 0 0 
Post-Innovation Competition and 
Appropriability Effect 
 
 
- Leapfrogging is Expected to be Likely - 0 +/- +/- 0 
- Leapfrogging is Expected to be Unlikely 
(neck and neck) - 0 +/- +/- 0 
- Leapfrogging is Expected to be Unlikely 
(leader & laggard) 0 0 0 0 0 
- Leapfrogging is Expected to be Unlikely 
(laggard & laggard) 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 
Internalization of Spillovers Effect + + + + + 
“0” stands for is approaching zero; “-“ stands for negative impact; “+” stands for positive impact   
Source: Authors 
 
Once competition in innovation is considered as a process which requires critical specialized 
assets, the acquisition and monopolization of such (substitutive) assets will most likely have a 
negative impact on the firm’s incentives to innovate. This stems from the fact that this 
monopolization shields the firm from potential innovation competition which, absent the 
merger, could e.g. lead to a replacement of current products.  
The evaluation of the “elimination of an actual replacement threat effect” hinges on the 
fact whether the merger sufficiently eliminates the menacing replacement threat or not. If the 
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acquirer assimilates the only firm which represents a serious source for a replacement threat 
and entry barriers are furthermore high, than the effect will have a negative impact on the 
firm’s innovation incentives. If the merger, however, leads either only to an incomplete 
elimination of the actual replacement threat or the elimination is complete but entry barriers 
are very low, than the impact will most likely be approaching zero. 
The evaluation of the impact of the “post-innovation product market competition and 
appropriability effect” is probably the most complex one. This stems from the fact that its 
impact on the firms’ incentives hinges on several determinants. Since intense innovation 
competition can create high innovation incentives (because each firm has an incentive to 
innovate first), but too much innovation competition can also cause appropriability problems, 
a merger can lead to both, an in- or a decrease of innovation incentives. A crucial factor which 
determines whether the effect goes in the one or the other direction is the distinction into 
situations in which IPRs allow only for an insufficient protection of an introduced innovation, 
and those situations in which an innovation is well protected by intellectual property rights. 
But, under insufficient IPRs, the impact of the effect is furthermore determined by the 
expected type of post-innovation product market competition. The appropriabilty, and thus the 
innovation incentives, will e.g. not change significantly, if the future products of the merging 
parties were expected to be solely far substitutes or to compete with one another in a Bertrand 
like price competition. If the these products are, however, expected to be relatively close 
substitutes, the incentives can increase, if the positive influence of a change in the “market 
room factor” overcompensates the negative influence of a change in the ”stimulus factor”. 
Nevertheless, besides the characteristics of IPRs and the type of post-innovation product 
market competition, it is also decisive whether leapfrogging is expected to be possible and, if 
this is not the case, whether the merging firms are neck-and-neck innovation competitors. The 
previous considerations about the impact of this effect hold only true, if at least one of these 
two properties is fulfilled. Otherwise, the merger will most likely not affect the firms’ 
innovation incentives (e.g. in the case of a leader and a laggard competitor which was close to 
giving up) and, in the case of a merger between two laggard competitors, the merger can even 
increase the firms’ innovation incentives because it prevents them from dropping out of the 
competition process.   
The last effect which has to be assessed is the possibility that knowledge spillovers get 
internalized. Hence, whenever significant spillover effects between the merging firms existed 
before the merger, the internalization of these spillovers will most likely increase the firms’ 
innovation incentives.        
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IV. ASSESSING THE INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN PRODUCT INNOVATION ORIENTED R&D WITHIN 
SIX DISTINCT CASE GROUPS  
A.  Six Case Groups of Innovation Competition Mergers   
Since not every effect is always relevant and because of the fact that the determinants, which 
are decisive for the impact of a certain effect, can differ from merger case to merger case, the 
first step towards the development of an assessment framework is to identify groups of 
merger cases which share the same properties. Consequently, each of these case groups 
encompasses those kinds of merger cases which require the assessment of similar effects and 
determinants. Thus, the review process varies from case group to case group, but remains 
consistent and uniform within each case group. As a consequence, such an approach allows to 
combine the objective of accounting for the specific characteristics of each merger case with 
the requirement that this assessment is carried out in a consistent and transparent manner. 
As it was shown in Kern (2014)49, there can basically emerge six distinct scenarios in 
which a merger, which affects innovation competition, can take place from an antitrust 
authority’s perspective. In this connection it was proposed to differentiate between mergers in 
which the relevant innovation competitors correspond to the relevant competitors on the 
respective pre-innovation product markets and (2) those kind of mergers in which innovation 
competition takes place detached/absent from pre-innovation product market competition. 
Therefore, the firms which are involved in a merger (which raises anticompetitive concerns 
with respect to innovation) can, but do not necessarily have to, be pre-innovation product 
market competitors. Beside this, it was suggested to account for the fact whether antitrust 
authorities can “observe” the R&D projects of the merging parties and their competitors (e.g. 
because of FDA approval procedures in pharmaceutical mergers)50, or whether the authorities 
have difficulties in doing so. In the latter case, antitrust authorities have to rely on 
“specialized assets” which are deemed as indispensable for undertaking R&D in a certain 
field of research.51 As a consequence, besides the distinction in mergers which affect pre-
innovation product market competition and those which exclusively affect innovation 
competition, is it further necessary to differentiate between mergers (1) in which R&D is 
“observable” and those (2) in which the agencies have to rely on the “specialized assets”. 
Nevertheless, in the case of “observable” R&D projects it is moreover important to 
distinguish between R&D projects which are expected to create an entirely new product 
market (close to the idea of radical/drastic innovations) and those, which will most likely 
 
49  See Kern (2014), pp. 9. 
50  See Carrier (2008), pp. 401. 
51  See Gilbert & Sunshine (1995a). 
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result in a product which still belongs to an already existing product market (close to the idea 
of incremental innovations). Thus, the subcategory of “observable” R&D has to be further 
refined into “observable” R&D which constitutes a new product market and “observable” 
R&D which does not constitute a new market. This distinction leads to the following six Case 
Groups: 
 
Table 3. Overview on Six Case Groups of Innovation Competition Mergers  
 
The Merging Firms are Pre-
Innovation Product Market 
Competitors 
The Merging Firms are not 
Pre-Innovation Product 
Market Competitors 
Identification by required 
Specialized Assets (1) (2) 
“Observable” R&D Projects  
which create a New Relevant 
Product Market 
(3) (4) 
“Observable” R&D Projects 
which do not create a New 
Relevant Product Market 
(5) (6) 
Source: Kern (2014). 
 
It is evident that in some merger cases competition authorities have to account for the whole 
range of identified effects, because the merger will alter both, pre-innovation product market 
structure and the competitive structure regarding innovation competition (i.e. in case group 1, 
3, and 5). This stems from the fact that in these mergers the innovation competitors do also 
compete with one another on the respective pre-innovation product market. As a consequence, 
such a merger will alter both, pre-innovation product market structure as well as the 
competitive structure with respect to innovation competition. Therefore, also the incentives to 
innovate will be affected by both changes. 
In other merger cases, however, only a limited number of the introduced effects appear to 
be relevant. This is particular true for those kinds of mergers in which current pre-innovation 
product market structure is unaffected by a merger (i.e. case group 2, 4, and 6). Hence, in 
contrast to case group 1, 3, and 5, mergers between firms which compete with one another 
only in regard to innovation do not change the actual pre-innovation product market structure. 
Thus, the incentives and abilities to innovate, stemming from the nature and characteristics of 
pre-innovation product market competition, are not affected by such kind of mergers. As a 
consequence, many insights regarding the firms’ incentives and abilities to invest in R&D, 
23 
 
provided by models which rely on mechanisms, rooted in pre-innovation product market 
competition, do not hold anymore in such a situation.           
 
B.  Assessing the Innovation Incentive Effects of Mergers within the Six Case Groups  
1.  The Merger Affects Innovation Competition as well as Pre-Innovation Product Market 
Competition and the Firms are identifiable by the required Specialized Assets 
This first case group is probably the fuzziest and most ambiguous one, making it very difficult 
to assess. This stems from the fact that the R&D projects, in these merger cases, cannot be 
“observed” and pre-innovation product market competition as well as innovation competition 
is affected. Hence, a merger which takes place in such an environment will influence the 
firms’ innovation incentives via both channels. As a consequence, competition authorities 
have to analyze each of the introduced effects carefully in order to come to a satisfactory 
assessment.  
In regard to the effects, stemming from a decrease in pre-innovation product market 
competition, it has to be assessed whether:  
- The financial base of the merging parties improves and whether this will have a 
significant effect on the firms’ capability to invest in R&D, or whether this increase will 
only play a minor role for financing R&D, because of an already high financial base (due 
to a large firm size or substantial market power on other markets).  
- The incentives to escape the respective pre-innovation product market are reduced by the 
merger and whether this reduction is substantial, or whether there are still enough 
competitors left who ensure that the competitive pressure on the actual pre-innovation 
product market is upheld. 
- The incentives to invest in product innovation oriented R&D are reduced due to an 
increase of the pre-innovation market share and a consequential reallocation of the R&D 
budget away from product oriented - towards process oriented R&D, or whether these 
incentives are expected to increase in the case of imperfect IPRs in combination with 
incremental product innovations. As a consequence of the fact that R&D projects can 
hardly be “observed” in this case group, this differentiation between radical and 
incremental product innovations will probably be difficult to assess. Hence, in these 
merger cases it will be very challenging to reveal the overall impact of this effect.   
- A replacement effect is likely to occur and if so, whether the merger augments its extent. 
In order to find out whether the merger will rather in- or decrease the firms’ innovation 
incentives via this effect, competition authorities have to assess whether an “actual” 
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and/or “perceived replacement threat” exists. This requires analyzing the current and 
“observable” research projects of the merged entity’s innovation competitors as well as 
the existence and relevance of entry barriers. Since this case group is characterized by 
R&D projects which can hardly be “observed”, the investigation of the replacement effect 
has to be carried out predominantly by analyzing the entry barriers in the sense of 
specialized assets which are necessary to undertake R&D towards product innovations 
which will have a replacement effect on the firms’ products. If these entry barriers are 
low, the increase in market power will most likely lead to an increase of innovation 
incentives, because after the merger the firm has “more to lose”. However, the incentives 
will rather decline, if the entry barriers are high. This stems from the fact that the merged 
entity has firstly “less to win” and secondly because the perceived threat, that a 
replacement takes place, is low.  
 
In regard to the effects, which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, it has to be 
assessed whether:  
- The merger leads to a monopolization of critical specialized assets (e.g. patents) which 
are decisive for taking part in the process of innovation competition. 
- The merger will lead to an elimination of an actual replacement threat and if so, whether 
there are still enough competitors left, which ensure that the competitive pressure is 
upheld. This assessment is again quite difficult due to the fact that the R&D projects can 
hardly be “observed”. Instead, it is again helpful to assess the existence and relevance of 
entry barriers in the sense of specialized assets which are necessary to undertake R&D 
towards product innovations which will have a replacement effect on the incumbent 
firms’ products.  
- The incentives to innovate are changed via the “post-innovation product market 
competition and appropriability effect”. In this connection it is first of all crucial to find 
out whether innovation profits can be appropriated due to the existence of strong IPRs, or 
whether IPRs have to be considered as imperfect and insufficient. In the latter case, it is 
furthermore important to get an impression of the post-innovation product market 
characteristics and the expected type of competition. On this basis, competition 
authorities have to assesses whether the reduced “stimulus effect” or rather the improved 
“market room factor” has a stronger impact on the firm’s innovation incentives. Apart 
from that, it is also important to investigate whether one of the competitors is way ahead 
in the innovation process, or not. However, since the possibility to “observe” whether one 
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firm is ahead, or not, is not provided in these kinds of merger cases, the influence of 
distance on the innovation incentives will most likely play a minor role in the 
corresponding assessment. 
- The merger between two innovation competitors is expected to lead to a noticeable 
internalization of R&D spillovers. If this is the case, the merger might have a positive 
impact on the firms’ innovation incentives due to the internalization of these spillovers.  
Prominent merger cases which fall into this case group are, for instance, the proposed mergers 
of GM and ZF52 or Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman53, as well as the merger of 
Halliburton and Dresser.54       
 
2.  The Merger affects only Innovation Competition and the Firms are identifiable by the 
required Specialized Assets 
In comparison to case group 1, the analysis of effects stemming from pre-innovation product 
markets is no longer a part of the anticompetitive assessment. The assessment of the effects, 
which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, should be carried out in analogy to 
case group 1.  
 
3.  The Merger affects Innovation Competition as well as Pre-Innovation Product Market 
Competition and R&D Projects are furthermore “Observable” (expected to create a New 
Relevant Product Market) 
How does the assessment change for mergers falling into case group 3, in comparison to those 
of case group 1? Since the merger will still alter both pre-innovation product market structure 
and innovation competition, antitrust authorities still have to account for the whole set of 
effects as they were described in line with the assessment of case group 1. However, there are 
some remarkable differences. These differences stem from the fact that, in this case group, 
antitrust authorities can “observe” the R&D projects of the firms. The ability to “observe” the 
respective R&D projects results, in most cases, from lengthy regulatory approval procedures 
(like in the case of pharmaceuticals)55, which function as entry barriers for future goods 
markets. As a consequence, antitrust authorities can get quite a good impression of which 
products might make it to the market within the next couple of years. However, not only the 
antitrust authorities can “observe” these projects, but also all the other firms. Besides this, 
 
52  See, United States v. General Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530 (complaint filed D.Del. Nov. 16, 1993). 
53  See United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed March 23, 1998). 
54  See United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 1998). 
55  See Carrier (2008). 
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there seems to be a high correlation between the industries which can be characterized by 
these regulatory approval procedures, and the industries in which the relevance of IPRs for 
appropriating innovation profits is particularly high.56 Furthermore, the competitive 
assessment of mergers, which fall into case group 3, deals with research projects which are 
expected to constitute a new relevant product market. Hence, we will only consider for the 
effects regarding radical product innovations, leaving incremental product innovations aside.  
In regard to the effects, stemming from a decrease in pre-innovation product market 
competition, these properties of case group 3 have the following effects for the competitive 
assessment (in comparison to case group 1):    
- The “pre-innovation market size and appropriability effect” will now have a neutral or 
negative impact. This stems from the fact that the relevance of IPRs, regarding a merger 
which falls into case group 3, is expected to be high. Furthermore, this case group 
encompasses mergers in which the emergence of a new product market is at stake. As a 
consequence, neither current market shares nor current market power will improve the 
firms’ ability to appropriate their innovation profits. However, the increased market share 
of the merged entity can lead to a reallocation of the R&D budget towards process 
innovation oriented R&D, leaving less financial resources to strife for product 
innovations.      
- There is also a high likelihood that the “increase in the extent of a replacement effect” 
will have a negative impact. This stems from the circumstance that the high relevance of 
IPRs and experience in these industries often constitute high entry barriers for entering 
the process of innovation competition. Besides this, the regulatory approval procedures, 
which are expected to play an important role in this case group, do not allow for an 
unexpected and fast introduction of a new product. As a consequence, the merged firm 
will get a pretty good impression of whether and when a competitor might introduce a 
new product, which would threaten its current profits. Hence, the idea of a balance 
between having “less to win” and simultaneously also “more to lose” seems to shift 
towards the “less to win” side. This stems from the fact that the likelihood that these 
greater losses become reality gets easier to estimate and calculate. Such a behavior is also 
in line with a so called “fast second strategy”57 which implies that dominant firms are 
rather reluctant with respect to investing in R&D unless they are challenged. Only after 
realizing this threat, they start to vigorously fight back.  
 
56   See Cohen, et al. (2000); Peneder (2010).  
57  See Scherer & Ross (1990). 
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However, under the existence of an “actual replacement threat” one can also think of 
increasing innovation incentives. This is the case when there is at least one firm which 
already works seriously on an innovation which could have a replacement effect on the 
firm’s products. In comparison to the exclusive analysis of entry barriers in line with case 
group 1, the ability to “observe” R&D projects now allows to directly identify the firms 
which currently undertake R&D towards product innovations which could, if carried out 
successfully, replace current products. If there is indeed at least one firm which is already 
seriously undertaking R&D, the innovation incentives of the merged entity would 
increase because the firm has “more to lose”, even though the assessment reveals that 
entry barriers are high. 
- Apart from these changes, the assessment of effects stemming from pre-innovation 
product markets should be carried out in analogy to the corresponding assessment of case 
group 1.           
 
In regard to the effects, which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, the properties 
of case group 3 have the following effects for the competitive assessment (in comparison to 
case group 1): 
- As already discussed in line with the “increase in the extent of a replacement effect”, the 
ability to “observe” R&D projects allows for a direct assessment of the products which 
are currently in the R&D pipelines. This has also strong implications for the assessment 
of the “elimination of an actual replacement threat effect”. First, it is crucial to assess 
whether a certain merger would lead to the elimination of a concrete replacement threat 
and if so, whether there are still enough competitors left which ensure that the 
replacement threat is upheld. In comparison to case group 1, this analysis becomes 
feasible thanks to the ability to “observe” the firms’ R&D projects. What is also new in 
case group 3 is the significance of IPRs (e.g. patent protection) for current and future 
product markets. Whenever existing products are protected by IPRs, the elimination of an 
actual replacement threat can be particularly critical. This stems from the fact that a 
patent provides a temporal and legally granted monopoly position, leading to the greatest 
replacement effect possible. Therefore, in the case that no serious threat exists, the 
merged firm would have a strong incentive to delay the introduction of a new product 
until the patent of the existing product (and thus the temporal monopoly) expires. 
- Since IPRs can be expected to play an important role in the industries whose mergers 
often fall into this case group, also the “post-innovation product market competition and 
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appropriability effect” will most likely have a negative impact because of the diminished 
“stimulus factor”. However, whenever IPRs are nevertheless insufficient, it has to be 
assessed whether the expected type of post-innovation product market competition can be 
characterized rather by competition in price or quantity, whether the R&D projects of the 
merging parties are expected to result in relatively homogeneous or rather differentiated 
products, and in the case of differentiated products, whether the products are expected to 
be rather close or far substitutes. In dependence of the outcome of this analysis it is 
possible that a positive impact because of the “market room factor” exists. However, even 
in those cases were one could think of such a positive influence, there still remains the 
negative impact because of the “stimulus factor”. Hence, these two opposing “factors” 
have to be balanced against each other.  
However, since the assessment of innovation effects of mergers should be triggered 
exclusively once the process of innovation competition is already highly concentrated and 
can furthermore be characterized by high entry barriers, it is very questionable whether 
the positive effect of the “market room factor” will have a strong impact on the outcome 
of the subsequent analysis. These doubts are further intensified since this case group 
deals with existing R&D projects which are already underway. This implies that the firms 
expected them to be profitable. Hence, even if the merger does not take place there is 
apparently enough “room” in the post-innovation market, given the number of competing 
R&D programs.        
- However, what could relax the anticompetitive doubts is the analysis of the distance 
between the merging firms’ R&D projects. Whenever R&D is expected to be cumulative, 
innovation competitors can be characterized as either “neck and neck”, or “leader and 
laggard” competitors (or even “laggard and laggard” competitors). This differentiation is 
again possible due to the ability to “observe” the firms’ R&D projects. Hence, whenever 
leapfrogging can be excluded, serious doubts will mainly arise in situations in which the 
competitive situation between the merging firms can be characterized as being close to 
“neck and neck”. Whenever a leader and a laggard competitor merge, this situation might 
be less problematic (in the case of a merger of two laggards, the impact might even be 
positive).  
- Apart from these changes, the assessment of the effects, which do not hinge on pre-
innovation product markets, should be carried out in analogy to the corresponding 
assessment of case group 1.           
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4.  The Merger affects only Innovation Competition and R&D Projects are furthermore 
“Observable” (expected to create a New Relevant Product Market)  
In comparison to case group 3, the analysis of effects, stemming from pre-innovation product 
markets, is no longer a part of the anticompetitive assessment. The assessment of the effects, 
which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, should be carried out in analogy to 
case group 3. Hence, apart from merger specific efficiency gains (synergies, complementary 
assets, etc.) almost all effects indicate that a reduction of the number of competitors results in 
a reduction of aggregated R&D efforts and most likely in a delay of the introduction date of 
the innovation. The only general argument(s) in favor of less competition is the possibility 
that duplicative R&D efforts could be avoided and spillovers might get internalized. Apart 
from that, competition authorities have to assess whether one of the companies is way ahead 
of the other(s) in the innovation process and whether leapfrogging is expected to be possible, 
or not. Prominent merger cases which fall into this case group were, for instance, the mergers 
of Glaxo and Wellcome58 or Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz59.60  
 
5.  The Merger affects Innovation Competition as well as Pre-Innovation Product Market 
Competition and R&D Projects are furthermore “Observable” (not expected to create a 
New Relevant Product Market)   
The assessment of mergers falling into case group 5 is very similar to those falling into case 
group 3. The main difference is that the “observed” R&D projects are expected to lead to 
product innovation which will be incremental in the sense that they do not constitute a new 
relevant product market.  
In regard to the effects, stemming from a decrease in pre-innovation product market 
competition, the properties of case group 5 have the following effects for the competitive 
assessment (in comparison to case group 3):    
- Due to the fact that this case group deals with incremental product innovations, the “pre-
innovation market size and appropriability effect” might also have a positive impact on 
the innovation incentives, if the firms are unable to protect their innovations sufficiently 
by IPRs. However, since the industries in which R&D efforts are quite “observable” can 
mostly be characterized by a high relevance of IPRs, this positive impact is (as in case 
group 3 & 4) rather theoretical. 
 
58  See Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995). 
59  See Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997). 
60  See, also American Home Products Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217 (1995); Pfizer Inc. and Warner-Lambert Co., FTC 
Dkt. No. C-3957 (June 19, 2000); Baxter Int’l, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904 (1997); The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 
(1996); Glaxo Wellcome plc, 131 F.T.C. 56 (2001). 
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- Apart from these changes, the assessment of effects stemming from pre-innovation 
product markets should be carried out in analogy to the corresponding assessment of case 
group 3.           
 
In regard to the effects, which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, the properties 
of case group 5 have the following influence on the competitive assessment (in comparison to 
case group 3): 
- The existence of a replacement effect is less likely to be a problem in this case group. 
Since the R&D programs aim at the development of products, which are expected to be 
offered on an existing relevant product market, they have to be considered as sufficiently 
substitutable. Hence, it is difficult to think of a replacement effect if the “new” and the 
“old” products are that interchangeable. Instead, these types of product innovations will 
rather lead to an increase in product variety. Nevertheless, an additional product entering 
an existing market will most likely result in an increase in competition on this market and 
thus to a decline of current profits. As a consequence, even though a real replacement is 
quite unlikely in this case group, there is still a risk that the target firm’s product 
innovation will never enter the market after the merger.    
- Apart from these changes, the assessment of the effects, which do not hinge on pre-
innovation product markets, should be carried out in analogy to the corresponding 
assessment of case group 3. 
 
6.  The Merger affects only Innovation Competition and R&D Projects are furthermore 
“Observable” (not expected to create a New Relevant Product Market)  
In comparison to case group 5, the analysis of effects, stemming from pre-innovation product 
markets, is no longer a part of the anticompetitive assessment. The assessment of the effects, 
which do not hinge on pre-innovation product markets, should be carried out in analogy to 
case group 5.  
Prominent merger cases which fall into this case group were, for instance, the merger of 
Hoechst and Marion Merrell Dow61 or the one between Astra and Zeneca.62 
 
 
 
 
61 See Hoechst AG, 120 F.T.C. 1010 (1995). 
62 See Zeneca Group plc, 127 F.T.C. 874 (1999). 
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IV.  Conclusion 
This article identified and classified the most relevant effects, which determine the impact of 
innovation competition mergers on the incentives to invest in product innovation oriented 
R&D. In this connection we differentiated between merger cases in which the merger affects 
only the intensity of innovation competition, and those cases in which the merger has an 
impact on both innovation competition and pre-innovation product market competition. 
Besides this, the article furthermore identified the relevant determinants, which are decisive 
for how a certain effect acts on the incentives to innovate. However, since not every effect is 
always relevant and because of the fact that the determinants can also differ from case to case, 
the development of an assessment framework requires the classification and allocation of 
merger cases, which share the same properties, into case groups. As a result, each of these 
case groups encompasses those kinds of merger cases which require the assessment of similar 
effects and determinants. Hence, the review process varies from case group to case group, but 
remains consistent and uniform within each case group. Since such an approach allows 
combining the objective of a case-specific assessment with the requirement that this 
assessment is carried out in a consistent and transparent manner, it is in the spirit of a rule 
based competition policy.  
As a consequence, this article contributes to the discussion about developing an assessment 
framework for analyzing the innovation effects of mergers. Thereby it was also shown that the 
interrelation between competition and the incentives to innovate is not always as unclear as it 
seems without making the differentiation between effects that hinge on pre-innovation 
product markets and those that do not. As a result, while the assessment of the effects of 
mergers on the firm’s incentives to undertake product innovation oriented R&D can indeed be 
challenging in some case groups (in particular within case group 1), it turned out that the 
investigation is much less complex in others (in particular within case group 4).  
However, it has to be recalled that this article focused exclusively on the incentives to 
invest in product innovation oriented R&D. Hence, it has to be acknowledged that the 
findings of this paper cannot be transferred to questions related to the effects of mergers on 
the incentives to invest in process innovations. This becomes particularly evident if one 
considers for the “Pre-Innovation Market Size and Appropriability Effect”. Hereby it was 
shown that a merger can indeed result in decreased incentives to invest in product innovation 
oriented R&D, because the merger leads to a reallocation of the firm’s R&D budget. This, 
however, implies that the incentives to undertake process innovations increase at the same 
time.  
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Besides this, a final assessment framework has to be supplemented by empirical studies in 
order to reveal the relevance and suitability of each of the theoretically developed assessment 
criteria.63 Furthermore, even though this article focused exclusively on the assessment of the 
merged firm’s incentives to innovate, the final assessment framework should not neglect to 
account for the benefits of “diversity” and “parallel research” for innovation. The 
consideration of incentive aspects alone will not be appropriate to capture innovation 
competition in its full extent.64 Moreover, it also needs to be emphasized that the findings of 
this paper do not imply that mergers have per se an anticompetitive effect on innovation, once 
the assessment of the introduced effects leads to a negative outcome. There is still great 
potential for merger specific efficiencies. Such efficiencies can encompass e.g. synergies 
among the merging entities, economies of scale and scope in R&D, a reduction of duplicative 
R&D efforts or the bringing together of complementary assets. As a consequence, these 
positive efficiency gains have to be balanced against the negative effects that might be 
revealed by the prior analysis. Besides the necessity to balance the potentially negative 
innovation incentive effects of mergers against innovation related efficiencies gains, the 
assessment of innovation effects generally represents only one part of the overall competitive 
assessment of mergers. Even though this article also accounted for pre-innovation product 
markets, the analysis of static price and non-price effects was not part of the assessment. As a 
result, the competitive assessment of mergers is not completed until it is analyzed how a 
certain merger affects competition with respect to all competition parameters: static price and 
non-price competition as well as innovation competition.  
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ABSTRACT 
A merger between two innovation competitors is often suspected to reduce the variety of 
heterogeneous entities which are currently undertaking R&D or which are well situated to 
undertake R&D in a certain field. The consequential reduction of “diversity” can be detrimental 
to innovation because it reduces the number of independent sources for possible future 
innovations and might furthermore lead to an alignment of formerly different R&D programs. 
However, if “diversity” indeed benefits innovative performance, even merged firms should have 
an incentive to maintain it in-house. Therefore, this article aims to bring to light whether firms 
can indeed be expected to create or maintain “diversity” post-merger. By focusing on the 
strategic management and organizational science literature we will demonstrate that the 
creation/maintenance of independent entities is indeed considered as an important determinant 
for the innovativeness and general performance of firms. Nevertheless, we will also show that 
this strategy has several grave implementation problems and might be hampered by certain trade-
offs. As a consequence, competition authorities cannot presume that a reduced “inter-firm 
diversity” will get substituted by an increased “intra-firm diversity” without fail.  
JEL: B52, K21, L4, M1, O31, O32 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The adequate consideration of innovation aspects in merger review was, and still is, one of the 
most controversially discussed issues among antitrust scholars.1
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1  See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger 
Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995); Richard T. Rapp, The 
Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 (1995); Robert 
J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: new Wine in old Bottles?, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (1995); George A. Hay, 
Innovations in Antitrust Enforcement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 7 (1995); Howard M. Morse, The Limits of 
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of this discussion deals with the question whether a more or rather a less concentrated market 
structure (mostly narrowed to product market structure) is beneficial to innovation.2 However, 
until to date, theoretical3 as well as empirical4
However, while mainstream economics focused almost exclusively on the likely effects of 
a change of market structure on the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D and their ability to 
innovate, a change of the market structure can also have an additional effect on innovation. 
This effect originates from the fact that a merger, which causes a reduction of the number of 
innovation competitors, can also harm innovation because it reduces the variety of 
heterogeneous entities which are currently undertaking R&D or which are well situated to 
undertake R&D in a certain field. This reduction can be detrimental to the overall 
innovativeness of an industry when we consider firms as being different with respect to their 
resources, their organizational structure, their business culture and the way how they do 
business.
 contributions delivered rather contradictory 
results in the sense that they support the proposition that highly competitive just as much as 
more concentrated markets can basically spur innovation. Hence, from this perspective, it is 
not clear whether a merger, which leads to a higher market concentration, is detrimental or 
maybe even beneficial to innovation.  
5
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Innovation Markets, 2 ANTITRUST & INTELL. PROP. (ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW NEWSL.) 22 (2001); 
Dennis W. Carlton & Robert H. Gertner, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior, in 3 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 29 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., MIT Press 2003); Robert W. Davis, 
Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 677 
(2003); Michael Katz & Howard Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2007); Josef 
Drexl, Anti-Competitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting Competition in 
Innovation without a Market, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 507 (2012). 
 As soon as we allow for these differences, it is appropriate to regard each firm as 
an entity which has unique capabilities and individual beliefs about the most promising way 
to innovate. Since innovation is particularly subject to uncertainty, it is impossible to 
2  See Rapp, supra note 1, at 26 et seq.; Carlton & Gertner, supra note 1, at 39 et seq.; Davis, supra note 1, at 
681 et seq. 
3  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed., Princeton University Press 1962); 
Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395 (1979); Richard J. Gilbert & David 
M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982); 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., Elsevier 1989); FREDERIC M. 
SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, at 513-660 
(Houghton-Mifflin, 3rd edn. 1990); Jan Boone, Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product 
and Process Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2000); Jan Boone, Intensity of Competition and the Incentive 
to Innovate, 19 INT. J. IND. ORGAN. 705 (2001); Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An 
Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. ECON. 701 (2005). 
4 For an excellent overview see Richard J. Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the 
Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, at 187-204 (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., MIT Press 2006).   
5 See Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity Through Competition Law, in 
ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 173 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 
Edward Elgar 2010). See also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 185-186. 
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determine how a certain innovation has to be achieved or which R&D project will be most 
successful. As a consequence, for the overall innovativeness of an industry, or respectively a 
certain field of research, it is also beneficial that a variety of independent firms undertake 
R&D due to their subjective resources and expectations. Hence, in contrast to the 
considerations about the firms’ incentives and abilities to innovate, this dimension of 
competition highlights the role of “diversity” for innovation and supports the idea that this 
characteristic of competition might also be worth protecting.  
It is remarkable that these considerations also played a role in a considerable number of 
challenges to mergers and acquisitions, investigated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Department of Justice (DoJ).6 In particular, the dissenting statements of 
Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson and Commissioner Pamela J. Harbour in connection 
with the FTC’s decision to close the Genzyme/Novazyme case indicate that this dimension of 
competition was, and still is, considered as an important but also highly disputed aspect in the 
review of mergers.7 However, in contrast to its relevance in applied merger review, this 
property of competition is much less recognized in the respective antitrust literature. One 
explanation for this phenomenon might be the fact that mainstream economics and especially 
the modern industrial organization literature have fundamental difficulties to capture this 
dimension of competition, which Joseph Farrell therefore called vividly “the dark matter of 
competition”8.9 Apart from that it is also argued that, if “diversity” indeed has a noticeable 
effect on innovation, a merged entity should have an incentive to preserve such a fruitful 
environment in-house.10
                                                          
6  See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed March 23, 
1998); United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 1998); Glaxo 
plc, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995); The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996); Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997); 
Pfizer Inc. and Warner-Lambert Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-3957 (June 19, 2000). 
 Hence, a reduction of “diversity” among different firms (“inter-firm 
diversity”) might get balanced by an increase in the diversity within a certain firm (“intra-firm 
diversity”) by itself. As a consequence, if one had to expect such an effect, antitrust 
authorities would have no reason to further consider this issue.   
7  Mozelle W. Thompson, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson Genzyme 
Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., File No. 021-0026 (Jan 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/thompsongenzymestmt.pdf (Aug. 20, 2013); Pamela J. Harbour, Dissenting 
Statement of Pamely J. Harbour Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., File 
No. 021-0026 (Jan 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/harbourgenzymestmt.pdf (Aug. 20, 
2013). 
8  See Joseph Farrell, Complexity, diversity, and antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 165 (2006). 
9  See, e.g., Stanley J. Metcalfe, Evolution and Economic Change, in TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
54 (Aubrey Silbertson ed., Macmillan 1989); Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about 
Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 48 (1995); Kerber, supra note 5. 
10 See Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms, 18 RAND 
J. ECON. 98, at 106 (1987). 
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Therefore, by assessing the management and organizational science literature, this article 
aims to bring to light whether and how firms consider the preservation of “diversity”, (1) 
either as a consequence of a newly created “intra-firm diversity”, or (2) because of a direct 
maintenance of an acquired firm’s autonomy, after a merger. For this purpose we firstly 
investigate the “Corporate Entrepreneurship” (CE) literature which highlights the creation of 
independent subunits and spinoffs within a corporation. We will thereby demonstrate that the 
idea of a creation of independent entities in-house is indeed considered as an important 
determinant for the innovativeness and general performance of firms. However, we will also 
show that firms, pursuing a CE strategy, will most likely face several grave implementation 
problems and trade-offs. The same holds true for a direct maintenance of “diversity” after a 
merger. Although the examined literature on post-merger integration presents strong 
arguments in favor of securing an acquired firm’s independence and autonomy in order to 
keep its innovation capacity, it also indicates that there will emerge a trade-off between this 
objective and the realization of efficiency gains through integration.    
Hence, on the one hand, the extensive management and organizational science literature 
suggests that considerations about the preservation of “diversity” in merger review might be 
exaggerated because firms should indeed have a strong incentive to preserve “diversity” in-
house. On the other hand, however, our analysis also shows that antitrust authorities cannot 
trust in the creation/maintenance of such an “intra-firm diversity” after a merger, since the 
merged entity will most likely face grave implementation problems and trade-offs.  
This article is structured as follows. In Part II we will provide a review of the neoclassical 
economics and evolutionary economics literature and highlight the differences between the 
considerations about the incentives and abilities to innovate on the one hand and the benefits 
of “diversity” for innovation on the other. Thereby we will also provide some exemplary 
merger cases in order to illustrate how the idea of a preservation of an “inter-firm diversity” 
was considered in the applied U.S. merger review during the last two decades. Subsequently, 
in Part III we will analyze to what extent considerations about the creation/maintenance of 
independent entities within firms can be found in the management and organizational science 
literature and whether we find evidence that this strategy is indeed regarded as a promising 
approach. Thereby we want to answer the question whether antitrust authorities can expect a 
preservation of “diversity”, either as a consequence of a newly created “intra-firm diversity”, 
or because of a direct maintenance of an acquired firm’s autonomy, after a merger. Part IV 
then concludes by drawing implications for the consideration of “diversity” aspects in merger 
review.        
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II. COMPETITION AND INNOVATION  
A. The incentives and abilities to innovate 
A broad range of literature is dealing with the interdependencies between competition and the 
firms’ incentives and abilities to innovate. The controversy in the academic debate started 
with Joseph Schumpeter who was particularly interested in the effects of competition on 
innovation.11 In his early work he assumed that competition fosters innovation in the sense 
that predominantly creative “entrepreneurs” are the main driver for innovation.12 In his view 
competition has to be seen as a process in which mainly small, innovative start-up firms come 
up with new ideas which then become manifest in new products and production processes.13 
In his later works, however, Schumpeter conversely argued that mainly big firms in highly 
concentrated markets are the key to technological progress.14
Apart from Schumpeter, a rich literature dealing with the effects of competition and 
concentration on innovation exists. Arrow demonstrated for example that the fruits of an 
innovation might (at least to some extent) solely replace previous profits (replacement-effect) 
if the innovator already has some market power on the respective pre-innovation market.
 Thereby he assumed that only 
these firms have the necessary ability to finance R&D projects, diversify the risks of 
innovative activities and appropriate its gains in a sufficient scale. 
15
Another very popular and likewise important argument why a rather less concentrated 
market structure drives innovation is the assumption that a firm, which does not fear rivalry 
from other competitors, would have no incentives at all to develop new products or 
production processes, because there is no need to improve or defend its market position
 
Hence, in the extreme case of a firm holding a monopoly position, the firm must fear that it 
will solely cannibalize its current profits by introducing an innovation to the market. As a 
result, a firm which possesses market power on a pre-innovation market would have fewer 
incentives to invest in R&D than a firm which faces fierce competition and which therefore 
generates merely little or even no pre-innovation profits.  
16 Yet 
another aspect why more competition might be the beneficial environment for innovation is 
based on the idea of patent races.17
                                                          
11 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, 
CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (Cambridge/Mass, Harvard University Press 1934). 
 An important characteristic of these models is the 
12  Id. at 74 et seq. 
13  Id. 
14 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, at 131-134 (Harper 1942). 
15  See Arrow, supra note 3. 
16  See John R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1 
(1935). See also Katz & Shelanski, supra note 1, at 9. 
17  See Loury, supra note 3; Reinganum, supra note 3. 
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assumption that perfect patent protection exists. Under such a setting, the innovator gains an 
exclusive right to market the invention. Thus, every firm taking part in this race has a strong 
incentive to be the first to invent. As a consequence, consumers may benefit from such an 
environment in the sense that new products or technologies are discovered earlier as 
compared to a situation in which there is solely little or no competition.  
However, like in the later work of Schumpeter, other scholars also argued that 
concentrated markets can equally foster innovation. By assuming product innovations and 
imperfect patent protection, Frederic Scherer and David Ross showed that increased 
competition can indeed foster innovation (stimulus factor) - but solely until a certain limit.18 
Too much competition might also hinder innovation in the sense that under very intense 
competition it is no longer possible to undertake profitable R&D projects because the 
innovation costs can no longer be recouped (market room factor). The authors therefore 
described the interrelation between competition and innovation in the pattern of an inverted-
U. This finding was confirmed in a recent article of Aghion et al.19 By differentiating between 
sectors with “neck-and-neck competitors” and those with “leading-” and “laggard 
competitors”, they showed that strong competition as well as market power can foster 
innovation, depending on whether the incentives to strive for “Schumpeterian rents” or the 
incentives to realize a so-called “escape-competition effect” outweighs the other. Other 
authors even demonstrated that also a monopoly might have strong incentives to innovate in 
order to defend its current monopoly position by patenting new technologies before potential 
competitors.20 As a result, to date, no general causal interrelationship between market 
structure and the incentives and abilities to innovate has been found. However, this finding 
should be interpreted with caution. The majority of the contributions presented above 
investigated the interrelation between product market structure and innovation instead of 
competition in innovation and innovation (or the structure of an ‘Innovation Market’21 and 
innovation). Since the competitors with respect to innovation do not necessarily compete with 
one another on actual product markets, a merger which affects innovation competition does 
not inevitably affect product market concentration.22
                                                          
18  See Scherer & Ross, supra note 
 If, however, a merger does not change 
product market structure, many arguments about the firms’ incentives and abilities to 
innovate, stemming from considerations about pre-innovation profits and the appropriability 
3, at 630-644. 
19  See Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. ECON. 701 
(2005). 
20  See Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 
AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982). 
21  See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 1. 
22  See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 1; Drexl, supra note 1. 
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of innovation gains, do no longer play a role in such an environment. As a consequence, many 
findings of the literature cited above cannot be transferred one-to-one to the interrelation 
between innovation competition and innovation.         
 
B. Competition, Diversity, Parallel Research and Innovation from an Evolutionary 
Economics Perspective   
While the discussion introduced in the last chapter mainly dealt with the question how 
competition influences the firms’ incentives and abilities to innovate, we will now focus on 
the role of “diversity” for innovation. It is remarkable that, in comparison to the questions 
related to a firm’s incentives and abilities to innovate, much less research has been carried out 
with respect to this dimension of competition for innovation. However, in 2006 Joseph Farrell 
introduced a paper which demonstrates the relevance of “diversity” from a competition policy 
perspective in a very vivid way.23
“[...] why not pursue both potentially life-saving treatments? Apparently Tanox thought it 
worth pursuing TNX-901 given the status of Xolair, which would be the normal market test if 
no ‘contract got in the way’ […].”
 In his article about “Complexity, diversity, and antitrust” he 
described his situation as a person who has got a peanut allergy in the context of the research 
efforts of the big pharmaceutical firms for a proper treatment for this allergy. The story was 
told as follows: A small biotech company called Tanox pursued a promising peanut allergy 
treatment called TNX-901. But, in 2003, Tanox’s corporation partners (Novartis and 
Genentech) insisted on the withdrawal of this research trial because, as they argued, the most 
promising drug was already found. However this promising treatment - Xolair - was already 
in the market for different indications. Whereon Farrell wondered:  
24
So he asked himself: “Isn’t diversity of approach one of the benefits of competition?”
  
25 And: 
”How, if at all, should antitrust seek to protect such diversity against (let’s assume) technical 
experts’ best judgements about ‘the most promising project’?”26
Even though very anecdotal, Farrell’s considerations out of a private demand lead our 
attention to the question about the role of “diversity” for innovation and consumer welfare. 
Compared to the debate related to the firms’ incentives and abilities to innovate, which is 
dominated by the industrial organization literature, the considerations about the important role 
of “diversity” are mainly rooted in evolutionary economics. The theoretical basis for 
    
                                                          
23  See Farrell, supra note 8. 
24  Farrell, supra note 8 at 166. 
25  Id. at 166. 
26  Id. at 166. 
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considerations about these aspects can be seen in the Hayekian concept of “competition as a 
discovery procedure”.27 Therein Hayek assumed that knowledge is always tacit, fragmental 
and dispersed.28 Beside the storable, scientific knowledge, he emphasized the meaning of 
knowledge as a “particular circumstance[s] of time and place” which “never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”.29 Thus, for Hayek, 
knowledge has an inevitably subjective character. This holds especially true for individual 
expectations, abilities, routines or a firm’s business culture which is very important for day-
to-day business, but hard to teach and learn. As a consequence, all individuals and all firms 
have a different knowledge base and should therefore be regarded as heterogeneous entities. 
Besides that, the idea of subjective knowledge in combination with (true) uncertainty30
This point of view is again in line with Farrell who wondered whether one important 
characteristic of competition might already be the persistence with approaches that other 
market participants think unpromising.
 also 
implies that the firms do not perfectly know ex ante which product is suited best to fulfil 
consumers’ needs, match with their preferences or how a certain innovation should be 
achieved best. Instead, each firm necessarily has to form its own expectations. This implies, 
especially in regard to innovation, that actions with respect to the future always rely on 
assumptions and expectations which can be either right or wrong.  
31 Farrell suggested that otherwise, “[…] if alternative 
approaches were clearly smart, even a monopoly could profitably pursue [them]”.32 This 
dimension of competition, the benefits of having a variety of different entities in the 
competition process, is what Farrell called very pictorially “the dark matter of competition”.33
The described knowledge problem is also a key component of evolutionary economics 
more generally.
  
34 In their seminal works, Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G Winter, for 
example, consider firms as diverse sets of “routines”.35
                                                          
27  See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); Friedrich A. 
Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND 
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., University of Chicago Press 1978). 
 In this connection, competition is 
considered as a process of variation and selection in which heterogeneous firms continuously 
offer solutions, in the form of new or at least modified products, for the problems and needs 
28   See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, at 519 (1945). 
29  Hayek, supra note 28 at 519. 
30   See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, (Houghton Mifflin 1921). 
31  See Farrell, supra note 8, at 168. 
32  Farrell, supra note 8, at 168. 
33  Id. at 168. 
34  See Nelson supra note 9, Metcalfe supra note 9, Kerber supra note 5. 
35  See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE, at 96 et 
seq. (Harvard University Press 1982). 
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of consumers.36 Thus, competition has an inherent experimental character of trial and error in 
which only the firms which have the right beliefs and expectations will prevail, while the 
others will disappear.37
In contrast to the original idea of Nelson and Winter, a further reduction in the number of 
independent competitors by mergers and acquisitions can nevertheless be detrimental for 
innovation. This applies if an already small number of innovation competitors coincide with 
the existence of remarkable entry barriers for the participation in a certain process of 
innovation competition.
 As a result, a reduction in the number of competitors is understood as 
a natural phenomenon in the competition process.   
38 In this case, the induced reduction of “diversity” cannot get 
balanced by new firms which could otherwise enter the process of innovation competition. 
However, this does not imply that the preservation of “diversity” should be put above 
everything else. It is undisputed that a trade-off between the benefits of having several 
independent firms undertaking R&D on the one hand and the advantages of integrating these 
efforts into a stronger and more efficient entity on the other can emerge.39 Hence, in analogy 
to Oliver Williamson’s idea of an “efficiency defence”40
Beside Hayek and the evolutionary economics literature, the view of heterogeneity 
between market participants is also shared in the management literature, particularly in the 
“resource-based view of the firm”.
, such considerations about possible 
innovation related efficiency gains should likewise be an integral part within the assessment 
of innovation effects of mergers.   
41 This field of literature highlights the importance of a 
firm’s particular resources like especially trained staff, experience, patents or a firm’s 
business culture.42
                                                          
36  Id. 
 Thus, in contrast to mainstream economics, where firms differ almost 
exclusively by the nature of their cost functions, firms are considered as entities which differ 
also with respect to their particular capabilities – capabilities which cannot be acquired and 
adopted easily in an adequate period of time. In regard to innovation, this assumption implies 
37  Id.  
38  The idea of entry barriers for the participation in the process of innovation competition is closely linked to 
the proposed assessment of specialized assets in the Innovation Market Analysis. See Richard J. Gilbert & 
Steven C. Sunshine, supra note 1, at 588 et seq. 
39 See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, The Tradeoff Between Firm Size and Diversity in the Pursuit 
of Technological Progress, 4 SMALL BUS. ECON. 1 (1992). 
40  See Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Anti-Trust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
18 (1968). 
41  See EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (John Wiley and Sons 1959); Jay B. Barney, 
Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MANAGE. 99 (1991); CYNTHIA A. 
MONTGOMERY, RESOURCE-BASED AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF THE FIRM: TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995). 
42  See, e.g., Scott L. Newbert, Empirical Research on the Resource-Based View of the Firm: An Assessment and 
Suggestions for Future Research, 28 STRATEG. MANAGE. J. 121 (2007). 
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that not only the incentives and the abilities to innovate matter, but also the variety of 
heterogeneous firms of which each might carry unique capabilities and ideas.  
Apart from the insights provided by economists and scholars working in the field of 
strategic management, it is also important to refer to the biodiversity literature where 
researchers analyze for instance the consequences of a decrease in the richness of species as a 
result of monoculture or dying breeds.43 In this respect it is argued that “diversity” matters in 
order to preserve nature’s capability to adapt to new conditions of a changing environment. 
This proposition is based on research findings which demonstrated that biodiversity indeed 
increases the probability that some species will adapt to an exogenous shock and therefore 
allow for a faster adjustment of the ecosystem to environmental changes.44 Furthermore, 
Tilman et al. have shown that, due to a so-called “probability effect”, the productivity of 
plants is positively correlated with the degree of biodiversity.45 These characteristics of 
biodiversity can also be understood as an “option-“ or “insurance value” which implies that 
“diversity” might play an essential role, even though the benefits are not obvious to us at the 
moment.46
It is interesting that some of the particular arguments put forward in the biodiversity 
literature can be applied again to the economic context. The idea of an “option value”, for 
instance, is also well known to economists.
  
47 In the competition context this value is created 
due to the fact that, under uncertainty, it is a priori unknown which firm or technology is 
suited best to solve a certain problem in the future or how a certain technology can be 
achieved.48
                                                          
43   See GISELA LINGE, COMPETITION POLICY, INNOVATION, AND DIVERSITY, at 122 et seq. (Tectum Verlag 
2008); For a rich overview on the relevance of biodiversity see e.g. Nina-Marie E. Lister, A systems 
approach to biodiversity conservations planning, 49 ENVIRONMENTAL MENTORING AND ASSESSMENT 123 
(1998). 
 From this point of view, it can be of relevance that a variety of independent firms 
exists. In analogy to the biodiversity literature, “diversity” should, one the one hand, augment 
the likelihood that there is at least one firm which has the necessary capabilities to adapt to a 
44  See, e.g., Randall Hughes & John J. Stachowitz, Genetic diversity enhances the resistance of a seagrass 
ecosystem to disturbance, 101 P. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA. 8998 (2004); Boris Worm & J. E. Duffy, 
Biodiversity, productivity and stability in real food webs, 18 TRENDS ECOL. EVOL. 162 (2003); David Tilman 
& J. A. Downing, Biodiversity and stability in grasslands, 367 NATURE 363 (1994). 
45  See, David Tilman et al., Diversity, productivity and temporal stability in the economics of humans and 
nature, 49 J. ENVIRON. ECON. MANAG. 405, at 412 et seq. (2005). 
46  It is remarkable that also the United Nations declared the year 2010 to be the international year of 
biodiversity. See Julia Marton-Lefèvre, Biodiversity Is Our Life, 327 SCIENCE 1179, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/327/5970/1179.full.pdf (Feb. 5, 2013). 
47  See, e.g., Richard L. Schmalensee, Option demand and consumer’s surplus: Valuing price changes under 
uncertainty, 62 AM. ECON. REV 813 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental 
Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. ECON. 312 (1974); David M. Kreps, A representative 
theorem for ‘preferences for flexibility’, 47 ECONOMETRICA 565 (1979). 
48  See, Stefan H. Thomke, EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
FOR INNOVATION, at 25 et seq. (Harvard Business School Press 2003). 
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possible “environmental change” and thereby solve a particular problem in the future. On the 
other hand, the “diversity” of approaches, in the sense of different currently employed R&D 
programs, can also lead to an increased probability that at least one of these current programs 
will be successful.        
In summary, there are actually two different reasons why “diversity” can be beneficial for 
innovation. First, “diversity” can be of value in the sense that a variety of heterogeneous and 
independent sources for future innovation exists. As a consequence, consumers would benefit 
from this variety in the sense that there is not just one but a couple of firms which have the 
capability to produce future innovations in a certain field of research. This should, in analogy 
to the biodiversity literature, augment the probability that there is at least one firm that offers 
an adequate solution for a certain problem in the future. It is remarkable that especially the 
U.S. antitrust agencies have put forward this line of argumentation in several challenges to 
mergers and acquisitions.49
“[...] Northrop, Lockheed, and Boeing do all pursue new ideas and designs for future high 
performance fixed-wing military aircraft to meet specific combat needs, and these firms are the 
only companies that have the capabilities to compete for combined electronics system integration 
and military airframe upgrades. The loss of Northrop as an independent entity will reduce the 
number of companies to which the Department of Defence can turn to design, develop, and 
produce high performance fixed-wing military aircraft from three to two.”
 In its complaint concerning the proposed acquisition of Northrop 
Grumman by Lockheed Martin in 1998 the DoJ argued for instance that:  
50
Hence, the DoJ obviously highlighted the relevance of the preservation of at least three 
independent entities as potential innovators and thereby aimed to protect “diversity” as an 
important feature of competition for innovation in order to meet future combat needs.
  
51
In addition to the relevance of “diversity” as a source for future innovations in a particular 
field of research, the second reason why “diversity” might play a crucial role for innovation is 
linked to research and development efforts which are already underway. In this respect 
“diversity” refers to research tracks which are carried out in parallel by distinct and 
independent entities, entities which have different beliefs and expectations about the most 
promising way to achieve a certain innovation. This idea of “parallel experimentation” or 
  
                                                          
49  See United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed March 23, 1998); 
United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 1998); United States v. 
General Dynamics Corp., Civ. No. 1:01CV02200 (D.D.C. complaint filed Oct. 23, 2001). 
50  See United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed March 23, 1998), at 
27. 
51  See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & John Hoven, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 65 (Jerry Ellig ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2001). 
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”parallel research” corresponds pretty much to Joseph Farrell’s Tanox-story in which he also 
questioned whether the abortion of the Xolair program might have been a bad decision from a 
consumers’ point of view. Like in the case in which “diversity” is understood as a source for 
future innovations, the U.S. antitrust agencies also challenged a remarkable number of 
mergers and acquisitions in which considerations about the preservation of existing parallel 
research paths played an important role.52 Thereby, the agencies argued in the majority of 
these merger cases that the transaction could lead to a “reduction or redirection” of research 
and development tracks. Hence, both the fear of a reduction as well as the suspected 
alignment of formerly independent research tracks can be associated with the protection of a 
“diversity” of research paths. Thus, in contrast to many industrial organization models in 
which “parallel research” is often seen as a wasteful duplication of R&D expenditures53
A good example which illustrates how heterogeneity and “parallel research” is considered 
in mainstream economics is provided by the seminal article of Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz.
, 
“parallel research”, carried out by independent entities, has to be seen more positively from 
this perspective. However, in the mainstream economics literature, the relationship between 
competition and the number of independent firms which are simultaneously undertaking R&D 
on the one hand and the consequential benefits for innovation on the other, plays only a minor 
role.  
54 Therein the authors demonstrated that, independently of the number of firms, there 
will always be an efficient market equilibrium (even though smaller than the socially optimal 
level) of research projects from an economy-wide perspective.55
                                                          
52 See, e.g., American Home Products Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217 (1995); Pfizer Inc. and Warner-Lambert Co., FTC 
Dkt. No. C-3957 (June 19, 2000); Baxter Int’l, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904 (1997); Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 
(1997); The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996); Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995); Glaxo Wellcome plc, 131 
F.T.C. 56 (2001). 
 Given a certain value of an 
innovation, each firm will pursue a certain number of R&D projects to optimize its 
probability of success in dependence of its research costs. If the number of firms decreases, 
the number of research projects of the remaining firms’ increases and the total number of 
R&D projects in the market will still maximize the economy-wide probability for success. As 
a consequence, the number of firms pursuing research projects in parallel has no impact on 
the innovative performance of an industry. However, this result only holds under the strong 
assumptions that the firms are homogeneous (have the same capabilities to undertake R&D). 
The authors acknowledged that: 
53  See, e.g., Loury, supra note 3; Reinganum, supra note 3. 
54  See Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 10, at 98 et seq. 
55  Id. 
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”[…] the probability of success of a particular project (conditional, say, on the failure of all 
other projects) is a function of the expenditure on that project and the expenditures on other 
projects, but not a function of the firms in which those other projects are undertaken.”56
Thus, only if the firms are considered as not being different with respect to how they do 
business, it is irrelevant (the probability of a success innovation is unaffected) if for example 
two R&D projects are undertaken by two distinct firms or simply by one big firm. This, 
however, is an assumption which one has to doubt against an evolutionary economics 
background.    
 
Hence, what is important for understanding the benefits of “diversity” is not only the 
consideration for uncertainty about how a certain innovation can be achieved best, but also 
the heterogeneity of the firms’ resources and capabilities for innovation as well as their 
subjective opinions about the most promising way to achieve them. Thus, our notion of 
“diversity” corresponds very well to what Constance K. Robinson, the former director of 
operations and merger enforcement of the DoJ, had in mind when she stated: “Even if two 
firms are attempting to achieve the same goal, they will approach this effort in different ways, 
making different choices along the way.”57 And, most importantly: “It is a matter of judgment 
as to the extent that one R&D effort duplicates another, and even small differences can make 
one attempt successful and another a failure.”58 Hence, from this perspective, it is not 
sufficient that firms merely undertake multiple R&D programs in parallel because they do not 
know which program is suited best in order to achieve a certain innovation.59
Nevertheless, there still remains a fundamental question. If the probability of a successful 
innovation also hinges on the variety of different, independent entities with unique 
capabilities, ideas, visions and business cultures - why should the merged entity abandon this 
variety? Would the merged firm not have an incentive to maintain this “diversity” in-house in 
 Instead, it is 
also important that these programs are carried out by different entities with different resource 
bases, cultures and different executives who decide about what is promising and what is not. 
                                                          
56  Id., at 106. 
57  Constance K. Robinson, Leap-frog and Other Forms of Innovation: Protecting the Future for High-Tech and 
Emerging Industries Through Merger Enforcement, Address before ABA, at 2 (June 10, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2482.pdf (Nov. 7, 2012). 
58  Id. 
59  See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel R and D efforts, 43 REV. 
ECON. STAT. 351 (1961); William J. Abernathy & Richard S. Rosenbloom, Parallel Strategies in 
Development Projects, 15 MANAGE. SCI. (10, Application Series) B486 (1969); Balaji S. Chakravarthy, 
Adaption: A promising metaphor for strategic management, 7 ACAD. MANAGE. REV. 35 (1982); Peter Moran 
& Sumantra Ghosal, Markets, Firms, and the Process of Economic Development, 24 ACAD. MANAGE. REV. 
390 (1999); Thomke, supra note 48. 
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order to augment its probability of a successful innovation? Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
already argued that:  
“[…] if different projects within a firm are sufficiently isolated from one another (for 
instance, because of the need to monitor the performance of different groups of researchers), 
then the firm affiliation may be less relevant.”60
The same question can be posed with respect to the first characteristic of “diversity”. If 
“diversity” indeed augments the probability that at least one firm has the capability to solve 
an unspecified problem in the future and will therefore successfully adapt to an environmental 
change, firms should again have an incentive to create/maintain such an environment in-
house, in order to ensure their survival in the long-run.
   
61
Hence, the crucial questions which have to be clarified in this respect are (1) whether firms 
do indeed consider the preservation of “diversity” in-house, either as a consequence of a 
newly created “intra-firm diversity”, or because of a direct maintenance of an acquired firm’s 
autonomy, after a merger. If our considerations about the benefits of “diversity” are correct, 
one would expect that we can also find respective evidence for this assumption in the more 
practitioner-oriented management and organizational science literature. However, in the event 
that we find evidence for the assumption that firms do indeed consider the 
creation/maintenance of “diversity”, it is still not guaranteed that they will really undertake 
such an attempt at the end of the day. Firms might face significant trade-offs, as well as 
problems in line with the creation/maintenance of “diversity” in-house. Hence, (2) we want to 
find out whether competition authorities can rely on an increase in the “intra-firm-diversity” 
which would compensate for a reduction of “inter-firm-diversity”, or whether they should 
rather expect a loss of “diversity” and some sort of alignment of formerly different 
approaches?  
  
 
III. DIVERSITY FROM A MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE  
A. Corporate Entrepreneurship literature 
The role of “diversity” for the innovativeness and general performance of firms is indeed not 
unknown in the field of strategic management. An important strand of literature which 
considers the idea of the introduced concept of “intra-firm diversity” is the Corporate 
                                                          
60  Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 10, at 106. 
61  See James G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, 2 ORGAN. SCI. 71 (1991); 
Daniel A. Levinthal & James G. March, The Myopia of Learning, 14 STRATEG. MANAGE. J. 95 (1993). 
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Entrepreneurship (CE) literature. Although scholars have not reached a real consensus on 
exactly  labeling the concept62 (the terms vary from “intrapreneurship”63, “internal corporate 
entrepreneurship”64, “corporate venturing”65, “new ventures”66 and “entrepreneurial 
management”67 to “strategic entrepreneurship”68), the common idea behind these terms can 
generally be summed up under the before mentioned ideational umbrella: Corporate 
Entrepreneurship.69 The same holds true with respect to the objective of what CE should 
actually achieve. The most prominent definitions range from diversification processes70, the 
transformation of ideas into collective actions71, the encouragement for risk taking72, the 
venturing of new business units73, strategic renewal74, the creation of new products or 
technologies75, to the development of new markets76
                                                          
62  See Lan Li et al., An Empirical study of Corporate Entrepreneurship in Hospitality Companies, 10 INT. J. 
HOSP. TOURISM ADM. 213 (2009); Karina S. Christensen, A Classification of the Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Umbrella: Labels and Perspectives, 1 I. J. MED. 301 (2004); Gregory G. Dess et al., Emerging Issues in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, 29 J. MANAGE. 351 (2003). 
. However, the vast majority of the 
63  See, e.g., GIFFORD PINCHOT, INTRAPRENEURING: WHY YOU DON’T HAVE TO LEAVE THE CORPORATION TO 
BECOME AN ENTREPRENEUR, (Harper And Row, New York 1985); Camille Carrier, Intrapreneurship in 
Large Firms and SMEs: A comparative Study, 12 INT. SMALL BUS. J. 54 (1994); Camille Carrier, 
Intrapreneurship in small Businesses: An exploratory Study, 21 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 5 (1996); Bostjan 
Antoncic & Robert D. Hisrich, Intrepreneurship: Construct Refinement and Cross-Cultural Validation, 16 J. 
BUS. VENTURING 495 (2001); Lin Chinho et al., Fuzzy Fitness model of Intrapreneurship activities or 
Taiwanese High-Tech Firms, 1 I. J. MED.  45 (2003). 
64  See, e.g., Hans Schollhammer, The Efficacy of Internal Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategies, in 
FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH (Karl H. Vesper eds., Wellesley/Mass, Babson College 1981); 
Gareth R. Jones & John E. Butler, Managing internal Corporate Entrepreneurship: An agency theory 
Perspective, 18 J. MANAGE. 733 (1992); G. T. Lumpkin & Gregory G. Dess, Clarifying the entrepreneurial 
orientation construct and linking it to performance, 21 ACAD. MANAGE. REV. 135 (1996). 
65  See R. J. Ellis & N. T. Taylor, Specifying Entrepreneurship, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPREUNERSHIP RESEARCH 
527 (N. C. Churchill et al. eds., Babson College, Wellesley/Mass 1987). 
66  See Edward B. Roberts, New Ventures for Corporate Growth, 58 HARVARD BUS. REV. 134 (1980). 
67  See Howard H. Stevenson & J. Carlos Jarillo, A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial 
Management, 11 STRATEGIC MANAGE. J. 17 (1990).  
68  See, e.g., Michael A. Hitt et al., Guest Editors’ Introduction to the Special Issue Strategic Entrepreneurship: 
Entrepreneurial Strategies for Wealth Creation, 22 STRATEGIC MANAGE. J. 479 (2001); R. Duane Ireland et 
al., Integrating Entrepreneurship and strategic management: Actions to create firm wealth, 15 ACAD. 
MANAGE. EXEC. 49 (2001). 
69  See Robert A. Burgelman, Corporate Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management: Insights from a Process 
Study, 29 MANAGE. SCI. 1349 (1983). 
70  Id., at 1349. 
71  Lai Hong Chung & Patrick T. Gibbons, Corporate Entrepreneurship: The roles of Ideology and social 
Capital, 22 GROUP ORGAN. MANAGE. 10, at 14 (1997). 
72  Shaker A. Zahra, Governance, Ownership, and Corporate Entrepreneurship: The moderating impact of 
industry technological opportunities, 39 ACAD. MANAGE. J. 1713 (1996). 
73  M.S. Spann et al., Entrepreneurship: Definitions, dimensions and dilemmas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE US 
ASSOCIATION FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 147, at 149 (1988). 
74  William D. Guth & Ari Ginsberg, Guest Editors’ Introduction: Corporate Entrepreneurship, 11 STRATEGIC 
MANAGE. J. 5, at 5 (1990). 
75  See Spann et al., supra note 73, at 149. 
76  See Daniel F. Jennings & James R. Lumpkin, Functioning modeling Corporate Entrepreneurship: An 
empirical Integrative Analysis, 15 J. MANAGE. 485, at 489 (1989).  
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definitions agree on the fact that CE aims, above all, at the enhancement of a firm’s capability 
to generate innovations.77
“[…] innovation, broadly defined, is the single common theme underlying all forms of 
corporate entrepreneurship.”
 Or as Covin et al. have put it: 
78
This stems from the fact that, from a management perspective, it is widely accepted that the 
generation of innovation in large firms requires numerous prerequisites such as adaptability, 
flexibility, corporate risk-taking behavior, speed or aggressiveness.
 
79
In order to overcome these problems and to generate an environment which fosters 
innovation, the Corporate Entrepreneurship literature often suggests the creation of 
independent units which have only limited structural linkages to the organization and which 
therefore possess a high degree of freedom of choice.
 As a consequence, there 
are various reasons why firms engage in the processes associated with CE. When established 
companies seek new business opportunities, they have to overcome various internal 
boundaries such as administrative barriers, risk aversion or organizational slack. Moreover, 
organizations are facing increased demands on individual products, fast-changing markets and 
increasing information flows. This requires a well adapting, flexible or even an 
entrepreneurial company.  
80 Such an approach ought to combine 
the entrepreneurial spirit of small, independent companies with the resources of large 
corporations.81 In particular, the establishment of these independent entities within a 
corporation is expected to be superior in the sense that it serves as a competitive advantage 
through the exploration of entrepreneurial opportunities and thus the generation of 
innovation.82
                                                          
77  See Elspeth McFadzean et al., Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation Part 1: The missing link, 8 E. J 
IM. 350 (2005). 
  
78  Jeffrey G. Covin & Morgan P. Miles, Corporate Entrepreneurship and the Pursuit of Competitive 
Advantage, 23 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 47 (1999). 
79  See Jennings & Lumpkin, supra note 76. 
80  See Eric von Hippel, Successful and Failing Internal Corporate ventures: An Empirical Analysis, 6 IND. 
MARKET. MANAG. 163 (1977); Morgan P. Miles & Jeffrey G. Covin, Exploring the practice of corporate 
venturing: Some common forms and their organizational implications, 26 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 21 
(2002); Thomas Keil, Building External Corporate Venturing Capability, 41 J. MANAGE. STUD. 799 (2004). 
81   See Edwin L. Hobson & Richard M. Morrison, How Do Corporate Start-Up Venture fare?, in FRONTIERS OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 390 (John A. Hornaday et al. eds., Babson Centre For Entrepreneurial 
Studies, Wellesley/Mass 1983). 
82  See Jeffrey G. Covin & Morgan P. Miles, Corporate Entrepreneurship and the Pursuit of Competitive 
Advantage, 23 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 47 (1999); R. Duane Ireland et al., Conceptualizing Corporate 
Entrepreneurship Strategy, 33 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 19 (2009); James C. Hayton, Strategic Human 
Capital Management In Smes: An empirical study of Entrepreneurial Performance, 42 HUM. RESOURCE 
MANAGE. 375 (2003); Todd J. Hostager et al., Seeing environmental Opportunities: Effects of 
Intrapreneurial Ability, Efficacy, Motivation and Desirability, 11 J. ORGAN. CHANGE MANAGE. 11 (1998). 
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In practice, Corporate Entrepreneurship can have numerous manifestations such as 
subsidiaries, joint-ventures, strategic alliances, business units or most recently the open-
innovation approaches.83
“[…] corporate entrepreneurship is basically an organisational mode, characterized by the 
factors of freedom and autonomy, allowing employees to innovate.”
 Nevertheless, in the context of CE, all of these organization forms 
share the property that they aim to foster the innovativeness of corporations by also 
considering the benefits of decentralization and autonomy as an important factor in order to 
reinvigorate the entrepreneurial spirit, behavior and capabilities within established firms. Or 
as Srivastava and Agrawal have put it:  
84
Hence, the CE literature can mainly be linked to the question whether firms can be expected 
to (newly) create “diversity” in-house, irrespectively of their decision regarding the direct 
maintenance/abandonment of the firms’ autonomy in a particular merger.  
 
It is remarkable that empirical research within the Corporate Entrepreneurship Literature 
has discovered that CE, if applied successfully, has indeed a significant impact on firm 
growth85 and their financial performance86. Hence, it is not surprising that many corporations 
engage in CE processes. Our literature review has brought to light several case studies on CE 
in corporations such as Philips87, Intel and General Electric88, FedEX89, Sony90, Google91, 
Accordia92, AT&T93 or 3M94
                                                          
83  See Bing-Sheng Teng, Corporate Entrepreneurship Activities through strategic alliances: A resource-based 
approach toward Competitive Advantage, 44 J. MANAGE. STUD. 119 (2007); MICHAEL H. MORRIS ET AL., 
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION (2nd ed., South-Western/Mason 2008). 
 just to name a few. Apart from these particular company 
84  Nidhi Srivastava & Anand Agrawal, Factors supporting Corporate Entrepreneurship: An exploratory Study, 
14 J. BUS. PERSP. 163 at 165 et seq. (2010).  
85  See, e.g., Bostjan Antoncic & Robert D. Hisrich, Intrepreneurship: Construct refinement and cross-cultural 
validation, 16 J. BUS. VENTURING 495 (2001); Franz W. Kellermanns & Kimberly A. Eddleston, Corporate 
Entrepreneurship in family firms: A family perspective, 30 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 809 (2006). 
86  See, e.g., Shaker A. Zahra & Jeffrey G. Covin, Contextual Influences on the Corporate Entrepreneurship 
performance relationship: A longitudinal analysis, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 43 (1995); Nihat Kaya, The impact 
of human resource management: practices and Corporate Entrepreneurship on firm performance: Evidence 
from Turkish firms, 17 INT. J. OF HUM. RESOUR. MAN. 2074 (2006). 
87  See Simon Ford et al., Evolving Corporate Entrepreneurship strategy: Technology incubation at Philips, 40 
R&D MANAGE. 81 (2010). 
88  See John Zimmerman, Corporate Entrepreneurship at GE and Intel, 6 JBCS. 77 (2010). 
89  See Broto R. Bhardwaj & Kirankumar S. Momaya, Role of Organizational flexibility for Corporate 
Entrepreneurship: Case study of Fedex Corporation, 7 GLOB. J.  FLEX. SYSTEMS MANAGE. 37 (2006). 
90  See Chung & Gibbons, supra note 71, at 12. 
91  See Todd A. Finkle, Corporate Entrepreneurship and innovation in silicon valley: The case of Google, Inc., 
36 ENTREP. THEORY PRACT. 863 (2012). 
92  See Donald F. Kuratko et al., Improving Firm Performance Through Entrepreneurial Actions: Acordia's 
Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategy, 15 ACAD. MANAGE. EXEC. 60 (2001). 
93  See Michael H. Morris & J. Don Trotter, Institutionalizing Entrepreneurship in a large company: A Case 
Study at AT&T, 19 IND. MANKET MANAG. 131 (1990). 
94  See Hostager et al., supra note 82, at 12 et seq. 
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examples, CE activity has also been reported for instance from Canadian95, German96, New 
Zealand97 or Dutch corporations98. It is not even bound to highly industrialized countries, 
since we found examples of CE activity in China99, Turkey100 or Argentina101
However, our assessment of the Corporate Entrepreneurship literature also revealed two 
important limitations with respect to the implementation of CE. (1) Empirical studies showed, 
that the employment of CE is apparently underlying certain variations. In the 1960s and early 
1970s, 25% of the Fortune 500 had a corporate venturing program. These were largely 
disbanded in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the corporate venturing was put back on the spot 
of corporations. But again, these initiatives were discontinued after the market downturn in 
1987. In the beginning of the 1990s the corporate venturing efforts were gaining momentum 
again and corporations have re-introduced CE activities.
.  
102 After the dot-com bubble burst, 
the initiatives were reconsidered and restructured again, since many firms were dissatisfied 
with the outcomes of the CE practices.103 Hence, CE seems to depend upon some kind of 
zeitgeist. (2) Even though several studies reported that some firms were remarkably rewarded 
after successfully relying on a CE strategy, other empirical studies which focused on the 
overall success rate of applied CE programs delivered much less promising results. Strebel, 
for instance, discovered that the success rates of corporate reengineering in Fortune 1000 
companies are solely between 20 and 50%104
“The disappointment […] reflects the fact that many companies are not very good at 
corporate venturing, or creating new businesses within their existing business.”
 and comparable observations lead Morris et al. 
to make the following disillusioning statement: 
105
                                                          
95  See Erik G. Rule & Donald W. Irwin, Fostering Intrapreneurship: The new competitive edge, 9 IJBS. 44 
(1988). 
 
96   See Ralf Schmelter et al., Boosting Corporate Entrepreneurship through HRM practices: Evidence from 
German SMES, 49 HUM. RECOURCE MANAGE. 715 (2010). 
97  See Jarrod M. Haar & Brook J. White, Corporate Entrepreneurship and information technology towards 
employee retention: A study of New Zealand firms, 23 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 109 
(2013). 
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This relatively poor performance might be caused by the fact that CE requires that it is 
embedded in the appropriate organizational environment. Such a CE-friendly environment 
can be characterized by the proper interplay of several factors which can be assigned to the 
following five main categories: organizational structure106, corporate culture107, human 
resource management108, corporate strategy109 and extern factors110
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Trotter111, Srivastava and Agrawal112, and Ireland et al.113). Hence, besides the extremely 
unlikely case in which a firm possesses such a CE-friendly environment automatically, it has 
to change its organizational structure, corporate culture, human resource management and 
corporate strategy in order to ensure a successful implementation of CE. As a consequence, it 
can be concluded that the willingness and ability to successfully change these factors towards 
a CE-friendly environment will, at the end of the day, also determine whether the 
implementation of CE will be successful or not. However, apart from the fact that the 
modification of the external factors is outside the scope of the firm, the attempt of changing 
the remaining internal factors is an ambitious and very risky undertaking. Beside the 
worrisome findings of Sirkin et al., who discovered that two out of every three transformation 
programs fail114, it was furthermore observed that firms are generally very reluctant with 
respect to attempts on organizational change (even though these changes are expected to 
improve their performance).115 This phenomenon, often called “structural inertia”116, is 
remarkable at first sight. However, Massimo Colombo and Marco Delmastro provided a 
comprehensive overview on explanations why firms might avoid any attempt of 
organizational change.117 In the population ecology literature, for example, it is argued that 
stable organizations with standardized routines create an environment of reliability and 
accountability - two properties that can also constitute an advantage in the evolutionary 
process of variation and selection.118
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decision making costs as a consequence of uncertainty, another explanation of this 
phenomenon was brought forward by the behavioralist theorists of organizations.119 Since, 
under such a setting, there is no guaranty that a change of the organizational structure will be 
successful, firms often prefer to stick to their current structure, until a very poor performance 
forces them to change.120 Yet another approach in order to explain the phenomenon of 
“structural inertia” can be found in the necessity to effectively monitor subordinates.121 The 
larger a firm’s size, the more levels of hierarchies can be needed in order to ensure a 
contracted level of effort and working morale of employees.122
“There is, in fact, a natural tendency for companies to lose the entrepreneurial spirit, and build internal 
constraints on entrepreneurship, as they evolve through the organizational life cycle.”
 Especially firms, operating in 
stable markets, often face a trade-off between a strong focus on cost reduction by relying on a 
clearly structured, highly hierarchical and effective organization and a rather entrepreneurial 
focus by relying on decentralization. Hence, there seems to arise a conflict with respect to the 
creation of the appropriate environment for corporate entrepreneurship on the one side and 
considerations relating to stability and cost efficiency on the other. This interpretation is 
further supported by the observation of Morris & Trotter who argue that: 
123
And: 
  
“These systems seek to provide stability, order, and coordination to an increasingly complex internal 
corporate environment. The trade-off, however, is a strong disincentive for entrepreneurship.”124
 
 
B. The Ambidextrous Organization  
This trade-off is also the essential component of the literature in connection with the idea of 
an ambidextrous organization.125
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exploration and exploitation strategies.126 That is to say, that a firm, in order to secure its 
long-term success, has to manage both, the exploitation of its current resources and 
competitive advantages, as well as the exploration of new business opportunities, new 
resources and the generation of innovations.127 However, this requires that firms, on the one 
hand, have to focus on the improvement of existing routines, structures and technologies in 
order to realize efficiency gains, quality advantages as well as incremental innovations, and, 
on the other hand, have to explore the technological search space in order to generate 
innovations and to find new business opportunities.128
To find a balance between these two goals is apparently not an easy undertaking, since 
many companies have difficulties in pursuing both strategies in parallel (mostly leading them 
to a dominant focus on exploitation).
  
129 Based on these observations, some scholars 
consequently suspected that there has to be some kind of unavoidable trade-off between 
exploitation and exploration activities.130
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depicted e.g. that pursuing either an exploitation - or exploration strategy requires 
fundamentally opposing sets of roles, incentives, culture and competences which hardly fit 
together within the same entity.131 In particular, explorative activities are considered as 
processes which succeed by experimenting and should therefore be carried out in small and 
decentralized units.132 Exploitation, however, requires rather large and centralized entities 
with tight cultures and processes.133 Benner & Tushman stated moreover, that even the 
diffusion of process management techniques as “Total Quality Management” (TQM), “Six 
Sigma” or the “International Organization for Standardization’s Series 9000” (ISO 9000) 
promoted exploitative innovations at the expense of explorative innovations, thereby 
indicating that both activities indeed cannot coexist in the same business unit.134 As a 
consequence, closely tied to the question relating to the compatibility of exploitation and 
exploration is the question with respect to the appropriate organizational structure for 
simultaneously pursuing these strategies on a corporate level. As a solution to this trade-off, 
some authors proposed to separate these activities from one another, whereas “[…] the tasks, 
culture, individuals, and organizational arrangements are consistent [within subunits], but 
across subunits tasks and cultures are inconsistent and loosely coupled”.135 Hence, the 
separation of the units with explorative tasks from the parent firm, and therefore also the 
degree of decentralization, in terms of organizational structure and autonomy, is often 
understood as the key element of success for achieving ambidexterity. This creation of 
separate structures for exploration and exploitation within one firm became known as 
structural ambidexterity.136 Others, however, consider these strategies as basically compatible, 
providing that they are pursued within an adequate organizational design.137 This approach, 
often called contextual ambidexterity, focuses on individuals to make choices between 
exploitation and exploration oriented tasks.138
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divide their work time according to the two activities so that they can also experiment with 
breakthrough ideas.  
Hence, this general tension between exploitation and exploration, which is deemed to 
determine a firm’s long-term success, provides the theoretical background for the following 
analysis of the firms’ incentives to maintain “diversity” in-house post-merger. While 
Corporate Entrepreneurship can be considered as an approach which reconciles exploitation 
and exploration strategies through the creation of independently operating business-units for 
exploration purposes139
 
, the post-merger literature can be linked to the question whether firms 
consider the direct maintenance of a target firm’s autonomy post-merger. Therefore, in the 
following we will analyze the post-merger integration literature in order to find out how and 
to what extent the preservation of “diversity” is considered against this background.  
C. Post-merger integration literature 
The literature on post-merger integration is familiar with the problem that the merging parties 
have to decide whether they want to exploit the newly gained resources and assets by 
structural integration or whether they should rather maintain the autonomy of the firms in 
order to enable continued innovation.140 In this context, structural integration is understood 
as: “[…] the alignment and standardization of processes and systems, common hierarchical 
control, cross-unit teams, and integrating managers […].141 It is argued that integration can 
benefit exploitation by offering substantial potential for synergies by realizing e.g. economies 
of scale and scope142, or by improving a firm’s capability to turn inventions into 
innovations.143 This improvement can be explained by an enhanced coordination through e.g. 
common processes, authority and incentive systems, as well as informal communication 
channels, a common language, group conventions and group identity.144
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acknowledged that structural integration can disrupt a firms’ capability for continued 
innovation which would therefore be detrimental for exploration strategies.145 Benner & 
Tushman146 as well as Ranft & Lord147, among others, pointed out that integration will 
inevitably alter the organizational routines and processes of the acquired firm (by making it 
similar to the acquirer), which will consequently lead to a loss of the firm’s identity and can 
diminish its capabilities to innovate.148
Thus, whilst centralization, control and structural integration is mostly understood as being 
beneficial for the exploitation of current resources,
  
149 decentralization and autonomy are often 
expected to be favorable for pursuing an exploration strategy.150 As possible solutions to this 
“coordination-autonomy dilemma”151, the literature basically offers two different approaches. 
Firstly, some authors proposed that an acquired firm could initially maintain its autonomy 
until it is integrated into the acquiring firm at a later point in time.152 However, the major 
shortcoming of these proposals is that the date, by which the acquired firm ought to be 
integrated, remains unspecified. Secondly, Puranam, Singh & Zollo153 recently offered an 
approach that relies on the progress of the underlying technological trajectory.154
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technological trajectory.155 However, whenever the technological paradigm appears to be in 
an already advanced stage, the negative consequences of structural integration were 
considered as less harmful.156
As a consequence, the arguments in favor of maintaining autonomy correspond very well 
to both aspects of our concept of “intra-firm diversity”. On the one hand it can be understood 
as an attempt to secure “diversity” in the sense of business units as independent sources for 
the generation of innovations and the identification of new business opportunities. On the 
other hand it is also in line with our second notion of “diversity” which focused on enabling 
an acquired entity to continue with its current innovation efforts without being influenced and 
interrupted by the acquirer and to avoid an alignment of so far different R&D tracks.  
       
However, even though considerations about the benefits of “intra-firm diversity”, by 
relying on autonomy for exploration purposes, apparently play a substantial role for scholars 
and practitioners who work in the field of post-merger integration, there are still significant 
incentives for structural integration in order to exploit current resources. This holds 
particularly true for large transactions. Since the majority of the contributions cited in this 
chapter on post-merger integration dealt with technology acquisitions of small innovative 
firms, the opportunity costs of preserving a target firm’s autonomy can be expected to be 
comparatively low. However, the larger the transaction, the higher is the potential to benefit 
from the exploitation of the newly gained resources and to achieve economies of scope. As a 
consequence, it is questionable whether private and social incentives (measured in consumer 
welfare) about the preservation of “diversity” after a merger do always coincide. This holds 
particularly true, whenever the benefits from exploiting the target firm are not passed on to 
consumers in the form of price-cuttings or significant product improvements, but become 
manifest predominantly in an increase in the firm’s profits. Hence, there can emerge 
situations in which an acquirer prefers structural integration and thus the exploitation of the 
target firm in order to increase its current profits, while consumers would favor to maintain 
the acquired firm’s autonomy in order to uphold the capacity for the generation of 
innovations. Besides this, March furthermore suspected that: “[E]stablished organizations will 
always specialize in exploitation, in becoming more efficient in using what they already 
know”.157 And O’Reilly & Tushman added: “In contrast, returns to exploration are more 
uncertain, more distant in time, and sometimes a threat to existing organizational units”.158
                                                          
155  See Puranam et al., supra note 
 
140. 
156  Id. 
157  March, supra note 129 at 14. 
158  O'Reilly III & Tushman, supra note 127 at 189. 
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These doubts are further reinforced by empirical studies which generally analyzed the 
impact of mergers and acquisitions on innovation. Even though these studies do not explicitly 
consider the impact of autonomy/integration on innovation, their findings still give food for 
thought. In their survey article on the empirical literature regarding the impact of M&A on the 
post-merger innovativeness of firms, De Man and Duysters159 could not find any significant 
positive effect of mergers and acquisitions on the innovativeness of the respective firms. The 
explanations put forward in line with this phenomenon vary from an assumed scarcity of 
financial resources for R&D as a consequence of the executed transaction160, integration 
problems161, to an overestimation of short-term financial targets over long-term strategic 
goals by managers162
 
. However, besides this, it can also be suggested that the observed 
negative effects of mergers on innovation stem, at least to some extent, also from an 
inordinate focus on exploitation strategies which sacrifice autonomy, and thereby the 
innovative capacity of the acquired firm, to structural integration.       
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is outstanding that many scholars, who can be associated with the disciplines of strategic 
management and organizational science, are obviously highly interested in the impact of a 
decentralized organizational structure and autonomy on the innovativeness and general 
performance of firms. Thus, the extensive literature analyzed in this article indicates above all 
that decentralized and independently operating business units, which possess a wide scope of 
decision-making and action as well as responsibility for their own budget, indeed foster 
innovation. Therefore, it can be derived that “diversity”, irrespective of the fact whether it can 
be found in-house or in the competition process among firms, apparently matters.  
Based on the richness of the introduced literature one might thus conclude that even 
merged entities should have an incentive to create/maintain “diversity” in-house and thereby 
balance a merger induced reduction of “inter-firm-diversity” by an increased “intra-firm-
diversity”. However, we also discovered that the creation of “intra-firm-diversity” is a very 
                                                          
159  See Ard-Pieter De Man & Geert Duysters, Collaboration and Innovation: A Review of the Effects of Mergers, 
Acquisitions and Alliances on Innovation, 25 TECHNOVATION 1377 (2005). 
160  See Michael A. Hitt et al., The Market for Corporate Control and Firm Innovation, 39 ACAD. MANAGE. J. 
1084, at 1089 (1996); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Research 
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAP. ECO. AC. 85 at 113 (1990). 
161  See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The two Faces of R&D, 99 ECON. J. 
569 (1989); Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and External Linkages: The Strategies 
of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. IND. ECON. 361 (1990); Udo Zander & Bruce Kogut, Knowledge 
and the Speed of the Transfer and Imitation of Organizational Capabilities: An Empirical Test, 6 ORAN. SCI. 
76 (1995); Teece et al., supra note 130. 
162  See Andrew D. James et al., Integrating Technology into Merger and Acquisition Decision Making, 18 
TECHNOVATION 563 at 566 (1998).  
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ambitious undertaking which demands that numerous requirements are fulfilled and which 
furthermore often tends to fail. Besides this, we depicted that the preservation of “diversity”, 
either as a consequence of a newly created “intra-firm diversity”, or because of a direct 
maintenance of an acquired firm’s autonomy, cannot be realized without (opportunity) costs. 
Hence, the firms will most likely face a trade-off between the creation/maintenance of 
“diversity” for the improvement of their innovative capacity on the one hand and integration 
and centralization for the exploitation of current resources and the realization of cost-saving 
potentials on the other. As a result, we can neither conclude that the degree of “diversity”, 
which existed before a certain merger takes place, will inevitably get lost, nor that it will 
definitely be upheld post-merger. However, apart from the difficulties in line with the creation 
of “diversity” in-house, we also found evidence that firms tend to have a predominant focus 
on exploitation goals at the expense of exploration objectives. Hence, we have good reason to 
reject the presumption that merging firms will definitely preserve an efficient level of 
“diversity” post-merger. 
What conclusions can be drawn from a competition policy perspective? Does the fact that 
the successful implementation of “intra-firm-diversity” is apparently not an easy task and that 
firms tend to overvalue exploitation objectives provide ample reasons for an intervention of 
antitrust agencies in the review process of mergers? Can mergers and acquisitions themselves 
not be understood as a process of experimentation on an organizational level and therefore as 
an inherent part of the overall evolutionary process of trial and error in which only the best 
solutions and most capable firms will prevail? Shouldn’t firms that have the capability to 
successfully implement “intra-firm-diversity” be rewarded by a higher innovativeness and a 
superior performance while the firms that lack these capabilities would simply disappear? 
Hence, it can be questioned why competition authorities should protect “inter-firm diversity” 
with the ultimate goal that a variety of sources for the generation of future innovations is 
secured and parallel experimentation is rendered possible, while they restrain the 
experimental process on the organizational level at the same time. 
These are serious questions and should be subject to further research. However, a crucial 
precondition for our considerations about the protection of “diversity” in merger review was 
the existence of significant entry barriers for the participation in the process of innovation 
competition. These kinds of entry barriers became known under the term “specialized 
assets”163
                                                          
163  See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 
 and are considered as assets which are indispensible, as well as difficult to acquire 
and adopt, for the generation of innovations in a certain field. As a consequence, whenever 
1. 
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competition authorities fail to identify such “specialized assets”, a loss of “diversity” should 
simply get balanced by new entrants – regardless of whether the merging parties succeed or 
fail to create/maintain “diversity” in-house. However, whenever these entry barriers are high 
and the competitive structure is furthermore already highly concentrated, the assessment 
becomes more delicate. Under such a setting it can indeed be advisable to challenge a certain 
transaction and thus suppress the process of experimentation on an organizational level in 
order to protect “inter-firm-diversity” and thereby the process of parallel experimentation as 
well as potential sources for future innovations.164
                                                          
164  For a further discussion, especially with respect to the trade-off between the benefits of “diversity” on the one 
hand and possible efficiency gains on the other, see Cohen & Klepper, supra note 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite the consensus that competition policy should also protect innovation competition, it is 
still very unclear whether and how competition authorities should take innovation effects into 
account. This is particularly true for merger policy, where the growing emphasis on case-
specific economic analysis has led to a greater focus on the assessment of short-term price 
effects of mergers, whereas the potentially negative effects on consumer welfare through less 
innovation are in danger of being ignored. This asymmetry can also be seen very clearly in 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines both of the EU and the U.S., in which innovation effects of 
mergers play only a small role (EU Commission 2004, DOJ/FTC 2010). One important rea-
son is the uncertainty of competition authorities (as well as lawyers and economists) about 
how innovation effects of mergers can and should be assessed (for an overview about the dis-
cussion Katz/Shelanski 2007). A crucial part of the problem concerns a basic conceptual is-
sue: Is the traditional approach of first defining product markets and subsequently analyzing 
the anticompetitive effects of a merger on these markets also suitable for assessing innovation 
effects of mergers or is it necessary to use a more innovation-specific assessment approach? 
In the U.S., this question led to the development of the Innovation Market Analysis (IMA) as 
a new approach for the assessment of innovation effects in antitrust law in the mid 1990s 
(Gilbert/Sunshine 1995). The problems with the traditional product market approach are, first-
ly, that the competitors in regard to the innovation of new products might not be identical 
with the competitors in a traditional product market, as some incumbent firms might not in-
novate or also non-incumbent firms might take part in innovation competition. Secondly, 
market shares and concentration levels on product markets might not be good indicators for 
assessing the effectiveness of innovation competition. Therefore, the basic idea of the innova-
tion market analysis focusses on a direct identification of the relevant innovation competitors 
by asking for the firms that have the necessary resources for innovation (in form of special-
ized assets), leading to so-called innovation markets. Subsequently, it is asked whether a mer-
ger would lead to negative effects on innovation, i.e. by delaying or reducing investment in 
R&D (with the possibility of balancing anticompetitive effects with efficiency effects). 
This new approach of the innovation market analysis had been criticized vigorously from its 
beginning.  The major points of criticism were that a new concept is not necessary (claiming 
that the traditional concepts are sufficient) and that such an analysis is unfeasible, given our 
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limited knowledge about the innovation effects of mergers.1 Nevertheless, and despite this 
critique, the innovation market analysis appears to have influenced considerably U.S. antitrust 
policy. One important application was the explicit inclusion of the concept of innovation mar-
kets in the "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property" in 1995 (DOJ/FTC 
1995). At the same time, a considerable increase of concerns in regard to innovation effects in 
the merger reviews of U.S. antitrust authorities can be observed (Gilbert 2008a). However, 
afterwards the support for the innovation market analysis in the academic discussion has 
waned dramatically. This has become evident in the discussion about the reform of the U.S. 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 2010) with its mixture of broad support for as-
sessing innovation effects in merger analysis but its rejection of recommending the innovation 
market analysis.2 
The objective of our paper is an empirical analysis to what extent and how the U.S. antitrust 
authorities, i.e. the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),  
took account of negative innovation effects in their assessments of mergers. Although the EU 
merger policy also considered innovation effects to some extent, the U.S. experiences with the 
assessment of innovation effects in merger reviews is much richer and more interesting, be-
cause the innovation market discussion allowed for a more explicit experimentation with new 
assessment approaches. In our empirical analysis, we have examined all 399 mergers that 
were challenged by the FTC and DOJ between 1995 and 2008.3 Our sources are the "com-
plaints", "decision and orders", "final judgments", etc. By analyzing all 399 complaints in 
these cases, we could identify a sub-sample of 135 merger cases, in which innovation con-
cerns have been investigated explicitly (FTC: 91, DOJ: 44). Therefore, in the U.S., a large 
number of relevant cases exists. In addition to that, the innovation concerns of the agencies 
also led to a considerable number of settlements with structural remedies. These settlements 
required the merging firms to far-reaching divestitures, especially in regard to parallel R&D 
projects, which had to be sold to competing firms in order to maintain innovation competition 
(for an overview see, e.g., Carrier 2008). 
                                                 
1  See for a critical discussion, e.g., Rapp (1995), Lang (1997), Morse (2001), Carlton/ Gertner (2003), 
Davis (2003), Kent (2011); see for a more balanced perspective Katz/Shelanski (2007, 41-44), Car-
rier (2008), and Kern (2014). 
2  The respective public comments and records of the FTC/DOJ joint workshops can be found on: 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2010/01/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-0 
(Aug. 14, 2014).   
3  See the “Annual Competition Enforcement Reports to Congress” of the agencies between the fiscal 
year 1995 and fiscal year 2008. 
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Although there is considerable literature on merger cases with respect to innovation aspects, 
which analyze particular cases in a qualitative way,4 only Gilbert (2008a) has so far analyzed 
cases also quantitatively. Our study is the first econometric study about the question how the 
U.S. merger policy assessed innovation effects of mergers. In comparison to Gilbert (2008a), 
our study encompasses more cases due to a longer investigation period (1995 - 2008) but also 
focusses not only on the question to what extent but also how the U.S. agencies assessed in-
novation effects of mergers. Additionally, we also ask whether the two agencies FTC and 
DOJ used the same or different assessment approaches in regard to innovation effects of mer-
gers, and whether we can observe developments during our investigation period 1995 - 2008 
in regard to these assessments.5 
The first part of our empirical study (in section 2) focusses on the extent the antitrust agencies 
took innovation concerns into account. How important were innovation concerns? Under what 
circumstances did the agencies assess a merger also in regard to innovation effects? Were 
there differences between the agencies? Our results will show that in a third of all challenged 
merger cases the agencies also raised innovation concerns, and in this regard we also could 
not find significant differences between the agencies or a change during the entire period. We 
can also show that the probability that the agencies assess innovation concerns increases with 
the innovativeness of the industry of the merging firms. 
In the following sections 3 and 4, we examine how the FTC and the DOJ assessed innovation 
effects in particular. This analysis takes place on the level of markets. Section 3 addresses the 
crucial question whether the agencies try to assess innovation effects more within the tradi-
tional approach of defining product markets, and only investigate negative effects on innova-
tion in the ensuing competitive assessment, or whether they use a newer, more innovation-
specific approach, which already considers innovation in the market definition. We will see 
that in a large number of markets, innovation was explicitly taken into account already in the 
market definition, and not only in the competitive assessment analysis. Our results will also 
show that both assessment approaches were used by both agencies, however, to a significantly 
                                                 
4  See, e.g., Davis (2003), Morse (2001), Rubinfeld/Hoven (2001), Landman (1999), Katz/Shelanski 
(2007), Carrier (2008), Kern (2014). 
5  Whereas this paper presents the econometric results of our study, a broader discussion of these (and 
additional) results within the context of the theoretical and empirical knowledge about innovation 
effects of mergers and the recent discussion in U.S. antitrust policy can be found in Kerber/Kern 
(2014) 
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different extent. It is particularly interesting that the FTC used more an innovation-specific 
approach than the DOJ in regard to market definition, whereas the DOJ stuck more to the tra-
ditional product market approach. Other empirical questions refer to the extent of the use of 
conventional (market shares, HHI) or more innovation-specific concentration measures (num-
ber of firms). 
The last part of our empirical study (in section 4) analyzes the theoretical reasonings the 
agencies gave why the mergers might have negative effects on innovation. We investigate not 
only what kind of theoretical reasonings have been mentioned (e.g., innovation incentives or 
diversity arguments), but also to what extent the agencies provided specific arguments at all. 
Although increasingly innovation incentive arguments were used, the results will show that in 
more than 50% of all assessed markets the agencies gave no specific reasons for their alleged 
innovation concerns (particularly the FTC). A surprising result is that increasingly the agen-
cies (and in particular the DOJ) also claimed static price effects in those markets, in which 
they had innovation concerns. In combination with the high share of cases without specific 
reasonings, this outcome raises critical questions about the quality and development of the 
policies of the agencies in regard to the assessment of innovation effects in merger cases. Our 
concluding section 5 will integrate the results of all three parts of the empirical study, discuss 
and relate these critical questions to the recent reform discussion of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, and give some hints for further research.  
 
2.   Extent of Assessing Innovation Effects in U.S. Merger Policy 
2.1  Hypotheses 
How often and under what circumstances did the U.S. agencies investigate mergers not only 
in regard to price effects but also in regard to negative effects on innovation as another possi-
bility how consumers can be harmed? For our empirical analysis, we consider a merger case 
as an innovation merger case, whenever the agencies have mentioned in the "complaint" in-
novation aspects in at least one market, either in the market definition or in the competitive 
assessment. Typical wordings, indicating that innovation is considered in the market defini-
tion, are provided by terms like "the research, development, manufacture and sale of [...]”, 
whereas a consideration of innovation effects within the competitive assessments is shown 
through explicitly claimed anticompetitive innovation effects. For identifying an innovation 
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merger case, it was sufficient that such innovation aspects were mentioned in at least one of 
the investigated markets.  
From the overall 399 merger challenges of the FTC and DOJ between 1995 and 2008, we 
identified 135 mergers, in which the agencies have mentioned innovation aspects in either the 
market definition and/or anticompetitive effects (FTC: 91; DOJ: 44; see Table 1). In this sub-
sample of 135 cases, the agencies have analysed 341 different markets. After excluding 18 
markets, in which only concerns in regard to price increases were raised, we received a sec-
ond subsample, consisting of 323 analyzed markets (FTC: 218; DOJ: 105), in which innova-
tion aspects were mentioned (either in the market definition or in the anticompetitive effects 
or in both).6 Whereas our analysis in this section focusses entirely on the case level (by inves-
tigating the 135 innovation merger cases in comparison to all 399 challenged mergers), our 
analyses how the agencies assessed these innovation effects (sections 3 and 4), are carried out 
on the market level and therefore use the subsample of the 323 markets with innovation as-
pects.  
What makes a merger case an innovation merger case in U.S. merger policy? When can one 
expect that antitrust agencies have concerns about negative innovation effects of mergers? It 
can be presumed that in high technology industries, in which innovation activities are particu-
larly important, more concerns about innovation effects will be raised than in other industries, 
which can be characterized by a lower relevance of innovation. Therefore, our first hypothesis 
is that mergers in more innovative industries will be assessed more often in regard to innova-
tion effects (see Gilbert 2008a). A rejection of this hypothesis would raise critical questions 
about the appropriateness of the selection of cases for assessing innovation effects by the anti-
trust agencies. 
H 1.1:  It is more likely that the FTC and DOJ consider negative effects on innovation when 
mergers take place in innovation-intensive industries.  
Since both agencies are in the same way authorized for merger reviews, we expect that no 
systematic differences between both agencies should be observed in regard to assessing inno-
vation effects. However, there are also strong arguments why one could suspect that there are 
still remarkable differences with respect to the way how they assess mergers. Apart from the 
                                                 
6 Please note that we do not call these markets innovation markets, because they need not be identical 
with how the innovation market approach would define innovation markets. 
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fact that the two agencies are composed differently (the DOJ as a part of the Administration 
and the FTC with a bipartisan mixture of Commissioners), some scholars also claimed that 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission do generally differ with respect 
to their skill sets, cultures, and capabilities. However, experience shows that the agencies 
have developed some kind of division of labour in regard to merger reviews. Although there 
are no legally binding rules about which agency scrutinizes what kind of mergers, in certain 
industries mergers are mostly assessed by the FTC, whereas in other industries this is done by 
the DOJ.7 As a consequence, it is necessary to control for these effects by using the industry 
classification as control variable.  
H 1.2:  There are no differences between the FTC and DOJ in regard to the probability that 
innovation effects are taken into account. 
Can we identify changes within the time span of 1995 to 2008 in regard to the question 
whether the agencies did consider innovation aspects in merger reviews? In his empirical 
analysis, Gilbert (2008a) divided his observed period from 1990 to 2003 into three sub-
periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2003. The study of Gilbert showed clearly that in-
novation effects of mergers played only a negligible role in the time before the Innovation 
Market Analysis was introduced in 1995. We decided for a simpler, two-period approach. The 
reason is that since the end of the 1990s an ever-increasing critique can be observed in regard 
to the application of the innovation market analysis, leading to claims that the Gen-
zyme/Novazyme landmark decision of the FTC in January 2004, in which the FTC did not 
challenge a 2:1 merger in regard to the development of a specific drug, might have been the 
result of a changing attitude towards the assessment of innovation effects of mergers (Muris 
2004, Balto/Sher 2004, Gilbert 2008b, Rosch 2009). Hence, we decided to use the sub-periods 
1995-2003 and 2004-2008. Our hypothesis is that the agencies challenged fewer mergers on 
the basis of innovation concerns since 2004 than before. 
H 1.3:  The probability that innovation effects are claimed is lower for mergers that fall into 
the period 2004-2008 compared to those falling in the period 1995-2003. 
 
                                                 
7 See for this discussion Maria Barroso Gomes (2013), Carroll (2009), Blumenthal (2013), Memo-
randum (2002). 
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2.2.  Data and Empirical Model   
For analyzing the determinants of merger cases being investigated for innovation effects, we 
defined a dummy variable (INNOV_CASE) which is equal to unity when innovation aspects 
were mentioned in the complaint and zero otherwise. Our first set of explanatory variables 
encompasses the innovativeness of the industry. By using the variables HITEC 0 - HITEC 5 
we accounted for the different degrees of technology intensity of the relevant industries. In 
this respect we follow Peneder (2010) in order to classify the industries of our sample into 
“Low” (HITEC 1), “Med-low” (HITEC 2), “Med” (HITEC 3), “Med-high” (HITEC 4) and 
“High” (HITEC 5) technology industries, according to their 2-digit ISIC/NACE denotation 
(Table A-1 in the appendix). The dummy HITEC 0 captures all industries which were not part 
of Peneder’s taxonomy but were characterized by much less innovative activity than HITEC 
1-industries.8 In order to obtain the ISIC/NACE number for the merger cases of our sample 
we used the relevant markets as they were defined in the complaints.9 The Dummy FTC, 
which is equal to one for FTC cases and zero for DOJ cases, indicates whether a case was 
challenged by the FTC or the DOJ. We also defined a dummy variable D04-08, which is set 
equal to unity whenever the respective case was challenged in the period 2004 - 2008. 
In order to test our hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3, we used probit10 techniques by regressing the IN-
NOV_CASE dummy on the explanatory variables: FTC, the time period (D04-08), and the 
technological intenseness of the industries (HITEC 1 to HITEC 5). Next, we built several in-
dustry dummies as controls to account for possible heterogeneity induced by different indus-
tries. For this purpose, we used the classification scheme of the FTC (according to the FTC 
Competition Enforcement Database11), with which the agency classified each of its actions 
                                                 
8 According to the 2-digit ISIC/NACE, HITEC 0 encompasses “construction” (45), “sale, mainte-
nance and repair of motor vehicles” (50), “retail trade, except of motor vehicles” (52), “hotels and 
restaurants” (55), “real estate activities” (70), “renting of machinery and equipment” (71), “public 
administration and defense” (75), “Education” (80), “health and social work” (85), “sewage and re-
fuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities” (90), “activities of membership organizations n.e.c.” 
(91), “recreational, cultural and sporting activities” (92), “other service activities” (93), “private 
households with employed persons” (95), “extra-territorial organizations and bodies” (99). 
9 Thereby we avoided possible biases as a consequence of the usage of, e.g., firm primary codes and 
safeguarded that we assign each merger case the appropriate industry classification number (on a 4-
digit level) from an antitrust perspective. 
10 As our left hand side variable INNOV_CASE is binary the application of OLS yields inefficient 
estimates. We therefore used probit models for all our regressions. We also used logit techniques 
and linear probability models in order to check for robustness. Overall, the results did not change 
qualitatively throughout the analysis in dependence of the respective method used.   
11  For a detailed overview see http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings (Aug. 14, 2014). 
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into one of seven main categories (Defense, Energy, Health Care, Information and Technolo-
gy, Manufacturing, Professional Services and Retail), and into 28 subcategories. Since our 
sample does not entail cases from all the industries, we end up with a maximum of 16 indus-
try classes (see Table A-2 in the appendix).  
 
2.3  Results 
In a first step we report the absolute and relative frequencies of innovation cases challenged 
by FTC and DOJ. As can be seen from Table 1 the agencies have analysed innovation aspects 
in 135 of the 399 challenged merger cases over the entire period, i.e., in 34% of all cases.   
Table 1: All challenges of mergers (by DOJ and FTC) and cases with innovation aspects  
  Ʃ  FTC + DOJ Ʃ FTC Ʃ DOJ FTC DOJ 
95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'08 95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'03 04-'08 
total % total % total % total % total % total % total % total % total % 
all challenged 
mergers*  399 100% 298 100% 101 100% 252 100% 147 100% 189 100% 63 100% 109 100% 38 100%
cases with inno-
vation aspects**  
(% of all chal-
lenges) 
135 34% 100 34% 35 35% 91 36% 44 30% 67 35% 24 38% 33 30% 11 29% 
Sources: DOJ/FTC Annual Competition Enforcement Reports and agency complaints. The years 
shown are fiscal years which start on October 1st.    
* including consent decrees, injunctive reliefs, administrative complaints, abandonments. 
** innovation aspects in market definition and/or in anticompetitive effects. 
This result supports the view that innovation concerns have been relevant in U.S. merger poli-
cy. Overall, differences between the agencies are only small with respect to the share of inno-
vation mergers (FTC: 36%; DOJ: 30%) over the entire period. Also the comparison between 
1995-2003 and 2004-2008 does not indicate significant differences between the time periods, 
neither in regard to all challenged mergers from both agencies nor in regard to FTC and DOJ 
separately. Therefore, the descriptive results do not suggest significant changes in regard to 
the extent of taking innovation aspects into account. 
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Table 2: Probit Regression: Cases with innovation effects  
INNOV_CASE Probit 2.1 Probit 2.2 Probit 2.3 Probit 2.4 
FTC - 0.101  (0.45) - 
0.096 
(0.44) 
D04-08 - - -0.089 (0.67) 
-0.085 
(0.67) 
HITEC 1 („low“) 3.799 (0.00) 
3.766 
(0.00) 
3.802 
(0.00) 
3.822 
(0.00) 
HITEC 2 („med-low“) 4.650 (0.00) 
4.592 
(0.00) 
4.680 
(0.00) 
4.676 
(0.00) 
HITEC 3 („med“) 5.010 (0.00) 
4.961  
(0.00) 
5.036 
(0.00) 
5.041 
(0.00) 
HITEC 4 („med-high“) 5.085 (0.00) 
5.030  
(0.00) 
5.106 
(0.00) 
5.105 
(0.00) 
HITEC 5 („high“) 5.647 (0.00) 
5.589  
(0.00) 
5.665 
(0.00) 
5.661 
(0.00) 
FTC Classes YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.387 (0.00) 
-5.362  
(0.00) 
-5.381 
(0.00) 
-5.410 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Log Pseudolikelihood -141.81 -141.70 -141.71 -141.61 
Obs 297 297 297 297 
Note: p-values given in parentheses. All values are calculated using robust and clustered standard errors. 
 
We now turn to the results of our regression analyses. Table 2 presents the results from differ-
ent specifications (Probit 2.1.-2.4) of our probit analysis of a merger case being identified as 
an innovation case by the agencies. All of the models show that the assessment of innovation 
effects is more likely with an increasing innovation intensity measured by HITEC-dummies. 
Estimated coefficients of HITEC-classes are steadily increasing in each of the regressions 
which indicates an increasing impact of the degree of technological intenseness (“Low”, 
“Med-low”, “Med”, “Med-high” and “High” technology industries), in comparison to our 
base category HITEC 0. This result is also supported by the marginal effects calculated at the 
sample means which can be seen from Table A-3 in the appendix. Therefore, hypothesis 
H1.1, i.e. that the agencies assess more innovation aspects if the mergers take place in more 
innovation-intensive industries, is confirmed by the data. The results also show no significant 
differences between the agencies (hypothesis H 1.2), i.e., both agencies take innovation ef-
fects into account to a similar degree. Finally, there is no evidence that the probability of as-
sessing innovation effects has changed significantly over time. As can be seen from Table 2, 
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our dummy D04-08 is statistically insignificant, indicating that, as suggested by our descrip-
tive results, there is no evidence for a suspected change in regard to the consideration of inno-
vation aspects after 2004 (hypothesis H 1.3). The Pseudo-R2 is identical for all of the regres-
sions. About 31% of the variation of our dependent variable can be described by our model. 
Hence, at least about a third of the variation in INNOV_CASES is explained by HITEC-
classes as well as FTC classes. 
 
3.  Market Definition and Competitive Effects: Are the Agencies Using an Innovation-
specific Approach? 
3.1  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
The traditional concept for assessing mergers uses the product market concept for identifying 
the relevant competitors in the market (hypothetical monopoly test) before carrying out a 
competitive assessment whether the merger is expected to harm consumers by raising prices 
or reducing innovation activities. This is the approach described in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, both before and after their reform in 2010 (DOJ/FTC 2010). In this approach the 
innovation dimension is not considered in the market definition, and can only be taken into 
account in the competitive assessment part of the merger review. The main problem with this 
approach is that not all firms that are competing for innovation by investing in R&D need be 
active in the current product market, and that not all incumbents in the product market need 
be competitors in regard to innovation. Therefore, the set of relevant firms in innovation com-
petition might be different from the relevant competitors in the current product market, lead-
ing to a wrong assessment of mergers through an erroneous market definition (for a deeper 
analysis, see Kern 2014).  
This is the reason why the "innovation market analysis" (IMA) introduced "innovation mar-
kets" as an additional way of identifying the relevant competitors in regard to innovation. It 
proposed a five step procedure for assessing the innovation effects of mergers (Gil-
bert/Sunshine 1995, 594-597; Gilbert/Tom 2001). In a first step, it is analyzed whether R&D 
activities of the merging firms overlap. This step is followed by an investigation of alternative 
sources of innovation (step 2). This requires an analysis of the necessary resources in form of 
specialized assets, as, e.g., laboratory equipment or intellectual property rights. Through these 
two steps the innovation competitors are identified (defining the innovation market). In the 
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following steps 3 and 4, it is assessed whether the merged firms would have the incentives 
and capabilities to reduce their R&D activities through either unilateral or coordinated behav-
iour, or whether other competitors would render such strategies as either not feasible or not 
profitable. This represents the analysis of potential anticompetitive effects in regard to inno-
vation competition, which is followed by an analysis whether an expected reduction in R&D 
investments through the merger could be defended through innovation-related efficiencies 
(step 5).  
In this section, we want to analyze whether the agencies in their innovation merger cases used 
the above-described traditional approach or used a new, more innovation-specific concept, 
which might be inspired by the innovation market analysis. In fact, in our data set we identi-
fied many innovation merger cases, in which we encountered market definitions in the form 
of "research, development, production and sale of [...]", whereas in many others we found 
only "production and sale of [..,]" in the market definition and innovation concerns are only 
mentioned in the competitive assessment of the merger. If innovation is already considered as 
a part of the market definition, it can be suggested that the agencies did not rely on the tradi-
tional product market approach but used a more innovation-specific approach. Thus, our deci-
sive criterion for distinguishing both concepts is whether innovation is already considered in 
the market definition, or only as an additional part of the anticompetitive effects analysis after 
defining markets along the product market concept. We think that the other steps of the IMA 
approach are less crucial for defining a new innovation-specific approach, because they also 
can be carried out within the traditional assessment approach. 
The question whether a traditional product market concept is used or a more innovation-
specific approach is also relevant for the usually most important first assessment criterion, i.e. 
the (change of) market concentration through the merger. Although this criterion is now seen 
much more critically than in former times even for the assessment of static price effects, there 
is a broad consensus that market concentration as measured by market shares and the Her-
findahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) might not be an appropriate criterion for assessing the inten-
sity of innovation competition, since these measures refer only to the market shares on current 
product markets. If firms compete for innovation, then the mere number of independent inno-
vating firms might be a simpler but more accurate innovation-specific measure for the market 
concentration that is relevant for the assessment of innovation competition. This is also the 
way how the U.S. Antitrust IP Licensing Guidelines of 1995 take account of market concen-
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tration in regard to innovation competition. There it is stated that an agreement is unlikely to 
have anticompetitive effects on innovation, if there are at least four other independently con-
trolled entities competing for innovation (4 plus-rule) (DOJ/FTC 1995, § 3.2.3).  Therefore, 
we also can distinguish two basic different groups of measures for concentration: First, con-
ventional approaches as HHI and market shares, which refer to current product markets and 
are therefore aligned with the traditional assessment approach. Secondly, the agencies can 
also use more the pure number of competitors as a measure which is better suited for as-
sessing innovation competition concerns. 
In this section 3, we will analyze our data set in regard to the question to what extent the 
agencies have made their assessment more along the traditional product market approach or a 
newer, more innovation-specific concept focusing on the question whether they use innova-
tion already in the market definition and the pure number of innovating firms instead of con-
ventional concentration measures. In regard to our econometric analysis the following hy-
potheses will be tested. First, we have seen in section 2 that the probability that the agencies 
consider innovation aspects increases with the innovation intensity of the industries. There-
fore, it could also be presumed that the agencies do also use a more innovation-specific ap-
proach for the assessment of innovation effects in innovation merger cases, if the merger 
takes place in a more innovative industry.  
H 2.1:  It is more likely that innovation is already considered in the market definition, when-
ever mergers take place in industries with high innovation intensity. 
In section 2, we could not find differences between the agencies regarding the probability of 
assessing innovation effects of mergers. However, the question arises whether there are dif-
ferences regarding the approach for the assessment of innovation effects, both for the question 
whether innovation is included in market definition and what kind of concentration measure is 
used.   
H 2.2a:  There are no differences between the agencies in regard to the probability that inno-
vation is already considered in the market definition. 
H 2.2b:  There are no differences between the agencies in regard to the probability that the 
number of firms is used as a concentration measure. 
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What developments can we observe with respect to the applied approaches over time? In sec-
tion 2, we did not find evidence for our hypothesis that the agencies have generally assessed 
innovation effects to a smaller extent in the period 2004-2008 in comparison with the prior 
period. Hence, we might also observe a similar development in regard to the use of innovation 
in the market definition. However, the mounting critique in the academic debate in regard to 
the innovation market approach suggests that the application of the new concept might have 
declined, leading both to a decline of the use of innovation in market definition and the use of 
the number of firms as concentration measure.    
H 2.3a:   The probability that innovation effects are considered in the market definition is 
lower for mergers that fall into the period 2004-2008 compared to those falling in 
the period 1995-2003.  
H 2.3b:  The probability that the number of firms is used as a concentration measure is lower 
for mergers that fall into the period 2004-2008 compared to those falling in the peri-
od 1995-2003. 
 
3.2  Data and Empirical Model 
The dependent variable in this model is "innovation in market definition" (INNOV_DEF), 
which is a dummy variable equal to one, if innovation aspects are mentioned in the market 
definition, otherwise it is set to zero. Regarding the different measures of concentration, we 
analyzed all markets with innovation aspects and determined whether the agencies provided 
HHIs and/or market shares, or whether they relied on the number of firms as a concentration 
measure. The latter concentration measure is captured by the dummy variable UNCONVEN-
TIONAL_CONC, which is set to 1, if the agencies have mentioned the number of competi-
tors; otherwise it is set to 0. However, it is worth noting that in some cases the agencies used 
both kinds of concentration measures (HHIs/market shares and the number of competitors), 
leading to aggregated percentages which exceed 100%. Moreover, apart from this distinction 
in more traditional and innovation-specific concentration measures, we also encountered 
statements with non-quantitative information about concentration, e.g., "highly concentrat-
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ed"12 or that the merging parties are “two of the leading suppliers in the world”13. Our first 
explanatory variable refers to the innovation intensity of the relevant markets.14 As a proxy 
we use the R&D expenditures (provided in U.S. Dollars spent) divided by employment (pro-
vided in percent of total employment of U.S. economy) (RDEXP/EMPL) of the industry to 
which the relevant market, defined in the complaint, belongs. We used the ISIC scheme on a 
2-digit level and matched the corresponding relevant markets with the "STAN Indicators 
2009" dataset of the OECD. In regard to the other independent variables FTC and the time 
period, we applied the same proxies as in the model in section 2. We used again the FTC clas-
sification as control variable for controlling industry effects. Additionally, we used the em-
ployment shares of the respective industries (EMPL) in order to control for industry heteroge-
neity.15 Our data set consists of all markets affected by the 135 innovation merger cases, in 
which the agencies have used innovation aspects in the market definition and/or the anticom-
petitive effects.  
 
3.3  Results 
Overall, within the set of 135 challenged mergers, the agencies considered innovation aspects 
in 323 relevant markets (see Table 3). The distribution of markets with innovation aspects 
between FTC and DOJ is similar to the one on the case level: While the FTC found 218 such 
markets, the DOJ investigated only 105. An important result is that in 222 markets the agen-
cies mentioned innovation aspects in the market definition (69 % of all markets). However, 
while the FTC mentioned innovation in about 82% of the markets in the market definition, the 
DOJ refers to innovation in the market definition in only 41%. In regard to the explicit claim-
ing of negative innovation effects in the competitive effects analysis (overall: 79%), we see 
the reverse picture: Here in 99% of all markets with innovation aspects, the DOJ claimed ex-
plicitly negative effects on innovation, in contrast to only 69% at the FTC. Regarding the two 
periods of interest, the share of markets with innovation in the market definition has overall 
                                                 
12  See, e.g., The Boeing Company, File No. 001 0092, Docket No. C-3992. 
13  See, e.g., Svedala Industri AB/Metso Oyj Corp., FTC File No. 001-0186, Docket No. C-4024. 
14  In contrast to our analysis on the case level, carried out in the previous section, we were now able to 
use the R&D expenditures as a control variable for the innovativeness of an industry instead of the 
HITEC variables. Due to a significant number of transactions taking place in hardly innovative in-
dustries, we had the problem of missing data regarding the R&D expenditures on the case level. 
15  Again, we used the ISIC scheme on a 2-digit level and matched the corresponding relevant markets 
with the "STAN Indicators 2009" dataset of the OECD. 
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increased from 65% (1995-2003) to 82% (2004-2008). While for FTC cases this share in-
creased from 78% to a 95%, the DOJ mentioned innovation in market definition in about 41% 
of the markets in both sub-periods. When analyzing competitive effects, the DOJ mentioned 
innovation effects in nearly 100% in both periods, while the corresponding percentage of the 
FTC decreased from about 76% to 50%.  
Table 3: Innovation aspects in innovation merger cases at the market level 
 Ʃ FTC + DOJ Ʃ FTC Ʃ DOJ FTC DOJ 
95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'08 95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'03 04-'08 
total % total % total % total % total % total % total % total % total % 
markets with 
innovation 
aspects 
323 100% 250 100% 73 100% 218 100% 105 100% 162 100% 56 100% 88 100% 17 100%
innovation 
aspects in market 
definition * 
222 69% 162 65% 60 82% 179 82% 43 41% 126 78% 53 95% 36 41% 7 41% 
innovation 
aspects in anti-
competitive 
effects * 
255 79% 210 84% 45 62% 151 69% 104 99% 123 76% 28 50% 87 99% 17 100%
Sources: Agency complaints. Years shown are fiscal years. 
* in % of markets with innovation aspects  
Table 4 summarizes the results from the probit regressions. Surprisingly, there seems to be no 
statistically significant effect of the industries’ innovation intensities on the probability that 
agencies use more innovation-specific analytical concepts (non-confirmation of hypothesis H 
2.1). RDEXP/EMPL is not significant in any of the specifications. However, the descriptive 
results of large differences between the agencies in the extent of considering innovation al-
ready in the market definition are supported by the probit analysis. The FTC is more likely to 
use the innovation-specific market definition concept than the DOJ (H 2.2a). Calculating the 
marginal effects at the sample means (see Table A-4 in the appendix) leads, depending on the 
specification, to a higher probability of 15-20% that innovation is mentioned in the market 
definition in FTC cases.  
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Table 4: Probit Regression: Markets with innovation in market definition 
INNOV_DEF Probit 4.1 Probit 4.2 Probit 4.3 Probit 4.4 
FTC 0.681 (0.02) - 
0.731 
(0.00) 
0.622 
(0.01) 
D04-08 - 0.543 (0.07) 
0.661 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.97) 
FTC*D04-08 - - - 1.122 (0.00) 
FTC Classes YES YES YES YES 
RDEXP/EMPL 6.17e-12  (0.44) 
4.00e-12  
(0.58) 
9.82e-13 
(0.88) 
-3.73e-12  
(0.65) 
Constant -0.684 (0.01) 
-0.001  
(0.07) 
-0.731  
(0.14) 
-0.621 
(0.11) 
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.37 
Log Pseudolikelihood -88.43 -90.70 -86.87 -85.91 
Obs 254 254 254 254 
Note: p-values given in parentheses. All values are calculated using robust and clustered standard errors.  
 
The hypothesis that innovation in market definition has decreased from the first to the second 
period (H 2.3a) is not supported by the data and has to be rejected. In contrast, at least two of 
the specifications show evidence for a more innovation-specific approach applied in the sec-
ond period (D04-08). Marginal effects show a higher probability of about 11% in 2004-2008 
(see Table A-4 in the appendix). However, following specification 4.4, this increase of inno-
vation in the market definition over time is mainly driven by the FTC. This is captured by the 
interaction term FTC*D04-08 which renders the main effect of period D04-08 insignificant. 
In contrast to the DOJ, the Federal Trade Commission seems to have used innovation aspects 
in the market definition more frequently in the later sub-period.   
In regard to the use of concentration measures, our descriptive results of Table 5 show that the 
agencies used either HHIs or market shares in 50% of the markets with innovation aspects. 
Apart from that, the DOJ apparently relied more often on these traditional concentration 
measures, but the use of these measures seems to increase over time, both at the FTC and the 
DoJ. 
  
17 
 
Table 5: Types of applied concentration measures 
  Ʃ  FTC + DOJ Ʃ FTC ƩDoJ FTC DOJ 
95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'08 95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'03 04-'08 
total % total % total % total % total % total % Total % total % total % 
markets with 
HHIs and/or 
market shares* 
162 50% 118 47% 44 60% 98 45% 64 61% 67 41% 31 55% 51 58% 13 76%
markets with 
the number of 
competitors*  
124 38% 87 35% 37 51% 81 37% 43 41% 52 32% 29 52% 35 40% 8 47%
markets with 
non-quantitative 
concentration 
measures* 
81 25% 70 28% 11 15% 70 32% 11 10% 60 37% 10 18% 10 11% 1 6% 
Sources: Agency complaints. Years shown are fiscal years. 
* in % of markets with innovation aspects (see Table 3)  
Note: The sum of all three lines exceeds 100%, because in some cases the agencies relied on more than only one 
kind of concentration measure. 
However, in 38% of all markets, the agencies provided the number of firms for characterizing 
the competitive situation and also here we can observe an increase in the use of this kind of 
concentration measure at both agencies. The DOJ seems to use this criterion more often than 
the FTC. This is a surprise, because we would have expected that the FTC, which in regard to 
the market definition used more an innovation-specific approach than the DOJ, would also 
use more the number of competitors as the innovation-specific concentration measure. The 
overall increase of quantitative concentration measures is mirrored by a decrease of the mar-
kets with only inconcrete, non-quantitative information about concentration. Especially in the 
first period the FTC has challenged mergers rather often without providing quantitative con-
centration measures. However, in the second period these inconcrete concentration measures 
were mentioned only in 10% of the analyzed markets. The results of the corresponding econ-
ometric analysis can be found in Table 6 (for the marginal effects see Table A-5).  
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Table 6: Probit Regression: The use of the number of firms as concentration measure  
UNCONVENTIONAL_CONC Probit 6.1 Probit 6.2 Probit 6.3 Probit 6.4 
FTC -0.918 (0.02) - 
-1.059 
(0.09) 
-1.249 
(0.05) 
D04-08 - 0.843 (0.01) 
1.007 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.69) 
FTC*D04-08 - - - 1.485 (0.03) 
HITEC Dummies NO NO NO NO 
FTC Classes YES YES YES YES 
RDEXP/EMPL -7.50e-12 (0.13) 
-1.96e-11 
(0.00) 
-2.30e-11 
(0.00) 
-2.98e-11 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.920 (0.02) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
1.068 
(0.08) 
1.260 
(0.07) 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.14 
Log Pseudolikelihood -154.98 -160.64 -148.67 -146.75 
Obs 251 251 251 251 
Note: p-values given in parentheses. All values are calculated using robust and clustered standard errors. The 
population is all markets with innovation aspects. 
The surprising descriptive results regarding the lower usage of the number of firms as a con-
centration measure by the FTC in comparison to the DOJ is confirmed by our econometric 
analysis (refuting our hypothesis H. 2.2b). Regarding the use of the number of firms over 
time, we found evidence that the use of this concentration measure increased significantly 
from the first to the second period, leading to a rejection of Hypothesis H. 2.3b. However, 
following specification 6.4, this increase is mainly driven by the FTC. This is captured by the 
interaction term FTC*D04-08 which renders the main effect of period D04-08 insignificant. 
Therefore, with respect to the FTC, we identified a significant increase of this more innova-
tion-specific way of concentration measuring as well as an increasing consideration of inno-
vation effects already in the market definition (see Table 4). However, since the Pseudo-R2 is 
rather low, the results should be interpreted with caution.16 
 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that we also empirically tested our descriptive observations regarding the use of 
HHIs and market shares as traditional concentration measures and the use of non-quantitative con-
centration measures. However, we did not get any significant results with respect to the use of HHIs 
and market shares. But, we confirmed our descriptive results regarding the use of non-
quantitative/inconcrete concentration measures. The observation that the FTC uses this kind of con-
centration measure more often and that its use decreases from the first to the second period could 
both be confirmed at a 1% significance level.  
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4.  Assessment of Innovation Effects: Theories and Reasonings 
4.1. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
To what extent did the agencies also offer clear reasons how the mergers could negatively 
affect innovation, and what kind of theories they relied on? It is not possible here to give an 
overview on the broad theoretical and empirical literature that might be relevant for the as-
sessment of innovation effects of mergers (for an overview: Gilbert 2008a). One group of 
arguments encompasses all reasonings that claim that mergers might reduce the innovation 
incentives of firms with the consequence of fewer investments in R&D or a slowing down of 
the innovation process.17 Although this group comprises a large number of different models 
and effects, we can summarize them under the heading of "innovation incentives". However, 
mergers might also have a negative effect on innovation, because they might reduce the num-
ber of parallel R&D projects and/or reduce the number of independent sources for future in-
novation in an industry. Hence, from an evolutionary economics perspective, mergers can 
lead to less parallel experimentation with new innovation projects, which - due to the uncer-
tainty of the innovation process - might lead to fewer successful innovation processes. Since 
mergers can reduce the benefits of diverse research paths, such kind of arguments can be 
called diversity arguments.18 However, whereas arguments about the effects of mergers on 
innovation incentives are much in line with mainstream industrial economics, diversity argu-
ments are closer aligned with evolutionary approaches to innovation economics. Although the 
literature on such evolutionary arguments is small, we decided to include diversity arguments 
in our empirical study, because in a number of cases the agencies have used very similar ar-
guments. Particularly the settlements in pharmaceutical merger cases, in which parallel re-
search was protected through divestitures, can be interpreted as being based upon such a di-
versity argument. Unfortunately, however, as it is shown in our descriptive statistics below 
(Table 7), the number of markets in which diversity arguments were used by the agencies (23 
markets; FTC: 14; DOJ: 9) is too small for allowing an econometric analysis. Therefore, we 
could include them only in our descriptive statistics.  
                                                 
17  See Arrow (1962), Loury (1979), Lee/Wilde (1980), Dasgupta/Stiglitz (1980), Reinganum (1989), 
Boone (2000, 2001), Aghion et al. (2005). 
18  See for evolutionary and diversity reasonings Metcalfe (1989), Nelson (1995), Farrell (2006), and 
Kerber (2011) with additional references. 
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Perhaps equally important is the question to what extent the agencies gave at all specific rea-
sons about how a merger could lead to negative effects on innovation, or whether they merely 
claimed the existence of such anticompetitive effects without providing any specific argu-
ments or evidence. Due to the general uncertainty about the consideration of innovation ef-
fects in merger cases, the specificity of reasoning regarding these effects is particularly crucial 
for the quality of merger reviews. Linked to this problem might be the question to what extent 
the agencies in addition to their innovation concerns simultaneously claimed on the same 
markets also static price effects. The agencies might deem it as a prudent strategy to challenge 
mergers in regard to innovation effects only in those cases, in which they can also claim price 
effects of mergers, since the latter are much more well-accepted arguments in antitrust law. 
Another important question is whether this uncertainty about the assessment of innovation 
effects in U.S. merger policy has been reduced over time due to the increasing experience 
during our investigation period and whether the observed differences between the agencies in 
the last section appear also in regard to these issues.  
Based on these questions we developed the following hypotheses for our econometric analy-
sis. Again, we presume that there are no differences between the agencies. 
H. 3.1a: There are no differences between the agencies in regard to the probability that inno-
vation incentive arguments are put forward. 
H. 3.1b: There are no differences between the agencies in regard to the probability that an 
agency claims static price effects in addition to innovation effects. 
The second group of hypotheses refers again to the development over time. Since the consid-
eration of innovation effects was new in the 1990s, we could expect that the uncertainty re-
garding the assessment of these effects has decreased over time, leading to an increase of the 
share of challenges, in which the agencies gave specific reasons about the innovation effects 
of mergers. Based upon the increasing critique of the new concept of innovation markets in 
the antitrust discussion since the end of the 1990s, we expect that the agencies, over time, 
relied stronger on innovation incentive arguments, which are more compatible with the estab-
lished industrial economics literature. It can furthermore be expected that the critical discus-
sion of innovation markets also induced the agencies to back up the claimed anticompetitive 
innovation effects with well-accepted static price effects. This leads to the following hypothe-
ses about the differences between the first period 95-03 and the second period 04-08: 
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H 3.2a: The probability that innovation incentive arguments are put forward is higher for 
mergers that fall into the period 2004-2008 compared to those falling in the period 
1995-2003. 
H 3.2b:  The probability that an agency claimed also static price effects in addition to innova-
tion effects is higher for mergers that fall into the period 2004-2008 compared to 
those falling in the period 1995-2003. 
 
4.2 Data and Empirical Model 
In this section the following variables have been used: The dummy variable INCEN-
TIVE_ASP is set to 1, if the agencies have mentioned in their complaints that the merger 
would lead to less innovation incentives. We considered this condition as fulfilled whenever 
the agencies either explicitly referred to decreased innovation incentives (by using the exact 
wording), or by relying on reasons which can still be considered as arguments in line with the 
theory about innovation incentive aspects (e.g. that “[…] innovation competition among pro-
ducers []”19 will be lessened, or that it will lead to a ‘slowdown’ in the pace of innovation20). 
For our descriptive statistics we also investigated whether the agencies have used arguments 
in their complaints that can be associated with diversity aspects. We regarded an argument as 
driven by diversity considerations, whenever the agencies either claimed that the merger will 
lead to a ‘reduction or redirection’ of research and development tracks21, or when they high-
lighted the relevance of the preservation of a number of independent entities for future inno-
vations22. However, there were also some cases in which the agencies used both kinds of ar-
guments. If, in addition to claiming negative innovation effects, the agencies have also 
claimed explicitly static price effects on the same markets, then the dummy variable 
EXPL_STATICCON is set to 1, otherwise 0. Our independent variables FTC and the time 
period D04-08 are the same as in the sections 2 and 3.  
                                                 
19  Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842, at 851  (1997).  
20  See, e.g., United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 
1998). 
21  See, e.g.,  The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996); Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815(1995); Ciba-Geigy 
Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842, at 851 (1997); Hoechst AG/Rhone-Poulenc S.A., Docket No. C-3919 (consent 
order issued January 18, 2000). 
22  See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed 
March 23, 1998). 
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4.3 Results 
Table 7: Theories and reasonings in the competitive assessment analysis  
  Ʃ  FTC + DOJ ƩFTC ƩDOJ FTC DOJ 
95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'08 95-'08 95-'03 04-'08 95-'03 04-'08 
total % total % To-tal % total % total % total % total % total % total % 
markets with innovation 
incentive arguments* 105 33% 73 29% 32 44% 67 31% 38 36% 45 28% 22 39% 28 32% 10 59% 
markets with diversity 
arguments* 23 7% 21 8% 2 3% 14 6% 9 9% 13 8% 1 2% 8 9% 1 6% 
inconcrete reasonings* 210 65% 171 68% 39 53% 148 68% 62 59% 115 71% 33 59% 56 64% 6 35% 
markets with  static price 
concerns* 272 84% 204 82% 68 93% 168 77% 104 99% 117 72% 51 91% 87 99% 17 
100
% 
Sources: Agency complaints. Years shown are fiscal years. 
Note: The sum of the first three lines exceeds 100%, because in some cases the agencies mentioned both diversi-
ty and innovation incentive arguments. 
* in % of the markets with innovation aspects (see Table 3)  
The results of our descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7. Out of 323 relevant markets, 
on which negative effects on innovation have been claimed, the agencies have mentioned in-
novation incentive arguments for 105 markets (32.5%). FTC and DOJ mentioned diversity-
related arguments for only 23 markets (7%). Since for the period D04-08 our sample contains 
only 2 markets (FTC: 1 and DOJ: 1), this might be a sign for a decline of the use of diversity 
arguments (but we cannot test this econometrically due to too few observations). A very im-
portant result is that in 65% of the relevant markets the agencies have not given any specific 
reasoning how the mergers might lead to negative effects on innovation. This encompasses 
both cases, in which innovation was used in the market definition and only a general claim of 
anticompetitive effects has been made, as well as cases, in which negative effects on innova-
tion were claimed in the anticompetitive effects but without giving any specific arguments 
(as, e.g., innovation incentives).  
Comparing the agencies, the DOJ has given more specific reasonings than the FTC, although 
even the share of the DOJ is still rather low (DOJ: 41%; FTC: 32%). Over time an increase of 
explicit reasonings can be observed (95-03: 32%; 04-08: 47%). But even in the latter period 
the share of markets without clear specific arguments is still over 50%. In contrast to this, it is 
noteworthy that in over 80% of markets with innovation concerns (84%) the agencies have 
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also claimed explicitly static price effects. A closer look reveals that particularly the DOJ has 
nearly always (99%) also claimed static price effects (while the FTC did so in 77% of the 
markets with innovation aspects). Moreover, the overall percentage of markets with claims 
about static price effects has increased from the first to the second period (95-03: 82%; 04-08: 
93%). 
Table 8: Probit Regression: Markets with innovation incentive arguments 
INCENTIVE_ASP Probit 8.1 Probit 8.2 Probit 8.3 Probit 8.4 
FTC -0.341  (0.42) - 
-0.423 
(0.35) 
-0.326 
(0.54) 
D04-08 - 0.715 (0.06) 
0.790 
(0.05) 
1.479 
(0.00) 
FTC*D04-08 - - - -0.914 (0.34) 
FTC Classes YES YES YES YES 
RDEXP/EMPL 4.79e-12 (0.79) 
-5.40e-12  
(0.76) 
-6.34e-12  
(0.71) 
-2.82e-12 
(0.47) 
Constant 0.207 (0.43) 
0.2342 
(0.47) 
0.449 
(0.15) 
0.309 
(0.86) 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Log Pseudolikelihood -144.66 -142.52 -140.67 -139.97 
Obs 252 252 252 252 
Note: p-values given in parentheses. All values are calculated using robust and clustered standard errors.  
Although the descriptive statistics might suggest that the DOJ uses a bit more often innova-
tion incentive arguments than the FTC, the regression results (see Table 8; marginal effects in 
Table A-6) confirm our hypothesis H. 3.1a claiming that there are no differences in regard to 
the use of innovation incentive arguments between both agencies. Possible differences are not 
statistically significant when controlling for other impacts. We also found a statistically sig-
nificant positive impact of the time period D04-08 on the use of innovation incentives argu-
ments (confirming the hypothesis H. 3.2a). Again RDEXP/EMPL is not statistically signifi-
cant at any usual level.23  
 
                                                 
23  Note that we also empirically tested for markets with inconcrete reasonings. However, in these re-
gressions we did not obtain any significant results. Hence, although the descriptive observations 
have suggested that the DOJ made less unspecific arguments than the FTC and that the share of in-
concrete claims of negative innovation effects is furthermore slightly falling in the second period, 
we did not find econometric evidence for these descriptive results. 
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Table 9: Probit Regression: Markets with static price effects arguments 
EXPL_STATICCON Probit 9.1 Probit 9.2 Probit 9.3 
FTC -2.515 (0.00) - 
-2.588 
(0.00) 
D04-08 - -0.018 (0.91) 
0.595 
(0.00) 
FTC Classes YES YES YES 
RDEXP/EMPL 7.96e-11  (0.01) 
5.36e-11  
(0.00) 
6.69e-11  
(0.00) 
Constant 0.586 (0.00) 
-1.173 
(0.00) 
1.023 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.21 0.38 
Log Likelihood -64.30 -80.52 -63.51 
Obs 171 171 171 
Note: p-values given in parentheses. All values are calculated using robust and clustered 
standard errors. 
Quite interesting results emerged from our analysis of the hypotheses about static price effects 
(see Table 9). The FTC claimed significantly less often static price effects than the DOJ in 
markets where they also claimed innovation concerns (rejection of hypothesis H. 3.1b). Given 
the marginal effects at the sample means reveals that the probability that the FTC claims also 
static price effects is about 20% lower compared to the DOJ (for the marginal effects see Ta-
ble A-7). The results about changes over time have to be interpreted with some caution. D04-
08 is only statistically significant in model 9.3. Following this result, static price effects were 
claimed more in the later period 2004-2008 than in the former one (1995-2003), which would 
confirm our hypothesis H. 3.2b. Marginal effects suggest a higher probability by about 9% in 
the period 2004-2008.24 It is a surprising result that the innovation intensity of industries con-
tributes significantly to the explanation of the use of static price effects but not to the use of 
innovation incentives.   
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions 
In our empirical study we analysed to what extent and how the U.S. antitrust agencies as-
sessed potential negative innovation effects of mergers in the period from the emergence of 
the "innovation market analysis" in 1995 (as the first innovation-specific assessment ap-
                                                 
24  Note that we also tested for a possible interaction between the FTC and the D04-08 variables. How-
ever, the interaction term FTC*D04-08 was omitted due to collinearity.   
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proach) until 2008. The background is the still unresolved question how innovation effects of 
mergers should be assessed, and whether the traditional "product market approach" (or other 
approaches as the "potential competition" or the "future market" concept) are sufficient or the 
application of a more innovation-specific approach, as, e.g., the "innovation market analysis", 
is necessary. In this paper we did not intend to discuss this question (for a detailed discussion 
see Kern 2014), but wanted to analyze empirically the merger case practice of the DOJ and 
FTC in regard to innovation effects of mergers. 
Our empirical study shows that the agencies claimed anticompetitive innovation effects in one 
third of all challenged mergers as a reason for intervention. The econometric results show 
neither significant differences between the first and second time period (1995-2003, 2004-
2008) nor between the two agencies. Therefore, both the politically more directly dependent 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the more independent (and bipartisan) FTC have taken 
negative innovation effects of mergers into account to a similar extent. Overall, this supports 
the view that innovation was taken seriously (at least to a certain degree) in U.S. merger poli-
cy - despite the increasingly critical attitude to the "innovation market analysis" in the U.S. 
antitrust discussion. However, our study cannot contribute to the question in how many cases 
the agencies have erroneously not claimed negative innovation effects ("false negatives") or 
wrongly claimed innovation concerns ("false positive"). Such an ex-post case analysis of the 
assessment of innovation effects is still missing. However, the empirical result that the proba-
bility for innovation concerns being raised increases significantly with the innovation intensi-
ty of the respective industry supports the claim that innovation effects were taken stronger 
into account in more innovative industries. This indicates that, overall, the agencies might not 
have made too many mistakes.25 
Although both agencies claimed innovation concerns to a similar extent, our study found con-
siderable differences between the FTC and the DOJ regarding the basic assessment approach. 
We could identify in our data set two different approaches which were applied to a different 
degree by the two agencies. Whereas the DOJ more often used a traditional approach, which 
defines markets according to the product market concept and considers innovation effects 
only in the competitive assessment, we also found a more innovation-specific approach 
(mostly at the FTC), which already considers research and development in the market defini-
tion and then asks about the competitive effects on these markets. Although we would not 
                                                 
25 See also the empirical study of Park/Sonenshine (2012) from a slightly different perspective. 
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claim that this second approach is a direct application of the innovation market analysis, we 
view the rejection of a pure product market concept and the explicit inclusion of innovation in 
the market definition as a clear sign for an innovation-specific approach, which differs signif-
icantly from the traditional one. Since, overall, in nearly 70% of all markets with innovation 
concerns innovation was already used in market definition, the pure product market approach 
was applied less often than the more innovation-specific one. Even the DOJ used it in 41% of 
all markets with innovation concerns. Since our econometric results show that its overall use 
even increased during the investigation period, this innovation-specific approach seems to 
have gotten more support in the practice of the agencies over time.  
At first sight, it seems to be a surprising result that we could not confirm our hypothesis that 
the innovation-specific approach was used more in regard to mergers in innovation-intensive 
industries, although innovation effects are more taken into account in those industries. This 
result can only be interpreted in that way that the agencies have different opinions about 
which approach is better suitable for assessing innovation effects generally but do not think 
that one is better suited for less innovative industries and the other more for more innovative 
industries. This picture of two different concepts gets a bit more blurred, if we take into ac-
count our results about the use of the number of innovating firms as a more innovation-
specific measure for concentration compared to market shares and the HHI as concentration 
measures that are directly linked to the product market concept. Although we have a signifi-
cant increase of the use of the number of firms from the first to the second sub-period, which 
would fit nicely to the general increasing use of an innovation-specific assessment approach, 
we found that it is the DOJ, which used the number of firms as concentration measure more 
often than the FTC, even though the DOJ relied stronger on the traditional product market 
approach. 
A striking and worrisome result in regard to the reasonings of the agencies is that in the ma-
jority of markets, in which they claimed innovation concerns, they gave no specific reasons 
why the mergers might lead to negative innovation effects. We could also show econometri-
cally that this does not improve from the first to the second time period. In those cases where 
they provided reasonings, innovation incentive arguments were most important (in a third of 
all markets with innovation concerns). This kind of reasoning is based upon well-established 
approaches in industrial economics, and also the innovation market analysis used these rea-
sonings. In our empirical study we found that there are no significant differences between the 
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FTC and DOJ regarding their use, and the agencies also relied stronger on innovation incen-
tive arguments during the second time period. The increasing use of innovation incentive ar-
guments and the near disappearance of diversity arguments in the second period might be 
interpreted as the result of a greater cautiousness of the agencies through relying on a more 
well-established kind of theoretical reasoning.  
Such a strategy of greater cautiousness might also be the explanation for another surprising 
and puzzling result, namely the very large and increasing share of markets, in which the agen-
cies claimed simultaneously innovation concerns and static price effects. Theoretically, anti-
competitive effects of a merger on innovation on the one hand and prices on the other hand 
are very different effects. Price effects of mergers can emerge in established product markets 
either as a consequence of unilateral effects (due to less competitive pressure) or of coordinat-
ed effects through a higher likelihood of successful price collusion - requiring in both cases to 
take a deeper analysis (e.g., a merger simulation or investigating the specific conditions for 
successful price collusion). This is, however, very different from any specific analysis regard-
ing the impact of mergers on innovation incentives, particularly, if we take into account that 
the relevant competitors regarding innovation competition do not necessarily correspond to 
those of price competition on established product markets. However, our study shows that in 
272 of 323 markets with innovation concerns, the agencies claimed both anticompetitive in-
novation and price effects of mergers. Here we also found significant differences between the 
agencies: The FTC found significantly less often static price effects in markets with innova-
tion concerns than the DOJ. In fact, the DOJ nearly always claimed also price effects, when-
ever they claimed innovation concerns. In addition to that, the probability of claiming also 
price effects seems to have increased significantly from the first to the second period. This 
also implies that the share of markets, in which primarily negative innovation effects (without 
explicitly referring to price effects) have been claimed, has decreased considerably - at the 
FTC from 28% to 9%, whereas none could be found in the second period at the DOJ. Our 
interpretation of these results is that also due to the critique of the innovation market analysis, 
the agencies were getting increasingly cautious in challenging a merger without simultaneous-
ly claiming also static price effects. If such an interpretation is correct, then the DOJ had used 
such a strategy from the beginning, whereas the FTC increasingly embarked on such a cau-
tious strategy during the investigation period. 
28 
 
Overall, the results of our study show clearly that the U.S. agencies have taken the analysis of 
innovation effects of mergers seriously. This is also supported by the fact that in a considera-
ble number of cases settlements were made, in which the remedies explicitly focused on 
maintaining innovation competition, esp. in regard to mergers in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Carrier 2008, Kern/Kerber 2014). Here divestitures in regard to R&D projects played an im-
portant role with the explicit objective, to impede the reduction of the number of parallel re-
search projects. However, we could not see a clear tendency towards a clarification of the 
assessment approach for innovation effects. Not only the still very large share of claims about 
innovation concerns without specific reasonings, but also the differences between the agen-
cies about the applied approaches and the general tendency of greater cautiousness by relying 
more on traditional, well-established reasonings and the backing up of innovation concerns by 
simultaneously claiming static price effects are signs for the uncertainty of the agencies how 
to deal with innovation effects of mergers. This uncertainty also emerged in the U.S. antitrust 
discussion about the reform of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 2010). An 
analysis of this discussion shows that despite a broad consensus about the importance of as-
sessing innovation effects, there is still a large uncertainty and a great reluctance in recom-
mending innovation-specific assessment approaches (Kerber/Kern 2014 with more refer-
ences). Despite this discussion, it is surprising how clearly the new U.S. Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines still stick to the old product market approach, with the consideration of innovation 
only in the competitive assessment part, because this contradicts to a large extent the practice 
of the agencies during our investigation period - with its wide-spread consideration of innova-
tion already in the market definition, and the still existing U.S. Antitrust IP Licensing Guide-
lines of 1995 (with its explicit use of innovation markets) (Feng 2012). 
There are a lot of questions for future research. An obvious question is whether the merger 
policies of the U.S. agencies in this regard have changed since 2008, e.g., due to a change of 
antitrust policy by the Obama Administration, or, whether due to the clear decision for the 
product market concept in the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010 the agencies 
changed their assessment approaches. In the same way, a parallel and comparative empirical 
study about the practice of the European merger policy would be very interesting, especially 
since they never officially used the innovation market concept but also assessed innovation 
effects of mergers (and sometimes in the same merger cases). However, most important is 
further research in regard to the still open question how an appropriate investigation frame-
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work for assessing innovation effects of mergers should look like (in more detail Kerber/Kern 
2014). 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A - 1: The Sectoral Taxonomies 
Nace Industry CrType AcType ApType CuType InnoType 
10  Mining: coal, peat    TAD    ACQU    None    Low    Med-low   
11  Mining: petroleum, gas    TAD    ACQU    None    Med    Med-low   
14  Mining: other    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
15  Food products, beverages    TAD    ACQU    FORM    Low    Med-low   
16  Tobacco products    TAD    IR&D    FORM    Low    Med-low   
17  Textiles    MCRE    IR&D    FORM    Med    Med-high   
18  Wearing apparel, fur    Other    None    FORM    Low    Low   
19  Leather, -products, footwear    Other    None    FORM    Low    Low   
20  Wood, -products, cork    Other    ACQU    None    Low    Med   
21  Pulp/paper, -products    MCRE    ACQU    FORM    Med    Med   
22  Publishing, reproduction    TAD    ACQU    FORM    Low    Med-low   
23  Ref. petroleum, nucl. fuel    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    Med    Med-high   
24  Chemicals    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    High    Med-high   
25  Rubber and plastics    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    Med    Med-high   
26  Mineral products    MCRE    IR&D    BAL    Med    Med-high   
27  Basic metals    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    High    Med-high   
28  Fabricated metal products    MCRE    ACQU    None    Low    Med   
29  Machinery, nec.    HCRE    HR&D    PAT+    High    High   
30  Computers, office machinery    HCRE    HR&D    BAL    Med    High   
31  Electrical equipment, nec.    HCRE    IR&D    PAT+    High    High   
32  Communication technology    HCRE    HR&D    BAL    High    High   
33  Precision instruments    HCRE    HR&D    PAT+    High    High   
34  Motor vehicles, -parts    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    High    Med-high   
35  Other transport equipment    MCRE    IR&D    PAT+    Med    Med-high   
36  Manufacturing nec.    MCRE    ACQU    BAL    Med    Med   
37  Recycling    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
40  Electricity and gas    TAD    ACQU    None    Low    Med-low   
41  Water supply    TAD    None    None    Low    Med-low   
51  Wholesale trade    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
60  Land transport, pipelines    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
61  Water transport    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
62  Air transport    Other    ACQU    None    Low    Med   
63  Auxiliary transport services    Other    None    None    Low    Low   
64  Post, telecommunications    HCRE    ACQU    FORM    Med    Med-high   
65  Financial intermediation    MCRE    ACQU    STRAT    High    Med   
66  Insurance, pension funding    TAD    ACQU    STRAT    High    Med-low   
67  Auxiliary financial services    Other    None    FORM    Low    Low   
72  Computer services    HCRE    HR&D    STRAT    High    High   
73  Research and development    HCRE    HR&D    PAT+    High    High   
74  Other business services    MCRE    ACQU    STRAT    High    Med   
Note: CrType—HCRE: highly creative firms with product (and process) innovations; MCRE: intermediate 
creative firms only with process innovations; TAD: adaptive firms with technology adoption; Other: adaptive 
firms pursuing opportunities other than from technological innovation. OpType—HR&D: high intramural 
R&D (>5% of firm turnover); IR&D: intramural R&D; ACQU: acquisition of new knowledge (R&D, machin-
ery, patents, etc.); None: no innovation activities. ApType—PAT+: high use of patents and other measures; 
BAL: balanced use of various measures; FORM: other formal measures; STRAT: strategic means; None: no 
measures for appropriation. CuType—High: high cumulativeness; Med: intermediate cumulativeness; Low: 
low cumulativeness of knowledge. 
Source: Peneder (2010: 331) 
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Table A - 2: Variables description  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Variables Description 
INNOV_CASE Cases with innovation aspects 
INNOV_DEF Markets with innovation in market definition 
INCENTIVE_ASP Markets with innovation incentive aspects 
DIV_ASPECTS Markets with diversity aspects 
EXPL_STATICCON Explicit static effects in addition to innovation 
UNCONVENTIONAL_CONC No. of competitors as concentration measure 
FTC Accounts for the FTC/DoJ 
D95-03 Time period 1 (FY 1995 - FY 2003) 
D04-08 Time period 2 (FY 2004 – FY 2008) 
HITEC 0 Industry was not a part of  Peneder’s taxonomy 
HITEC 1 („low“) “Low” technology industries 
HITEC 2 („med-low“) “Med-low” technology industries 
HITEC 3 („med“) “Med” technology industries 
HITEC 4 („med-high“) “Med-high” technology industries 
HITEC 5 („high“) “High” technology industries 
FTC CLASS 1 Retail 
FTC CLASS 2 Professional Services 
FTC CLASS 3 Food & Beverages 
FTC CLASS 4 Energy 
FTC CLASS 5 Hospitals/Clinics and Pharmacies 
FTC CLASS 6 Consumer Goods 
FTC CLASS 7 Cable TV 
FTC CLASS 8 Chemicals/Industrial Gases 
FTC CLASS 9 Defense 
FTC CLASS 10 Industrial Goods 
FTC CLASS 11 Information and Technology - Hardware 
FTC CLASS 12 Information and Technology – Other 
FTC CLASS 13 Medical Equipment/Devices 
FTC CLASS 14 Prescription Drugs 
FTC CLASS 15 Software/Databases 
FTC CLASS 16 Professional Services – Other 
RDEXP R&D expenditures of the relevant industry 
EMPL Employment shares of the relevant industry 
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Table A-3: Marginal Effects of Table 2 
 
 Probit 2.1 Probit 2.2 Probit 2.3 Probit 2.4 
FTC - 0.0306 - 0.2894 
D04-08 - - -0.0265 -0.0252 
HITEC 1 0.8152 0.8137 0.8155 0.8169 
HITEC 2 0.8800 0.8782 0.8808 0.8815 
HITEC 3 0.8802 0.8787 0.8809 0.8816 
HITEC 4 0.9864 0.9853 0.9868 0.9867 
HITEC 5 0.9805 0.9797 0.9808 0.9809 
 
 
Table A-4: Marginal Effects of Table 4 
 
 Probit 4.1 Probit 4.2 Probit 4.3 Probit 4.4 
FTC 0.1847 - 0.1920 0.1541 
D04-08 - 0.1051 0.1150 -0.012 
FTC*D04-08 - - - 0.1614 
 
 
Table A-5: Marginal Effects of Table 6 
 
 Probit 6.1 Probit 6.2 Probit 6.3 Probit 6.4 
FTC -0.3538 - -0.4037 -0.4676 
D04-08 - 0.3264 0.4082 n.s. 
FTC*D04-08 - - - 0.5323 
n.s.: not statistically significant 
 
 
Table A-6: Marginal Effects of Table 8 
 
 Probit 8.1 Probit 8.2 Probit 8.3 Probit 8.4 
FTC n.s. - n.s. n.s. 
D04-08 - 0.2663 0.2940 0.5384 
FTC*D04-08 - - - n.s. 
n.s.: not statistically significant 
 
 
Table A-7: Marginal Effects of Table 9 
 
 Probit 9.1 Probit 9.2 Probit 9.3 
FTC -0.2048 - -0.2184 
D04-08 - n.s. 0.0898 
FTC*D04-08 - - - 
n.s.: not statistically significant 
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Wolfgang Kerber and Benjamin R. Kern∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Despite a broad consensus about the importance of also considering innovation effects of 
mergers (in addition to the usual price effects), it is still very unclear to what extent and how innovation 
effects of mergers should be assessed. In this paper, the results of the first comprehensive (quantita-
tive) empirical study on how the US antitrust authorities DoJ and FTC assessed mergers in regard to 
their innovation effects from 1995 to 2008 are presented. We could find 135 challenged mergers with 
overall 323 relevant markets, in which the authorities had also innovation concerns. Whereas in 
Kern/Dewenter/Kerber (2014) we have focused much more narrowly on the econometric results, this 
paper (in section 3) presents all our results (in a non-technical way) and analyzes them in the broad 
context of the theoretical discussion about innovation effects of mergers (section 2) and the recent 
discussion on how to deal with innovation effects in regard to the reform of the U.S. Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (chapter 4). In our empirical study, we are mainly interested in the question to what extent 
the agencies have assessed innovation effects within the traditional product market concept or by 
using a more innovation-specific approach which would consider research and development already in 
the market definition (along basic ideas of the innovation market analysis). Important results of our 
study are: In more than a third of all challenged mergers also innovation concerns were raised - with 
no differences between the agencies and over time. However, the agencies used rather different as-
sessment approaches, the DoJ more the traditional product market concept and the FTC more an 
innovation-specific approach; however, overall an innovation-specific approach was used more often. 
We also analyzed the cases for the applied concentration measures and levels, barriers to entry, the 
reasonings of the agencies, simultaneity of static price effects claims, and remedies. Our overall re-
sults are very ambivalent: The agencies have assessed innovation effects and this often also in an 
innovation-specific way, but they did not succeed to develop a clear and consistent approach and 
seemed to have gotten more cautious over time. In chapter 4, these results are confronted with the 
recent US antitrust discussion about the reform of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Both this 
discussion as well as the new Guidelines shows a clear reluctance of adopting a more innovation-
specific approach (by sticking clearly to the product market approach) which is at odds with the prac-
tice of the agencies until 2008. This disappointing result leads the authors to develop some ideas for 
new research perspectives on this issue. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the question whether and how innovation should be taken into account in competition 
law has become relevant in a number of different case groups within competition and antitrust law. 
Several of these case groups are directly connected to the complex relationship between competition 
and IP law, as, e.g., refusal to license cases, standard-essential patent cases, patent pools and cross-
licensing in licensing agreements as well as the patent settlement cases in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. But innovation concerns also seem to play a large role in many other competition law cases in the 
U.S. and the EU, esp. in high technology industries and the internet economy, as, e.g., in the recent 
Google search engine case, or in merger cases as Intel/McAfee. In the community of antitrust scholars 
on both sides of the Atlantic there is both a consensus about the great relevance of innovation effects 
in competition law and, at the same time, a lot of uncertainty and concern whether active attempts of 
competition authorities to protect innovation competition might not do more harm to innovation than 
support innovation, esp. in dynamic industries. Part of the problem is the question, whether we know 
enough about innovation processes for being capable of protecting innovation competition through 
competition law. However, the uncertainty might also be a sign of much deeper conceptual problems 
in regard to the relation between competition and innovation or between the static and dynamic di-
mensions of competition. This raises the question whether traditional categories in competition law 
(based upon static concepts) might be sufficiently suitable for dealing with innovation aspects.1  
Such conceptual issues also have been raised in regard to the question to what extent and how inno-
vation effects should be taken into account in merger reviews. Both in the EU and the U.S. there is a 
consensus that for the assessment of mergers due to their effects on consumers both price effects 
and innovation effects are important. However, since the 1990s competition authorities have focussed 
mainly on the question whether a merger would raise prices in the short term (using the manifold new 
sophisticated methods of economics). Therefore, the danger has emerged that longer-term anticom-
petitive effects of mergers on innovation are going to be neglected. The current Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines of the EU and (despite some changes 2010) also of the U.S. antitrust policy reflect this 
main focus on short-term price effects very clearly (EU Commission 2004, DOJ/FTC 2010). The rea-
sons of this reluctance to consider innovation effects in merger reviews lie to a large extent in the un-
certainty about how competition authorities should assess the impact of a merger on innovation (both 
in regard to pro- and anticompetitive effects). This reflects on one hand general concerns about our 
capabilities for assessing innovation effects of mergers. On the other hand, however, it also raises the 
question whether we might need new, more innovation-specific approaches for assessing the effects 
of mergers beyond the traditional approach based upon the product market concept which is still dom-
inating the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the EU and the U.S. 
In regard to merger reviews, the only new explicitly innovation-specific assessment approach was the 
"Innovation Market Analysis" (IMA), developed and introduced into the U.S. antitrust discussion in the 
mid 1990s (Gilbert/Sunshine 1995). The basic idea of the innovation market analysis was to identify 
                                                 
1 From an economic perspective see, e.g., Pleatsikas/Teece (2001), Sidak/Teece (2009), Shapiro 
(2012); from the law perspective, see, e.g., Drexl (2012). 
3 
the relevant competitors in regard to innovation competition independently from product markets by 
asking for (overlapping) innovation activities and necessary specialized assets, and then analyzing 
whether these innovation competitors have the capabilities and incentives for reducing or slowing 
down innovation activities (taking also into account any innovation efficiencies). The main difference to 
the traditional approach is that innovation is seen as already relevant for the definition of markets, and 
not only as part of the competitive assessment analysis. Whereas the "innovation markets" have been 
(and still are) included into the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (DOJ/FTC 
1995) in addition to product markets, this approach neither was used in the new U.S. Horizontal Mer-
ger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 2010) nor adopted by EU competition policy. It is well known that the "Inno-
vation Market Analysis" was harshly criticized in the literature, claiming huge doubts about its feasibil-
ity and necessity. However, despite this critique, already a superficial analysis of the merger cases of 
both U.S. antitrust authorities DOJ and FTC shows that in a large number of cases innovation not only 
seemed to have played a role in merger assessments, but that the agencies also used to some extent 
innovation-specific approaches for assessing the effects of mergers. This also included the use of 
innovation in the market definition, and the explicit protection of innovation competition through innova-
tion-specific structural remedies in settlements (Katz/Shelanski 2007a, Carrier 2008). 
The main objective of this paper is an analysis of the practice of the U.S. antitrust authorities in regard 
to the assessment of negative innovation effects of mergers. To a large extent, this analysis is based 
upon the results of an own empirical study how the DOJ and the FTC have assessed mergers in re-
gard to innovation effects. We analyzed the "complaints" and "decision and orders" from all 399 mer-
gers challenged by the DOJ or FTC between 1995 and 2008, and could identify 135 mergers, in which 
the agencies mentioned innovation concerns in overall 323 relevant markets. One important question 
in that regard was whether the U.S. authorities use predominantly a traditional assessment approach 
based upon the product market concept or whether they have also used or at least experimented with 
more innovation-specific assessment approaches, e.g. inspired by the "Innovation Market Analysis". 
The econometric part of this empirical study (with all the technical details) can be found in 
Kern/Dewenter/Kerber (2014). In this longer article here we present all the results we have found and 
discuss them within a much broader context, in regard to (1) the existing theoretical and empirical 
knowledge about innovation effects of mergers, (2) the discussion about suitable approaches for as-
sessing innovation effects, and (3) the overall U.S. antitrust policy discussion about this issue, e.g., in 
the discussion about the revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
How is this paper structured and what are important results of our analysis? In the next section 2, we 
firstly present a brief overview about the large body of theoretical and empirical literature in economics 
about innovation effects of mergers, showing the complexity of the problem but also that mergers can 
raise innovation concerns (particularly from an empirical perspective). At least as important is, second-
ly, the critical discussion of different approaches how to assess innovation effects in a structured way, 
e.g., the concepts of "potential competition", "future markets", or "innovation markets", but also dis-
cussing the question of presumptions and the relevance of case-specific analysis. These insights from 
section 2 provide the theoretical framework for the presentation and analysis of the results of our em-
pirical study in section 3.  
4 
Overall, our results about the practice of the assessment of innovation effects of mergers by the two 
U.S. antitrust authorities are very mixed and ambivalent. On one hand, we can show that in this entire 
period of 1995 until 2008, both agencies did consider innovation effects (in a third of all cases). On the 
other hand, the study also reveals that the two agencies did not have a clear and consistent assess-
ment approach, and that both of them differed significantly also in regard to the question whether a 
more traditional product market approach should be used (mainly the DOJ) or whether a more innova-
tion-specific approach should be applied, in which innovation is already considered in the market defi-
nition (used more by the FTC). A problematic outcome of our investigation is that in most cases the 
agencies gave no specific reasoning why the merger should lead to negative effects on innovation. 
Only in a minority of cases innovation incentive arguments and in some cases diversity arguments 
were mentioned. Another surprising and puzzling result is that the agencies increasingly have claimed 
simultaneously negative innovation and static price effects. We tend to interpret this as a sign of cau-
tiousness and uncertainty of the agencies by backing up their innovation concerns with more tradition-
al and well-established claims about price effects. However, we also found a rather consistent practice 
of using structural remedies for protecting competition between R&D projects, esp. in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. A final conclusion of our study will be that, on one hand, assessing innovation effects is 
a well-established practice in U.S. merger policy, but, on the other hand, there are a lot of inconsisten-
cies and open conceptual questions in regard to the assessment approach, which also have not dimin-
ished over time.  
This mixed and ambivalent assessment of the practice up to 2008 will be the starting-point for our final 
analysis in section 4. A brief (qualitative) analysis of important merger cases after 2008 as well as an 
analysis of the reform discussion leading up to the revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 
2010 will show, firstly, that the cautious approach to assessing innovation effects has not changed 
under the Obama Administration, and, secondly, that despite the general consensus about the im-
portance of innovation effects, the U.S. discussion is still very critical to more innovation-specific ap-
proaches in merger reviews. This can be seen in the revised U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which 
stick entirely to the traditional product market approach. As far as some statements about the assess-
ment of innovation effects are included in the Guidelines as part of the unilateral effects analysis, we 
will come to the conclusion that they are vague and inconsistent and do not give clear guidance about 
the assessment of mergers in regard to innovation competition. In that respect, the guidelines also do 
not seem to reflect the already well-established practice of the U.S. antitrust agencies of using innova-
tion-specific assessment approaches to a considerable extent. This rather negative assessment of the 
recent developments and discussions in combination with the emergence of innovation issues in other 
competition law contexts has motivated us to ponder briefly in our last subsection about new avenues 
of research in regard to the assessment of innovation effects of mergers, which might also be relevant 
for the general discussion how innovation should be taken into account in competition and antitrust 
law. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Assessment Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
Both the EU and the U.S. merger policy have the main objective to prevent negative effects on con-
sumers through substantially lessening of competition (EU: significant impediment to effective compe-
tition) caused by mergers. From an economic perspective mergers can harm consumers in different 
ways: Substantially lessening of competition can lead to higher prices, less quality and choice, or also 
less innovation. Although this multi-dimensionality of potential negative effects of mergers is acknowl-
edged by EU competition and U.S. antitrust law, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (in the U.S. and the 
EU) focus nearly exclusively (as many competition economists) on the question whether a merger 
would lead to higher prices, through coordinated or uncoordinated (price-increasing) effects balanced 
with (potentially price-decreasing) efficiency effects. However, from an economic perspective, it is 
clear that all effects on consumers through less competition should be taken into account. There is a 
wide-spread consensus among competition economists and lawyers that effects on innovation are the 
most important of these non-price effects. As in the case of price effects, a merger can lead both to 
positive and negative effects on innovation, implying a possible trade-off within the innovation dimen-
sion. But if a merger can have several different effects on consumer welfare, then many more trade-
offs might emerge. Particularly well-known is the trade-off between higher prices on one hand and the 
(long-term) benefits of more innovation on the other hand (leading to the static vs. dynamic efficiency 
trade off), but there also might be a trade-off between (short-term) efficiency effects of mergers and 
long-term negative innovation effects through higher concentration.2 In the following, we will focus 
primarily on the problem of the assessment of negative innovation effects of mergers. 
For answering the question how competition authorities should assess mergers and what kind of crite-
ria they should use, two different levels of analysis have to be carefully distinguished: The first level 
refers to the question what we know about the effects of mergers on prices, innovation, and other non-
price effects that are relevant for the consumers in these markets. In the following section 2.2, we will 
give an overview about the most important results of research in economics about possible anticom-
petitive effects of mergers on innovation. This is based mostly on theoretical and empirical research in 
innovation and industrial economics, and is primarily a discussion among economists. A second level 
of analysis refers to the question, what kind of theoretical assessment framework (and which criteria) 
should be used for analyzing a specific merger in regard to its effects on innovation. Such an assess-
ment framework encompasses the step-by-step proceedings of a merger review: Defining relevant 
markets first, and afterwards carrying out a competitive assessment by using a set of relevant criteria 
and investigation methods, is usually a crucial part of such an assessment framework. The practices in 
former cases as well as guidelines, e.g., about defining markets or assessing horizontal mergers, pro-
vide information about the assessment framework competition authorities are using for deciding 
whether and how they are assessing the effects of mergers. Part of this framework are also such in-
struments as safe harbour rules, presumptions, and rules about burden of proof as well as rules about 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive analysis of different trade offs in regard to mergers and innovation, see, e.g., 
Katz/Shelanski (2007a); for the important analysis of innovation efficiencies, see, e.g., AMC (2007). 
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possible remedies. From a legal as well as from an economic policy perspective, the ultimate research 
question refers to the problem what the most suitable assessment framework is for innovation effects 
of mergers. For this discussion, the knowledge from the first level of analysis about the innovation 
effects of mergers is a necessary and valuable input, but it also requires an additional analysis that is 
usually not done by innovation or industrial economists. This is the level, at which the question has to 
be discussed whether the traditional product market approach is also suitable for taking into account 
innovation effects or whether a more innovation-specific assessment framework might be necessary. 
This second level of the analysis will be addressed in section 2.3. 
 
2.2 Innovation Effects of Mergers: Theoretical and Empirical Results 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Both legal scholars and economists agree on the huge importance of competition for new products 
and technologies, and that market competition is a crucial driver for innovation. However, until today 
the concept of innovation competition has not been clarified very well. Neoclassical mainstream eco-
nomics, based upon maximizing agents and the (game-theoretic) equilibrium concept, always had 
serious difficulties in integrating technological progress into its paradigm. Important here is Hayek's 
critique that the model of perfect competition already assumed that the firms know the best products 
and production functions, and therefore does not address the true function of market competition, 
namely that competition is a "discovery procedure", in which the firms search for better problem solu-
tions in a process of trial and error (Hayek 1978). This echoes Schumpeter's insistence that competi-
tion is foremost a process of innovation and imitation, and that this dimension of (Schumpeterian) 
competition is much more important than traditional price competition (Schumpeter 1942). As we will 
see, industrial economists have developed a large number of models about important aspects of inno-
vation, especially in regard to innovation incentives. However, the specific characteristics of innovation 
processes (complexity, Knightian uncertainty, creativity) leads to the insight that different theoretical 
and empirical approaches might be necessary for analyzing innovation processes. Therefore, the con-
cept of innovation competition requires the combination of different theoretical approaches for explain-
ing the innovation dimension of market competition. As a consequence, we also will have to take into 
account dynamic or evolutionary concepts of competition (Schumpeter, Hayek) and evolutionary ap-
proaches to innovation economics in addition to the contributions of mainstream industrial organization 
models (Metcalfe 1998, Linge 2008, Sidak/Teece 2009, Kerber 2011).  
These particular characteristics of innovation processes, which lead to a certain unpredictability of the 
specific outcomes of innovation processes, and the possibility that important (even revolutionary) in-
novations can emerge also entirely unexpected from anywhere, have raised the question whether 
policy-makers have enough knowledge about determinants of innovation for applying policy instru-
ments for promoting innovation in a way that leads to more benefits than harm. This question is rele-
vant for all kinds of policies for promoting innovation, as, e.g., technology policy (subsidies) or intellec-
tual property. It is certainly also relevant for the question to what extent competition law and, in particu-
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lar, merger policy should take account of innovation effects. The main concern of many legal scholars 
and economists about the consideration of innovation in competition law is that the activities of the 
competition authorities might lead to more harm than benefits for innovation. In competition policy (as 
in any other economic policy) a balancing has to be made between the possible advantages of pro-
tecting innovation competition and the danger of harming society by making wrong decisions (market 
failure vs. state failure). However, the problem that specific innovation processes might be hard or 
impossible to predict does not mean that research in competition and innovation economics has not 
found a lot of important insights about determinants and patterns of innovation competition, which can 
be used in the application of competition law in order to protect innovation competition.3  
The debate about innovation effects of mergers has taken place in the U.S. antitrust policy discussion 
mostly within the "Schumpeter vs. Arrow" framework. In his later work, Schumpeter (1942) claimed 
that large firms and firms in highly concentrated (or even monopolistic) markets might be particularly 
innovative. This led to the famous two Schumpeter hypotheses about a positive link between (1) the 
size of a firm and innovation and (2) firm concentration and innovation. Larger firms and/or firms with 
larger market power might have advantages of financing R&D projects (through past profits or an eas-
ier appropriation of future profits), of risk diversification, and other innovation efficiencies. These hy-
potheses about a correlation between market structure and innovation fitted also very well into the 
empirical research program of the structural approach of the Harvard School, which asked for the 
identification of optimal market structures (Scherer/Ross 1990). If the Schumpeter hypotheses would 
be true, then merger policy would face a difficult trade-off-problem between competition and innova-
tion, because mergers leading to higher concentration might promote innovation.4 Arrow (1962) of-
fered an important counterargument to these arguments. Starting from a public good model of innova-
tion, Arrow could show that under the assumption of perfect patent protection firms in a competitive 
environment have higher incentives to invest in R&D (for process innovations) than a monopolist (or, 
more generally, a firm with market power), because a firm with market power would cannibalize (to a 
certain degree) its own previous profits ("replacement effect"). From such a perspective, higher firm 
concentration would lead to lower innovation incentives. With two powerful theoretical arguments why 
mergers might lead to more or less innovation and the empirical question of the causal relationship 
between firm concentration and innovation, the stage was set for the development of a rich, and very 
differentiated theoretical and empirical literature, whose results we will briefly summarize in the next 
subsections.5 
 
  
                                                 
3 See for this discussion, e.g., Katz/Shelanski (2007a), Shapiro (2012), and from the perspective U.S. 
courts Ginsburg/Wright (2012). 
4 In Europe, this argument was also used to substantiate industrial policy arguments about the promo-
tion of national champions. 
5 For other broad overviews about the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge about competition 
and innovation see Gilbert (2006, 2008a), in regard to the relation between firm concentration and 
innovation Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 13-31), and in defence of the "Innovation Market Analysis", also 
Carrier (2008). 
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2.2.2 Theoretical Models and Reasonings 
In the model-theoretic literature about the interdependencies between competition and innovation it is 
important to distinguish between a group of models, in which the innovation incentives of firms are 
influenced only by competition for innovation itself (e.g., in order to get a patent or to realize first mover 
advantages), and another group, in which the incentives to innovate are also influenced by pre-
innovation product market competition (e.g., pre-innovation profit margins as in the model of Arrow). 
This distinction shows the importance of clarifying carefully the links between already existing product 
markets and innovation competition, which can be very different. 
One important strand of models which belong to the first group of innovation competition without a 
relevant link to existing product market is based on the idea of patent races (Loury 1979, Dasgupta / 
Stiglitz 1980, Lee/Wilde 1980, Reinganum 1983, 1989). A crucial assumption in these models is that 
only one of the participating firms can win the race (winner takes it all). The firm that discovers a par-
ticular technology first is the winner of the race and gets all the profits (patent). Since these models 
assume a perfect patent protection, each firm taking part in such a race has a strong incentive to be 
the first to invent, leading to a faster development of new products or technologies. Modifications of 
the patent race models account for the role of knowledge in the innovation process. For instance, 
Fudenberg et al. (1983) modelled a dynamic patent race with two stages with asymmetries between 
the firms in regard to their knowledge stock. As a consequence, the intensity of innovation competition 
can change with the firms’ distance in progress within the patent race (modelled by progress in the 
accumulation of knowledge). If one firm is able to outpace the others, the laggard firms might decide to 
give up and drop out of the race. Therefore, it is also crucial whether these models allow for leapfrog-
ging (the possibility that laggard firms can catch up with the leader), or not.6  
However, a crucial assumption of the patent race literature is perfect patent protection. Whenever the 
firms are unable to protect their innovations fully by intellectual property rights, intense innovation 
competition can also lead to appropriability problems due to knowledge spillovers to other imitators 
and other innovators. On one hand, this can lead to the well-known problem of underinvestment in 
R&D. D'Aspremont/Jacquemin (1988) demonstrated that in this case mergers can foster innovation if 
they lead to a larger internalization of knowledge spillovers, because this would increase innovation 
incentives. On the other hand, imperfect intellectual property rights also influence the incentives in 
innovation competition itself (as shown, e.g., in Scherer/Ross 1990, Kamien/Schwartz 1976, and 
Stewart 1983). 
This stems from the fact that under insufficient intellectual property rights the benefits of an innovation 
have to be shared with other firms, and therefore the revenues of each single firm declines with an 
increase of the number of innovation competitors. Scherer/Ross (1990, 630-637) analyzed the incen-
tives to undertake product innovation-oriented R&D under imperfect patent protection in dependence 
from the number of firms. They can show that a larger number of firms leads to a faster innovation 
process due to higher incentives to invest in R&D ("stimulus factor"), but that due to the sharing of the 
                                                 
6 For models that allow for leapfrogging see, e.g., Harris/Vickers (1987), Doraszelski (2003), Gross-
man/Shapiro (1987), Lippman/McCardle (1987). 
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market with other innovators and imitators the revenues for the single firm decrease, leading to the 
opposing "market room factor". However, if there are too many firms, then the revenues of each firm 
are too small for recouping their R&D costs and the danger arises that the entire innovation process 
breaks down. This resembles similar earlier results of a different model of Kamien/Schwartz (1976), in 
which an increase in the intensity of competition, defined as the probability that one of the other firms 
innovates in the next period (hazard rate) and therefore can reap as innovating firm higher profits than 
an imitating firm, also leads to faster innovation through more innovation incentives, however only up 
to a certain limit. If competition intensity is getting too large, then the innovation incentives drop again. 
Therefore, models that do not allow the firms to protect their innovations perfectly by intellectual prop-
erty rights lead often to an inverted-U shape kind of relation between competition and innovation.  
This shape of an inverted-U was also claimed in articles of Aghion et al. (2001, 2005). However, here 
the authors also included pre-innovation product markets. By differentiating between sectors with 
“neck and neck competitors” and those with “leading-“ and “laggard competitors”, they showed that 
strong competition as well as market power can foster innovation, depending on whether the incen-
tives to strive for “Schumpeterian rents” or the incentives to reap a so-called “escape-competition ef-
fect” outweighs the other. The results of Boone (2000, 2001) are also in line with these findings. In one 
model he found that in industries with weak competitive pressure the least efficient firm of the industry 
innovates, whereas in industries with intense competitive pressure the leader innovates and increases 
its dominance. In contrast to Aghion et al. (2001, 2005), Boone (2001) did not assume differentiated 
but homogeneous products. Hence, regarding the models which analyze the interdependency be-
tween competition and innovation by relying (also) on pre-innovation product markets, it is furthermore 
important to consider how competition on these pre-innovation markets is modeled. For instance, Agh-
ion et al. (2001, 2005), Qiu (1997), Lin/Saggi (2002), and Sacco/Schmutzler (2011) modeled competi-
tion intensity by relying on the degree of product substitutability. It is also important whether competi-
tion is assumed to be characterized by making decisions about prices (e.g., Aghion et al. 2001, 2005; 
Cellini/Lambertini 2011), or quantities (e.g., Katz/Shapiro 1987; Ceccagnoli 2005; Sacco/Schmutzler 
2011). Another important distinction is whether the incentives for product or process innovations are 
analyzed. For example, Dutta et al. (1995) and Schmutzler (2010), who focused particularly on the 
effect of competitive pressure, found that the incentives to strive for product or process innovations 
can be different. Hence, for models that rely also on pre-innovation competition it is important whether 
they address process or product innovations.7 By differentiating between incumbent firms and poten-
tial entrants, other authors, showed that a monopoly might also have strong incentives to innovate due 
to the maintaining of its monopoly power by patenting new technologies before potential competitors 
(Gilbert/Newbery 1982). 
Other groups of theoretical approaches to innovation competition are based upon new research about 
the specific characteristics of high-technology industries and the "new economy" as well as basic ide-
as of the early Schumpeter, Hayek, and evolutionary approaches to innovation economics. Due to the 
specific characteristics of the information-technology industry and the internet economy (rapid techno-
                                                 
7 See, e.g., the models of Boone (2000), Bonanno/Haworth (1998), Dutta et al. (1995), Schmutzler 
(2010), Yin/Zuscovitch (1998), and Vives (2008). 
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logical progress, high fixed costs and small variable costs, huge network effects with the tendencies of 
winner-takes-all races / natural monopolies etc.) a broad literature emerged which emphasized the 
particular problems that antitrust authorities face in these "dynamically competitive" high technology 
industries. In these (Schumpeterian) industries markets are hard to define and market shares do not 
reflect the competitive positions of firms, especially because also market leaders might lose their dom-
inant position through new innovations very fast ("creative destruction"). In this respect, also a new 
discussion emerged about the concept of "dynamic competition" for grasping innovation competition in 
contrast to the well-established concept of "static (price) competition".8 This discussion, however, hints 
to the much older research about Schumpeterian concepts of dynamic competition, based upon 
Schumpeter's "Theory of Economic Development" (Schumpeter 1911/1934) with his concept of com-
petition as a rivalrous process of innovation and imitation.9 Whereas Schumpeterian approaches di-
rectly address innovation and imitation as part of market competition, Hayek (1978) started from the 
knowledge problem and viewed "competition as a discovery procedure", in which firms search for bet-
ter knowledge in regard to products and production technologies in a trial and error process. Market 
competition can therefore be seen as a process, in which new knowledge is generated through a pro-
cess of parallel experimentation with different problem solutions and mutual learning through imitation. 
Both the Schumpeterian and the Hayekian concept of competition can therefore be analyzed also as 
an evolutionary process of variation (innovations of firms) and selection (through the market). The 
evolutionary approaches to competition and innovation try to take explicitly into account the specific 
characteristics of innovation processes, as "true uncertainty" (Knight 1921), heterogeneity, openness, 
and the impossibility to predict specific outcomes of innovation processes.10 In evolutionary innovation 
economics a rich and broad body of literature about theoretical models and empirical studies about 
innovation has emerged, which can be used for analyzing innovation effects in competition law con-
texts.11 
In what respect can these evolutionary approaches be relevant for competition law and merger policy 
in particular? On one hand, they emphasize the knowledge problems of competition authorities due to 
the difficulties of predicting future competition and innovation processes. On the other hand, they also 
allow for a better understanding of the value of a decentralized search for innovation, in which due to 
high complexity nobody knows what the best solutions are, and in which heterogeneous firms with 
different knowledge and capabilities search independently from each other for new innovations, and 
can mutually learn from their successes and failures. In evolutionary economics, it can be explained 
                                                 
8 For these discussions, see as overview Evans/Schmalensee (2002), Pleatsikas/Teece (2001), Sid-
ak/Teece (2009). 
9 See as overviews for the U.S. Ellig/Lin (2001) and for former German approaches of dynamic com-
petition Kerber (1994, 1997).   
10 For explicitly evolutionary concepts of competition based upon Schumpeter and/or Hayek, see Ker-
ber (1997, 2011) and Metcalfe (1998). 
11 For evolutionary approaches to innovation see as overviews Nelson (1995) and Cantner (2011) with 
many references. These evolutionary approaches to competition and innovation are also compatible 
with the "dynamic capabilities" approach (Teece 1986, Teece/Pisano/Shuen 1997) and the "re-
source-oriented view" of the firm in the innovation management and strategic management literature; 
see Montgomery (1995) and for the link to merger policy Kern/Ackermann (2014) with many refer-
ences. 
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why the existence of a multitude of firms with different capabilities can lead to more innovation, be-
cause more and different research paths are tried out. From that perspective, the diversity of an exist-
ing population of firms (number of firms and their heterogeneity) in market competition can have a 
large value (with some analogy to the economics of biodiversity) (as an overview: Kerber 2011). In a 
small article Farrell (2006) has called this "econodiversity" as one of the crucial (but also so far ig-
nored) benefits of competition and asked whether competition law should "seek to protect such diver-
sity" (Farrell 2006, 166). An application of this evolutionary argument in merger policy would imply that 
a merger might have negative effects on innovation because the number of independent entities that 
search for new problem solutions (e.g., parallel research projects) decreases, leading to less parallel 
experimentation, and therefore to less generation of new knowledge through a process of mutual 
learning.12 In the economics of parallel research the trade-off between these advantages of parallel 
experimentation and its costs through cost duplication and economies of scale and other synergy ef-
fects in regard to innovation are analyzed.13 We think that some reasonings of antitrust authorities in 
U.S. merger cases (later in section 3 called "diversity arguments"),14 could be interpreted (and per-
haps better explained) from such an evolutionary perspective. Important is that from this perspective, 
mergers can have an additional negative effect on innovation, which is entirely independent from the 
innovation incentive arguments that are analyzed in the industrial organization literature above. 
 
2.2.3  Empirical Results 
Theoretical analyses how firm concentration (and therefore indirectly also mergers increasing firm 
concentration) might influence innovation have provided a rich and very differentiated picture that 
shows that firm concentration is an important determinant but that its influence can depend on a num-
ber of other relevant determinants. What are the results of the empirical studies? First, we will ask 
about the empirical evidence in regard to the two Schumpeter hypotheses, especially the link between 
firm concentration and innovation. Secondly, we will summarize the findings of empirical studies that 
have directly analyzed the impact of mergers on their innovative activities.  
There is a broad consensus in the empirical literature that both Schumpeter hypotheses about a gen-
eral positive link between firm size respective firm concentration on one hand and innovation on the 
                                                 
12 For a simulation model see Kerber/Saam (2001). In regard to parallel research in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, see also Comanor/Scherer (2013). 
13 See, e.g., Nelson (1961), Cohen/Klepper (1992), Linge (2008), and Kerber (2011) with many refer-
ences.  
14 This refers particularly to pharmaceutical merger cases as, e.g., the Glaxo-Wellcome case, in which 
the agencies argued that the merger would decrease the number of research and development 
tracks, and tried to maintain competition between parallel research projects through divestiture. An-
other example is the Northrop/Lockheed case, in which the DOJ was interested "to maintain a num-
ber of firms with the capability of innovating to meet future national security challenges" (Robinson 
1999, 13). Also the safe harbour solution in the Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Proper-
ty (1995) of at least 5 independent entities with capabilities for innovation fits well into such an evolu-
tionary perspective on innovation. See for more detailed analyses of these and other cases from an 
evolutionary perspective Kerber (2011) and Kern (2014). 
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other hand could not be confirmed empirically.15 While some authors (Scherer 1965, Scott 1984, Lev-
in/Reiss 1984, Levin et al. 1985) did not find any correlation between concentration and R&D, 
Link/Lunn (1984) and Lunn/Martin (1986) identified a positive link between concentration and R&D. 
Most interesting was that Scherer (1967), Mansfield et al. (1977) as well as Culbertson/Mueller (1985) 
could identify a positive interrelationship between concentration and R&D, but only up to the threshold 
of a moderate firm concentration (Scherer 1967: C4 of 50-55%; Culbertson/Mueller 1985: C4 of ca. 
60% as critical thresholds), which would have confirmed the hypothesis of an inverted U-curve, as it 
was theoretically suggested by, e.g., Kamien/Schwartz (1976) or Scherer/Ross (1990). These empiri-
cal findings were confirmed most recently by the studies of Aghion et al. (2005) and Polder/Veldhuizen 
(2012). Besides this, Angelmar (1985) indeed identified a positive correlation between concentration 
and R&D intensity, but solely for industries with low barriers to imitation. For industries with high imita-
tion barriers, he found a negative correlation. Furthermore, Lunn (1986) found that patents for process 
innovations in low-tech industries are positively related to concentration. However, for product patents 
or process patents in high-tech industries he did not find any effects. Overall, the results of these stud-
ies show clearly that no general stable relationship between firm concentration and innovation that is 
vailid across all sectors could be found, although there is considerable empirical evidence that neither 
a very low firm concentration nor a very high concentration might be very conducive for innovation 
(Scherer/Ross 1990, 644; Gilbert 2006, 187). 
All of these empirical studies suffer to some extent from the problem that they have focussed on the 
relationship between firm concentration on the industry level and innovation. Industry concentration is 
very different from firm concentration on product markets or innovation competition, on which most of 
the theoretical literature has focussed. Also for antitrust authorities in merger reviews it is the firm con-
centration on the relevant markets that is relevant, and not firm concentration on the industry level. 
However, as we will see later in more detail, firm concentration at the level of product markets might 
also not be very suitable for assessing the effects of mergers on innovation competition, because the 
firms competing for innovation might not be identical to those on the current product market. There-
fore, empirical studies using industry concentration might also allow for a broader picture of the com-
petitive structure of an industry and help to shed some light on the competitive conditions for innova-
tion competition.16 However, due to these shortcomings, it is interesting to look at empirical studies 
which try to approach the problem more directly and avoid using firm concentration at the industry 
level. 
Such a rather direct approach is provided by the empirical study of Tang (2006) who tried to capture 
the competitive pressure (regarding innovation) by using data on firms’ perceptions about their com-
petitive environment (survey data during the period of 1997–1999). He defined four types of competi-
tion: (1) easy substitution of products, (2) constant arrival of competing products, (3) quick obsoles-
                                                 
15 For comprehensive overviews see Scherer/Ross (1990, 613-660), Gilbert (2006), and Cohen 
(2010). 
16 However, since industry classifications are quite an artificial construct (originally developed for na-
tional accounting) and often quite broad (even on 3 or 4 digit levels), many of the firms in the same 
industry might not consider themselves as competitors, neither in regard to existing products (pre-
innovation markets) nor with respect to innovation (innovation competition). 
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cence of products, and (4) rapid change of production technologies. The study showed that competi-
tive pressure is generally positively correlated with innovation, but that easy substitution of products 
has a negative impact on product innovations, whereas a quick obsolescence of products had a posi-
tive effect on product innovations, but a negative one on process innovations. Another study which 
avoids relying on industry concentration was conducted by Kukuk/Stadler (2005). By using (also ques-
tionnaire based) data from the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) survey, they examined 
the influence of technological rivalry, market power, technological opportunities and demand expecta-
tions on the planned timing of innovations. The study showed that market structure is indeed an im-
portant explanatory factor when it comes to analyzing innovation behaviour. However, it is not the 
number of competitors in the pre-innovation or post-innovation product market but the number of rivals 
participating in the innovation race that strongly influences the innovative dynamics of firms.  
The study of Park/Sonenshine (2012) about the "Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Research and De-
velopment and Patenting" used a very different approach. They used the assessment of the U.S. anti-
trust authorities DOJ and FTC about whether a merger would lead to anticompetitive concerns due to 
an increased market concentration as criterion for separating between different samples of mergers, 
one in which the agencies saw a problem and challenged them, and other ones which were not chal-
lenged by the authorities. The authors compared the innovation behaviour of such a  sample of R&D-
intensive challenged mergers to a similar sample of non-challenged mergers and to a control group of 
non-merged firms. As a result, Park/Sonenshine (2012) found that firms, whose mergers were chal-
lenged by the authorities because of a substantial increase in market power, undertook significantly 
less innovation efforts after the transaction took place, than they otherwise would have without the 
merger. Firms whose mergers were not challenged did not innovate differently from how they would 
have done, if they had not merged. These results suggest that mergers at such a high concentration 
level that they are challenged by the antitrust authorities seem to have a negative impact on innovation 
in comparison to other mergers or comparable firms which do not merge.17 This study is already close 
to the following number of empirical studies about the direct effects of mergers on innovation. 
De Man/Duysters (2005) presented a meta-study about the empirical literature on the impact of mer-
gers on innovation. It is very remarkable that their review did not identify a single study showing a 
positive impact of mergers on innovation. Hitt et al. (1996) and Hall et al. (1990), for instance, found 
that leverage financing of mergers increases the capital costs of the firms, leading to a relative scarcity 
of financial resources for R&D. There is also a number of studies which were not considered in the 
review of de Man/Duysters. James et al. (1998, pp. 566) found that managers tend to overestimate 
short-term financial targets in comparison to long-term strategic goals. Since R&D activities require 
long-term investments and strategic planning, innovation often suffers from M&A. Grimpe/Hussinger 
(2007) found empirical evidence that the prices paid for target firms, which hold patents capable to 
block competitors, are higher, if these patents are closely related with the patent portfolio of the acquir-
ing firm. The study of Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg (2006) examined the post-merger inno-
vative performance of 347 firms in four major high-tech industries. For this purpose they analyzed 
                                                 
17 Please note that their method could not determine whether the antitrust authorities saw any specific 
concerns in regard to innovation, or whether they challenged due to static price concerns. 
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2429 M&A events within the period of 1985–1994. In contrast to Ahuja/Katila (2001) they found that 
non-technological mergers generally had a negative impact on the acquiring firm’s innovative perfor-
mance, while the impact of technological M&As appeared to have a more ambivalent influence. This 
ambiguity is caused by the observation that the absolute size of the acquired knowledge base had a 
positive effect on the innovative performance of the acquiring firm during the first two years. However, 
after this initial positive impact, the effect turned around and the authors observed a negative effect on 
the innovative performance. In regard to the impact of the relative size of the acquired knowledge base 
and the post-merger innovativeness of the acquiring firm, the results did, just as the study of Ahu-
ja/Katila (2001), show only a negative impact. Apart from this, also their study revealed that the relat-
edness between the target and acquiring firms’ knowledge bases appears to have a curvilinear impact 
on the merging firms’ innovative performance. The authors, therefore, concluded that acquiring firms 
should, in order to improve their innovative performance, “target M&A ‘partners’ that are neither too 
unrelated nor too similar in terms of their knowledge base” (Cloodt/Hagedoorn/Van Kranenburg 2006, 
642).  
Stahl (2010) also investigated the relationship between innovation and merger decisions. Just as 
Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg (2006) she relied on patent counts in order to measure the 
firms’ innovativeness. However, since she explicitly accounted for sequential innovations, she also 
used patent citations in order to retrace the paths of these sequential innovations. Stahl (2010) found 
evidence that the rate of sequential innovation indeed increases in the years preceding a merger. But, 
similar to the observation of Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg (2006), this rate appeared to 
decline in the years following a merger. She, therefore, states that her results support the suggestion 
that “[…] mergers are motivated more by the desire to dampen competition than by the desire to cap-
ture information spillovers” (Stahl 2010, 4). This bad performance over time was also highlighted by 
Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson (2007) who investigated the M&A effects for large and small firms in 
the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology industry. In comparison to previous findings of Higgins/Rodriguez 
(2006), which, however, used a smaller sample, the authors did not find evidence that, in the long run, 
mergers have a positive effect on the innovative performance of large firms. The pharmaceutical in-
dustry was also the basis for the study of Ornaghi (2009). By using data from 1988 to 2004, he exam-
ined the effects of M&A on the R&D activity of consolidated firms for investigating the relationship be-
tween the ex-ante relatedness of the merging firms and their post-merger performances. Also his re-
sults suggest that merged firms have, on average, a worse performance than their counterparts of the 
control group of non-merging firms. Besides this, he furthermore found that a higher level of technolog-
ical relatedness cannot be linked to an improvement regarding the R&D outcome.  
Nevertheless, even though the empirical literature on mergers and innovation appears to deliver quite 
consistent results which indicate that the impact of M&A on the innovative performance of firms can be 
expected to have a negative (long-term) effect, there are also a few studies which indicate that there 
might also occur a positive effect. For instance, Zhao (2009) investigated how successful acquisitions 
and lost bids affect the innovative performance of the corresponding firms in the following three years. 
He finds that firms, which were less innovative before the bid, benefit stronger from acquisitions. He, 
therefore, concludes that: “technological innovation affects firms’ acquisition decisions, and in turn, 
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acquisitions help firms’ innovation efforts” (Zhao 2009, 1170). However, he also found that the firms, 
which engage in acquisition activities, are generally less innovative firms and that, among these (less 
innovative) bidding firms, the relatively more innovative ones are less likely to be the successful ac-
quirer. Hence, the positive effect, identified in this study, seems to account for the special case of un-
derperforming firms/laggard firms which are enabled to return/catch up as a consequence of the ac-
quisition.  
 
2.2.4  Conclusions 
In this section 2.2, we saw that a large number of theoretical and empirical studies exist that are rele-
vant for the question of innovation effects of mergers. What conclusions can we draw from the results 
of these studies? First, the results both from theoretical models as well as empirical studies confirm 
clearly that mergers either directly or through increasing market concentration can have considerable 
negative effects on innovation. It is interesting that the most direct empirical studies, namely those 
about the effects of mergers on the innovation of these merging firms themselves seem to provide 
nearly unanimously support for raising considerable concerns about negative innovation effects of 
mergers. Therefore, the question for negative innovation effects of mergers should be an important 
concern for antitrust authorities in merger reviews. Secondly, however, both from a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective no general stable relationship between market structure and innovation has 
been found. As well as there is no general optimal firm size for innovation, also no optimal market 
structure for innovation can be defined, although the hypothesis of some kind of inverted U-curve is 
still on the table (meaning that both a too high and too low concentration might be less conducive for 
innovation). However, a closer look at the many sector-specific studies on innovation would show that 
the determinants of innovation might be very different between different sectors. This leads, thirdly, to 
the conclusion that the innovation effects of mergers might be very different under different circum-
stances, e.g., different appropriability conditions (including intellectual property protection), in regard to 
product and process innovations, low or high barriers to entry (financial and knowledge resources), the 
size of technological opportunities, and, particularly, the different economic and technological condi-
tions of different sectors. These insights suggest that any assessment framework for innovation effects 
of mergers should be capable of a differentiated analysis with a number of assessment criteria, and 
firm concentration might not be the most important one (as it is also no more in regard to price compe-
tition).  
 
  
16 
2.3 Assessment Concepts for Innovation Effects of Mergers 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In the last section 2.2 we gave an overview about our general theoretical and empirical knowledge in 
regard to innovation effects of mergers. In this section we discuss the issue of a structured investiga-
tion and decision approach, which allows competition authorities to distinguish as good as possible 
between problematic mergers that impede competition and harm consumers and unproblematic mer-
gers with no significant anticompetitive effects. From an economic perspective this can be seen as a 
decision-theoretic problem, in which the competition authority should minimize the sum of costs 
through erroneous decisions (welfare losses through "false positives" and "false negatives") and inves-
tigation costs (error cost approach). The problem of optimal structuring such an investigation and deci-
sion process includes the questions for suitable investigation and assessment criteria that allow for 
identifying problematic mergers, for an optimal sequencing of this process, for the use of presumptions 
(as, e.g., in safe harbour rules), and rules for burden of proof.18 In regard to innovation effects of mer-
gers the debate about the suitability of the traditional product market approach or the necessity of a 
more innovation-specific approach as well as the applicability of general presumptions about any neg-
ative innovation effects of higher firm concentration can be seen as important parts of this search for a 
suitably structured investigation and decision framework for mergers in regard to innovation effects. 
Both in the U.S. and the EU a well-established basic structure of merger reviews exists: Market defini-
tion is followed by a competitive assessment of mergers (including both anticompetitive effects as well 
as efficiencies) and the analysis of potential remedies. Without market definition it is not possible to 
calculate market shares as well as measures of market concentration, which still play an important 
role, (1) as one of the assessment criteria in a deeper case analysis but (2) also as a first (sorting) 
criterion for distinguishing unproblematic mergers from potentially more problematic ones which re-
quire a deeper analysis. In the product market approach the competition authorities define the markets 
by focusing on the current products and identify the relevant competitors by investigating in a step-by-
step approach whether the firms in the market (if they would act as a hypothetical monopolist) could 
profitably increase prices permanently for 5 - 10% (SSNIP: “small but significant non-temporary in-
crease in price”) or whether - due to demand or supply substitution - additional products (and firms) 
have to be included into the market. In the meantime, a lot of quantitative investigation methods exist 
(as, e.g., critical loss analysis) for carrying out such analyses in specific cases.19 This approach can 
be found both in the relevant U.S. and EU guidelines about market definition and the assessment of 
mergers, and is also well-accepted in competition economics. Within such a traditional product market 
approach, the investigation of innovation effects of mergers would be included as part of the second 
step, the competitive assessment of the merger.  
                                                 
18 For an economic analysis of such an approach see Easterbrook (1992), Christiansen/Kerber (2006) 
with many references; for an explicit decision-theoretic approach Beckner/Salop (1999) and Ker-
ber/Kretschmer/Wangenheim (2012). In regard to merger policy, a decision-theoretic approach was 
also suggested by Katz/Shelanski (2007b). 
19 See for an overview Kerber/Schwalbe (2008, 263-277); we will see later in section 4.2 that this is 
also the approach of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 (DOJ/FTC 2010). 
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The crucial question is whether this traditional product market approach is also capable of dealing with 
negative effects of mergers on innovation competition. A very fundamental first critique is that the en-
tire approach of defining markets with the current products of the firms is a purely static approach that 
might be only helpful in regard to analyzing scopes for price increases of these current products but is 
not suitable for assessing competitive conditions for the innovation of new products, which would 
change these markets. Directly linked to this is the widely acknowledged insight that the current mar-
ket shares of the incumbent firms in a market might not be a good indicator for assessing competition 
in regard to innovation: On one hand, market shares in regard to current sales might not say much 
about the strength of the innovation activities of the firms (Evans/Schmalensee 2002, 16). On the other 
hand, the relevant innovating firms might not even be identical with the current incumbent firms on a 
product market. Some of the firms in the current product market might not invest in R&D and are 
therefore no innovation competitors, at the same time other firms from outside the market might com-
pete with the innovation activities of incumbent firms. Using the market definition of the product market 
would identify a wrong set of relevant competing firms, and therefore lead to wrong assessments of 
innovation effects of mergers (Kern 2014, 174). One important group of cases are mergers of incum-
bent innovating firms with innovating firms from outside the product market. In these cases innovation 
competition might be impeded, although there is no accumulation of market shares.20 But it might also 
be that the merger of two innovating incumbent firms might be less problematic, because there are a 
number of additional non-incumbent innovation competitors. Another group of cases refers to situa-
tions, in which innovating firms compete with their R&D for solving a certain problem but so far no 
current product market exists.21 
  
2.3.2 Innovation Market Analysis 
The "Innovation Market Analysis" proposed by Gilbert/Sunshine (1995) was an explicit attempt to in-
corporate dynamic efficiency concerns more directly into the merger analysis of U.S. antitrust law. 
They proposed a 5-step-procedure for identifying the relevant innovation competitors and the possible 
anticompetitive and efficiency effects. Their basic idea might be best explained by looking at the "Anti-
trust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (DOJ/FTC 1995), where they found their first 
recognition in an official antitrust document. In these guidelines the U.S. agencies distinguished be-
tween three different kinds of markets: product markets, technology markets, and innovation markets. 
Technology markets are markets for technology as the result of R&D, which, e.g., might be protected 
by patents and therefore can be traded. Technology markets are very similar to product markets and 
pose no new conceptual challenges in regard to their definition. This is different with innovation mar-
kets. In these antitrust licensing guidelines it is explicitly argued that competition to develop new or 
                                                 
20 Another related case is that the merging innovating firms are in the same product but in different 
geographical markets (as, e.g., in the case General Motors /ZF Friedrichshafen). 
21 See Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995); Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997); American Home 
Products Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217 (1995); Pfizer Inc. and Warner-Lambert Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-3957 
(June 19, 2000); Baxter Int’l, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904 (1997); The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996); 
Glaxo Wellcome plc, 131 F.T.C. 56 (2001). 
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improved products and processes might not be addressed adequately through the analysis of goods 
or technology markets. Then separate innovation markets might be defined in the following way: 
"An innovation market consists of the research and development directed to particular 
new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and de-
velopment. The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, 
and goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the 
relevant research and development, for example by limiting the ability and incentive of a 
hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research and development. The Agencies 
will delineate an innovation market only when the capabilities to engage in the relevant 
research and development can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics of 
specific firms" (DOJ/FTC 1995, 11). 
Therefore, the crucial idea of the "innovation market analysis" is the identification of the relevant com-
petitors in innovation competition through the identification of overlapping (substitutive) R&D activities 
combined with the identification of specialized assets that are necessary for this kind of R&D, which 
can also be interpreted as barriers to entry for innovation. If no such necessary specialized assets can 
be identified, then Gilbert/Sunshine (1995, 588) would not recommend the definition of separate inno-
vation markets. After this definition of the innovation market, the innovation market analysis concept 
would require an analysis whether the merged firms would have the capabilities and incentives for 
reducing or slowing down their R&D activities either through unilateral or coordinated behavior or 
whether other competitors would make such strategies either not feasible or not profitable. Such an 
analysis would be followed by the possibility of counterbalancing any anticompetitive effects of innova-
tion through innovation-related efficiencies (Gilbert/Sunshine 1995). 
It is well-known that the "Innovation Market Approach" was - and still is - heavily criticized by many 
lawyers and economists. From a primarily legal perspective it has been claimed that the U.S. antitrust 
law would not support an approach like the one introduced by Gilbert and Sunshine (Hoerner 1995). 
Other authors complained that the "Innovation Market Analysis", by focusing on R&D efforts, would 
only maximize the inputs (R&D) instead of directly targeting the relevant output (innovation) (Hoerner 
1995, 52; Rapp 1995, 33; Morse 2001, 32; Carlton/Gertner 2003, 10). Another important concern was 
that, also due to asymmetric information, the agencies would not be able to identify the actual competi-
tors on a particular innovation market (Rapp 1995, 27; Carlton/Gertner 2003, 15).22 In the following, 
we want to focus primarily on two specific critical arguments: The first one refers to argumentations 
that the "Innovation Market Analysis" would not be necessary, because other approaches as the "po-
tential competition" doctrine (Hay 1995, Rapp 1995) or the "future market" concept (Kent 2011) are 
sufficiently capable of dealing with those innovation effects of mergers. The second one refers to the 
concern that since there does not seem to exist a clear linkage between market structure and innova-
tion no general presumptions can be applied that a higher firm concentration would lead to negative 
effects on innovation (Hay 1995, Rapp 1995, Davis 2003, Muris 2004). 
 
 
  
                                                 
22 For a defence of the "Innovation Market Analysis" against these criticisms see Carrier (2008). 
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2.3.3 Potential Competition and Future Market Concept 
Can negative innovation effects of mergers be taken into account by the "potential competition" con-
cept?23 Firstly, the "potential competition" concept had always been defined in regard to the question 
how firms from outside the market limit the scope for price increases of incumbent firms in a product 
market.24 Secondly, the arguments about how to use the "potential competition" concept for assessing 
the innovation effects of mergers usually focus on one group of cases, in which an incumbent firm 
already offers a product on a market and buys another firm outside the product market which has a 
new product in the pipeline, which would compete with the product of the incumbent after market in-
troduction. In that case, the second firm can be seen as a potential competitor, and the merger as 
threatening future competition on that product market. Although the merger might also impede innova-
tion, the main concern from the potential competition perspective is here the loss of future price com-
petition on the already existing product market. Such an application of the "potential competition" con-
cept is not about innovation competition but about (future) price competition. The potential competition 
concept also cannot be used for groups of cases, in which so far no product markets exist. However, 
also in the cases, in which the potential competition concept is applicable, the antitrust authorities still 
need to identify the innovation activities of those potential competitors, which requires similar analyses 
as the "Innovation Market Analysis" concept would suggest. 
What about the suitability of the "future market" concept?25 This concept is particularly interesting in 
cases, in which so far no product markets exist but the (merging) firms compete with their R&D pro-
jects for developing new products, which would lead to a future product market. In this group of cases, 
mergers between these firms might lead to the problem that fewer R&D projects are finished, leading 
to the introduction of fewer products on such a future product market. Again, the question emerges 
what kind of competition the antitrust authorities want to protect in their merger review: Is it really inno-
vation competition between the innovating firms or is it price competition on the future product market? 
The authors who see the concept of "future markets" as a clearer approach compared to "innovation 
markets" seem to interpret the "future market" in the latter sense, i.e. that they see it as a future prod-
uct market, and that they want to protect (price) competition on this future product market. Although 
this is a legitimate concern, because getting less price competition on a future product market through 
less innovation would harm consumers, such an application of the "future market" concept would not 
focus on the protection of innovation competition itself. If, however, the future market approach would 
be applied in a way that attempts to protect innovation competition, then we also would have to identify 
the innovation activities (e.g., R&D projects) or specialized assets necessary for this kind of innovation 
in order to identify the firms that compete for innovation in regard to a future product market, and ask 
about the effects of a merger upon such a process of innovation competition. The questions that have 
to be answered would be the same as suggested by the "Innovation Market Analysis" approach. 
                                                 
23 The arguments of this section about the suitability of the "potential competition" and "future market" 
approach are based also upon the much more detailed analysis in Kern (2014), which also entails 
the analysis of specific merger cases. 
24 See the definition of entry barriers in Bain (1956) or the theory of contestable markets 
(Baumol/Panzar/Willig, 1982). 
25 See generally Baxter (1985), Lang (1997), and Landman (1999). 
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Our comparative analysis of the suitability of the "Innovation Market Analysis", the "potential competi-
tion" concept, and the "future market" concept for assessing innovation effects of mergers leads to the 
following results: The current concepts of potential competition and future markets can deal with the 
anticompetitive effects of mergers in regard to less price competition on a current or future product 
market, because through the merger fewer new products might be introduced into these markets, and 
therefore firm concentration might be higher on current or future product markets than they would be 
without the merger. This might harm consumers and should be a concern for competition authorities. 
However, both concepts cannot take into account the negative effects of the merger in regard to inno-
vation competition itself. For both the theoretical industrial economics models that analyze the incen-
tives for R&D under different market structures and different assumptions and also the evolutionary 
economics approaches, which focus on the benefits of parallel R&D projects as a parallel experimen-
tation process, the benefits of innovation competition are the welfare increases through more and fast-
er innovation, and not the easing of static price concerns on current or future product markets (see 
again section 2.2.2).  
Therefore, our conclusion is that both the potential competition concept and the future market concept 
are either not suitable for dealing with anticompetitive effects of mergers on innovation competition or - 
if applied differently - would have to ask the same questions as the "Innovation Market Analysis" has 
proposed: It would be necessary to identify the relevant competitors in regard to innovation competi-
tion, which either requires the observability of R&D projects (as, e.g., in the pharmaceutical industry) 
and/or the identification of specialized assets as barriers to entry for innovation competition. If this is 
not possible, then also the identification of the relevant innovation competitors is not possible and no 
analysis can be made whether a merger would lead to a substantial lessening of innovation competi-
tion or not.26 In this article, we do not want to make a comprehensive assessment of the "innovation 
market analysis" approach, which would require a much deeper analysis. Our intention here is to show 
that it was the "Innovation Market Analysis", which has asked the right questions about the identifica-
tion of the relevant competitors for innovation competition, and that the potential competition and fu-
ture market concept are not suitable alternative approaches, which would lead to easier and more 
well-established methods for dealing with innovation competition concerns in merger cases. Therefore 
the main discussion should be on methods about the improvement of the identification of the relevant 
competitors in innovation competition (see below section 4.3). 
 
2.3.4 Structured Assessment Approach of Innovation Effects 
After the identification of the relevant innovation competitors, a structured investigation and assess-
ment approach would require a clear set of assessment criteria, which are applied in a systematic 
structured way in order to investigate the positive and negative effects of a merger on innovation com-
petition and their implications for consumers. One simple solution would be the application of a pre-
                                                 
26 This precondition was always emphasized by proponents of the "Innovation Market Analysis". See 
Gilbert/Sunshine (1995), Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 43), and also Gilbert/Rubinfeld (2010, 19) in their 
comment on the reform of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
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sumption that a certain increase of the relevant firm concentration through a merger might lead to 
negative innovation effects. This leads back to the above-mentioned critique of the "Innovation Market 
Analysis" that such general presumptions are impossible due to the unclear relationship between mar-
ket structure and innovation. For example, in the context of the closing of the Genzyme/Novazyme 
case at the FTC in 2004, which was a 2:1 merger leading to the elimination of the only other competi-
tor for developing the first drug for the (very rare) Pompe disease, the FTC Chairman Muris (2004) 
argued that due to the unclear relationship between market structure and innovation, no general pre-
sumptions can be used, and therefore fact-dependent analyses of the merger cases should be 
made.27 Although Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 76-85) agree that there should be no general presumption 
that the reduction of the number of firms through a merger would lead to negative effects on innova-
tion, in the specific case of a 2:1 merger (monopolization) they recommend a rebuttable presumption 
of negative innovation effects. This already hints to a more differentiated approach between a simple 
presumption and a pure fact-dependent analysis). 
In light of the overview in section 2.2. about our theoretical and empirical knowledge about innovation 
effects of mergers, it seems to be clear that a general and unqualified presumption about negative 
innovation effects of a merger seems to be hardly defensible. It can be presumed that the error costs 
(from both types of errors, false positives and false negatives) by using a simple presumption are 
much too high, because we saw in section 2.2 that the innovation effects of mergers might be very 
different under different circumstances and in different sectors. Therefore from a decision-theoretic 
perspective, the development of a structured assessment approach is necessary, in which for different 
sectors and circumstances the innovation effects of mergers should be analyzed in a differently struc-
tured way. The rich theoretical and empirical literature about innovation competition can be used as 
input for developing such a differentiated approach. Such an approach is very close to the well-
established practice in competition law for forming a number of groups and subgroups of cases, which 
are treated differently, both in regard to the relevant assessment criteria but also in regard to the nec-
essary depth of specific case analysis or whether under certain circumstances also presumptions can 
be used. It cannot be excluded that for certain subgroups of cases, i.e. under certain conditions, also 
(rebuttable) presumptions about negative innovation effects of mergers might be recommended. So far 
there is not much research about the problem, how we can derive such a structured investigation and 
assessment approach from the rich theoretical and empirical literature that we summarized briefly in 
section 2.2.28 
 
 
  
                                                 
27 For the Genzyme/Novazyme case, see also the dissenting statements of the other Commissioners 
Thompson (2004) and Harbour (2004) as well as Balto/Sher (2004), Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 81-85), 
Gilbert (2008b) and Shapiro (2012, 394-398). 
28 For contributions that already try to develop first approaches in this direction, see, e.g., Gilbert 
(2006), Baker (2007), Kern/Mantilla (2014), and for the pharmaceutical industry Carrier (2008). It can 
also be found in Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 2007b) with an explicit claim for using a decision-theoretic 
framework. 
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3.  Innovation Effects of Mergers: Analysis of U.S. Merger Policy 
3.1 Introduction 
Before the 1990s, the impact of mergers on innovation did not play an explicit role in US merger poli-
cy. This is corroborated by the fact that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 1992 mentioned innova-
tion only once in a footnote (DOJ/FTC 1992, 2, fn.6). However, in the 1990s an increasingly important 
discussion emerged about the relevance and necessity of considering innovation effects in antitrust 
law (see, e.g., Yao/DeSanti 1992) and in this context "Innovation Market Analysis" (Gilbert/Sunshine 
1995) emerged. Over the last twenty years officials of both US antitrust agencies, the DOJ and FTC, 
have regularly emphasized the importance of the assessment of innovation effects in regard to their 
merger reviews (e.g., Robinson 1999, Rosch 2009, 2010). As we will analyze in more detail in chapter 
4, the newest version of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 2010) entails explicitly rules 
when and how innovation effects should be considered. Most remarkable, however, is that innovation 
seems to have played an explicit role in a large number of merger cases in the last twenty years(with a 
considerable number of innovation-related divestitures as remedies in settlements).  
In this chapter, we want to analyze the practice of US merger policy in regard to the assessment of 
innovation effects by looking empirically at the merger cases of the DOJ and FTC. We are particularly 
interested in the following questions: (1) To what extent have the agencies considered innovation in 
their merger reviews? Have innovation effects been a relevant aspect in merger reviews or has it been 
considered only in rare cases? Have innovation aspects been seen as more relevant in innovation-
intensive industries? (2) For those cases, in which innovation aspects have played a role in the as-
sessment, the question arises, how the agencies have assessed these innovation aspects. Did they 
use the traditional product market concept, as suggested by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, or did 
they use a more innovation-specific approach (e.g., along the lines of the innovation market concept)? 
What kind of specific theoretical reasonings did they mention why a merger should have negative ef-
fects on innovation, and what specific assessment criteria did they apply? What kind of remedies did 
they use in their settlements? Since the assessment of innovation effects of mergers is itself an inno-
vation, a third set of questions is interesting: (3) Did the two U.S. antitrust agencies use the same or 
different approaches in regard to assessing innovation effects, and can we see a development over 
time in regard to the extent and methods of assessing innovation effects, e.g. through more experi-
ence? In that respect, we should also bear in mind that in the last twenty years three different Admin-
istrations (Clinton, Bush, Obama) with different political agendas might have influenced U.S. antitrust 
policy.  
We are not the first asking about the practice of US merger policy in regard to innovation concerns. 
There are a number of papers which either have analyzed specific merger cases and/or provided 
some overviews about the general policies of the agencies in regard to the assessment of innovation 
effects. Perhaps most important are the articles of Gilbert/Tom (2001), Katz/ Shelanski (2007a), and in 
regard to pharmaceutical mergers Carrier (2008). However, none of these articles have analyzed em-
pirically with an econometric study the U.S. merger cases, especially in regard how the agencies have 
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tried to assess the innovation effects of these mergers.29 Our analysis here is based primarily upon an 
empirical study, in which we analyzed all challenged mergers of the U.S. antitrust agencies DOJ and 
FTC between 1995 and 2008. From our overall data set of 399 merger challenges, the agencies have 
considered innovation in 135 merger cases, which has been our subset of mergers with innovation 
concerns, which we analyzed in regard to the above-mentioned research questions. Therefore, our 
study is the first that analyzes the assessment approach of the U.S. agencies in regard to innovation 
effects in detail and with quantitative empirical methods. In the following subsections, we will summa-
rize and discuss the results of our study. Both the methodology of our study and the econometric re-
sults can be found in more detail in Kern/Dewenter/Kerber (2014). However, in this section we will also 
present additional descriptive results (not mentioned in our econometric paper) as well as carry out a 
deeper analysis and interpretation.  
 
3.2 To What Extent Have the U.S. Antitrust Agencies Considered Innovation in their Assess-
ments of Mergers? 
During the 1990s the U.S. merger policy started to take innovation effects in merger reviews into ac-
count much more seriously. Gilbert/Tom (2001) and Gilbert (2008a) could show that the number of 
challenged mergers, in which innovation effects were alleged increased considerably between 1990 
and 2003 (from 3% of all challenged mergers in the period 1990-1994 to 38% between 2000 and 2003 
for both agencies). However, Gilbert also emphasized that in only few of these cases innovation con-
cerns played a crucial role for the agencies, and that these mergers would have presumably also be 
challenged on conventional static concerns (Gilbert 2008a, 4). Much more unclear is whether this un-
disputed increase in the 1990s led to a stable policy of including innovation effects in merger reviews 
or whether the massive critique of the innovation market approach led also to a setback in regard to 
the consideration of innovation effects in the practice of U.S. merger policy, especially after the closing 
of the Genzyme/Novazyme case in the beginning of 2004 (see Muris 2004, Gilbert 2008b, Rosch 
2009). Since there is a broad consensus that innovation concerns were relevant also after 2003, the 
question is whether these were only some prominent cases, esp. in the pharmaceutical industry, or 
whether the inclusion of innovation effects became part of the general merger policy. 
  
                                                 
29 Gilbert/Tom (2001) and Gilbert (2008a) provide some descriptive statistics about the extent of the 
consideration of innovation effects. See for qualitative assessments of merger cases, e.g., Davis 
(2003, 687 et seq.), Morse (2001, 26 et seq.), Rubinfeld/Hoven (2001), Landman (1999), Lang (1997), 
Kent (2011) and Kern (2014).  
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Table 1: Assessment of Innovation Effects in Challenged Merger Cases (DOJ and FTC,1995-2008) 
 
 
  
25 
In our study we could identify 135 mergers of overall 399 mergers that were challenged between 1995 
and 2008 by DOJ and FTC, in which the agencies also raised innovation concerns. We defined a mer-
ger with innovation concerns as a merger, in which the agencies had mentioned innovation in at least 
one relevant market, either as part of the market definition or as part of their competitive effects analy-
sis (see more specifically subsection 3.3). Therefore, in a third of all challenged mergers (34%) also 
innovation concerns were raised. Although the numbers in Table 1 in regard to the share of such inno-
vation cases differ slightly between the DOJ and FTC and between 1995-2003 and 2004-2008, our 
econometric analysis, which also controlled for the effects that the agencies usually review mergers 
from different industries, showed clearly that no statistically significant differences can be found be-
tween the probability that the DOJ or the FTC raised innovation concerns, and between both periods 
(Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 4-10). The latter result strongly supports the thesis that the relevance of 
innovation concerns has not decreased after 2003. It is also remarkable that the DOJ and FTC con-
sidered innovation concerns to a similar extent, because we will see below considerable differences 
between the agencies in regard to their assessment approaches. 
A different question is whether the agencies correctly identified the mergers with innovation concerns. 
The agencies could have made two kinds of mistakes: On one hand, they could have mistakenly 
raised innovation concerns on markets, on which no such effects can be expected ("false positive"). 
On the other hand, the agencies could also have been mistaken in not identifying cases with innova-
tion effects ("false negatives"). In the literature a number of cases are discussed, esp. in regard to the 
pharmaceutical industry, in which the use of innovation markets and/or the alleged innovation effects 
are criticized, leading to an allegation of identifying too often or too rarely mergers with negative ef-
fects on innovation (see, e.g., Carrier 2008 and Kent 2011). However, no systematic ex post-analysis 
exists in regard to the extent of the correct identification of mergers with innovation effects. In our em-
pirical study, we could only contribute indirectly to this issue: We showed econometrically that the 
probability that the agencies challenge mergers with innovation concerns increases with the innovation 
intensity of the industries of the merging firms.30 The fact that the agencies focussed more on innova-
tion in innovative industries provides at least some confidence that the agencies considered innovation 
where it is particularly relevant. 
 
3.3 Market Definition: Did the Antitrust Agencies Use an Innovation-specific Approach?  
The next question is how the agencies assessed whether it can be expected that the mergers might 
lead to negative effects on innovation. In section 2.3, we saw that the main discussion in the literature 
focused on the problem whether traditional approaches as the product market approach are also suffi-
cient for dealing with innovation effects or whether a more innovation-specific approach might be nec-
essary. In our study we did not ask directly whether and/or to what extent the antitrust authorities have 
applied the innovation market analysis. Instead we asked whether the agencies used an innovation-
specific investigation approach that differs significantly from the traditional product market approach. 
As a crucial criterion for distinguishing a new innovation-specific approach from the traditional product 
                                                 
30
 See Kern/Dewenter/Kerber (2014, 8-10); see also Gilbert (2008a) and Park/ Sonenshine (2012). 
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market approach we asked whether the agencies considered already innovation in the market defini-
tion or only in the competitive effects analysis. 
Therefore, in our empirical analysis (see Table 1) we investigated whether innovation was mentioned 
explicitly in the market definition and in the competitive assessment part of the "complaints". Taking 
the criterion "innovation in market definition" as crucial distinction feature leads us to two different ap-
proaches that have been applied by the agencies: In the first traditional approach an agency used the 
wording "manufacturing and sale of ..." without referring to innovation or R&D, and claimed negative 
innovation effects only in the competitive assessment analysis.31 In the second innovation-specific 
approach, the agencies used innovation already in the market definition, e.g. as "research, develop-
ment, manufacturing and sale of  ...", and afterwards claimed either (a) explicitly negative innovation 
effects or (b) only implicitly innovation effects by claiming generally anticompetitive effects in regard to 
a market, whose definition also included innovation.32 
It is a surprising result of our study that, overall, in 69% of all markets, in which the agencies claimed 
innovation concerns, innovation can already be found in the market definition. Additionally, this share 
increased from 65% to 82% from the first (1995-2003) to the second sub-period (2004-2008), and this 
rise is also statistically significant (Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 16). A closer look, however, reveals 
significant differences between the two agencies DOJ and FTC. Whereas the DOJ used innovation in 
the market definition in only 41% of all markets (with no differences between both sub-periods), the 
FTC used innovation on average twice as often (82%), and with a clear increase from the first (78%) to 
the second sub-period (95%). This implies that the FTC has used innovation in the market definition 
nearly always between 2004 and 2008. This also statistically significant difference in the use of inno-
vation in the market definition between both agencies shows that despite considering innovation ef-
fects to a similar extent, their approach for assessing innovation effects differed considerably. This is 
also confirmed by the different extent of the use of innovation in the competitive effects analysis: 
Whereas the DOJ mentioned in this part nearly always innovation effects explicitly (99%), the FTC did 
this to a much lesser degree, and with a further decrease from the first to the second sub-period (from 
76% in 1995-2003 to only 50% in 2004-2008). Since at the FTC this decrease is entirely compatible 
with the increase of innovation in the market definition, these developments indicate that these differ-
ent approaches of both agencies have become to some extent more consistent and accentuated over 
time. However, it is also important to note that despite these clear differences, both agencies used to 
                                                 
31
 DoJ: e.g. United States v. Cookson Group PLC, et al., 1:08CV00389; United States and Plaintiff 
States v. Oracle Corporation; United States v. Computer Associates International, Inc. and Platinum 
Technology International, Inc., 1:99CV01318; U.S. v. MICROSOFT  CORPORATION (INTUIT, 
INC.)). FTC: e.g. Solvay & Ausimont, Docket No. C-4046; Tyco & Mallinckrodt, Docket No. C-3985; 
Zeneca & Astra Docket No., C-3880. 
32
 a) DoJ: e.g. United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed 
March 23, 1998). FTC: e.g. Amgen & Immunex, Docket No. C-4056; Glaxo Wellcome & Smith Kline 
Beecham, Docket No. C-3990; INA Holding Schaeffler & FAG Kugelfischer, Docket No. C-4033; 
Lockheed Martin & Loral, Docket No.  C-3685. b) DoJ: United States v. Raytheon, General Motors, 
and HE Holdings, 1:97CV02397. FTC: e.g. American Home Products & Solvay, Docket No. C-3740; 
Baxter & Immuno, Docket No. C-3726; Raytheon & Chrysler, Docket No. C-3681. 
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some extent both approaches, i.e. also the FTC used the traditional product market approach, and the 
DOJ the more innovation-specific approach in regard to market definition in a minority of their cases. 
In a recent, at first sight, very critical article of Kent (2011) about the use of innovation markets in U.S. 
merger policy, it was alleged that the agencies did not analyze sufficiently whether there were "spe-
cialized assets". In the innovation market approach (as well as in the IP Antitrust Guidelines, DOJ/FTC 
1995), it was emphasized that for the definition of innovation markets it is also necessary that special-
ized assets can be identified, which are necessary for innovation and whose absence would hinder 
other firms to innovate in this particular field. Otherwise, negative effects of mergers on innovation 
cannot be reliably expected and no innovation markets should be defined (Gilbert/Sunshine 1995, 
596). From an innovation economics perspective, this criterion can be linked to the resource-based 
theory of the firm, which views the knowledge base of a firm as its most critical resource for achieving 
a competitive advantage.33 From that perspective, specialized assets, which are indispensable for 
innovation, can be seen as a barrier to entry for innovation competition. Therefore, the question is 
important, to what extent the agencies investigated whether specialized assets can be identified. This 
can be viewed as part of the question for an innovation-specific approach to market definition. 
In our study, we regarded all resources as specialized assets, which are indispensable for research 
and development and which are difficult to acquire and adopt in an adequate period of time (e.g. intel-
lectual property rights, experience, know-how, etc.). We distinguished them from other (less innova-
tion-specific) entry barriers as, e.g., high sunk costs, manufacturing capabilities, service and sales 
networks. In a second step we differentiated within the innovation-specific specialized assets between 
intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights etc.) on one hand and knowledge-based resources as 
experience, know-how, qualification etc. on the other hand. A first important result (see Table 1) is that 
in most cases both innovation-specific entry barriers (intellectual property rights, know-how and expe-
rience) and other (more conventional) entry barriers were claimed as important by the agencies. Tradi-
tional entry barriers were claimed in 84% of all relevant markets. Since overall in only 30% of all mar-
kets innovation-specific entry barriers as intellectual property rights, know-how, and experience were 
not mentioned by the agencies, the question of necessary specialized assets for research and devel-
opment was addressed in regard to 70% of all markets with innovation concerns. It is also an interest-
ing result that non-intellectual property knowledge resources (in 60% of all markets) were seen more 
often as a critical asset than intellectual property rights (in only 19% of all markets). More importantly, 
the descriptive statistics seem to suggest that the importance of these innovation-specific entry barri-
ers increased over time. In the period 2004-2008, the DOJ and FTC saw know-how and experience 
(intellectual property rights) in 74% (36%) of all markets as a specialized asset. Although our analysis 
cannot assess how seriously the agencies investigated the question of necessary specialized assets, 
these results show clearly that both agencies considered this criterion in most cases. It also gives 
                                                 
33 See, generally, Barney (1991), Newbert (2007), and Kern/Ackermann (2014). 
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some support to our thesis of an increasing relevance of an innovation-specific assessment approach 
for the review of mergers.34 
 
3.4 Competitive Assessment 
3.4.1 Firm Concentration  
Identifying the relevant competitors through market definition is always only the first step in any merger 
assessment. In section 2, we provided an overview about our insights from theoretical and empirical 
research about innovation effects of mergers, and the discussion about relevant assessment criteria. 
Usually the first criterion in the competitive assessment part is concentration measures, which at least 
serves as a sorting criterion for deciding between unproblematic and more problematic mergers that 
warrant a deeper analysis. Since traditional measures as market shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman-
Index (HHI) might not be very relevant (or even not computable) in regard to innovation concerns, the 
pure number of independent innovating entities is often seen as a more innovation-specific measure 
for the relevant concentration.35 In regard to concentration measures our study shows that the agen-
cies used both the conventional concentration measures market shares and HHI (50% of all markets) 
and the number of firms (38%; see Table 1). The use of both types of quantitative measures increases 
over time, whereas the use of vague non-quantitative statements about concentration (as, e.g., "highly 
concentrated"36), which had been used particularly often in FTC cases in the first sub-period, has 
declined over time. In regard to the more innovation-specific measure "number of firms", it is interest-
ing that our econometric study suggests that, firstly, the application of this measure significantly in-
creased from the first to the second sub-period (to overall 51%; however, mainly through an increase 
at the FTC), but, secondly, it was surprising that overall the DOJ used the number of firms significantly 
more often than the FTC. The considerable share of markets, however, in which also the conventional 
measures were used, is not surprising, because the agencies - as we will see below in section 3.4.4 - 
often also claimed price effects at the same markets. Overall, the broad and increasing use of the 
measure "number of firms" as a relevant concentration measure for assessing innovation effects of 
mergers clearly supports the view that both agencies used in that respect also an innovation-specific 
approach. 
                                                 
34 However, the descriptive statistics show that both agencies also used more traditional entry barriers 
in addition to the innovation-specific ones. 
35 This is also the reason why in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
(DOJ/FTC 1995) the safe harbour solution of at least four other independent firms is defined with the 
number of firms, and not with market shares. 
36 See, e.g., "[…] highly concentrated" (see, e.g., American Home Products & Cyanamid, Docket No. 
C-3557; Sensormatic & Knogo, Docket No. C-3572; The Boeing Company, File No. 001 0092, Dock-
et No. C-3992); ”highly concentrated […] Respondents are the two leading suppliers” (see, e.g., 
General Electric & Invision, Docket No. C-4119); „[…] two of a very small number of competitors” 
(see, e.g., Raytheon & Chrysler, Docket No. C-3681); “[…] the two largest suppliers in the US” (see, 
e.g., Itron, Inc. & Schlumberger Electricity, Inc., Docket No. C-4114); “[…] two of the leading suppli-
ers in the world” (see, e.g., Svedala Industri AB/Metso Oyj Corp., FTC File No. 001-0186, Docket No. 
C-4024). 
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How high were the post-merger concentration levels in all those markets where the agencies claimed 
innovation concerns? Since in 81 markets the agencies gave only inconcrete, non-quantitative infor-
mation about concentration, we limited our analysis to the 242 markets, in which the agencies provid-
ed quantitative ex-post merger concentration measures (HHIs, market shares, or the number of com-
petitors). Since nearly all of the markets were highly concentrated according to the definition of both 
the old and new Horizontal Market Guidelines, we used a different classification with finer distinctions 
within the large range of highly concentrated markets (see Table 1). We defined three classes: mar-
kets with very high concentration (HHI ≥ 5000, market shares ≥ 70 %, or a post-merger number of 
competitors ≤ 2, i.e. that the mergers lead to a duopoly or monopoly), markets with high concentration 
(3000 ≤ HHI < 5000, 45% ≤ market share < 70%; 3 ≤ number of competitors ≤ 4), and markets with 
low and medium concentration (HHI < 3.000, market shares < 45%, number of competitors > 4).37 The 
most important result of our analysis is that in nearly two thirds of all markets with innovation concerns 
the post-merger concentration level is in the class of very high concentration. Post-merger HHIs of 
larger than 5000 or 3:2 and 2:1 mergers are examples of such an extremely large concentration. In 
only 5% of all markets with innovation concerns of the agencies the concentration level was low or 
medium (HHI < 3000). This result seems to suggest that the agencies do only claim innovation con-
cerns of mergers in the case of high and very high concentration levels. The descriptive statistics also 
indicate that this is even more so at the DOJ than the FTC, and it might have increased over time.38  
Since we will see below that the agencies often claimed both innovation and static price concerns at 
the same market, we have to discuss these results within a broader context later. 
 
3.4.2 Theories about Innovation Effects of Mergers 
The overview about our theoretical and empirical knowledge in regard to innovation effects of mergers 
(section 2.2) showed that many theoretical models as well as empirical studies with manifold insights 
exist. However, it also became clear that any investigation into the innovation effects of particular mer-
gers is based upon a much thinner and more disputed scientific evidence than, e.g., price effects. This 
is particularly true for the question of a clear link between firm concentration on one hand and innova-
tion on the other hand, but also in regard to the mechanisms through which mergers might have an 
impact on innovation. From that perspective, it is, in a first step, important to ask what kind of specific 
reasonings the agencies provided, why a merger should have negative effects on innovation. Since 
the agencies were often not very specific in their reasonings (as we will see in the next section), we 
differentiated in our empirical study only between two groups of arguments. The first group encom-
passes reasonings which are based upon various theories and models which argue that a merger 
might reduce innovation incentives, which might lead either to less investment in R&D and/or a slow-
                                                 
37 A more precise explanation of the methodology for this classification can be found in the appendix. 
38 Since we have not tested this econometrically, we do not know whether this is statistically signifi-
cant. 
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ing down of research and development.39 The mechanisms behind these decreasing innovation incen-
tives might be very different (see section 2.2.2), but they are mostly based upon mainstream industrial 
economics approaches. However, in our analysis of cases, we also found reasonings about negative 
innovation effects of mergers that were close to evolutionary arguments about possible negative ef-
fects on competition as a process of parallel experimentation with different problem solutions through 
a reduction of parallel R&D projects and/or the number of independent sources of innovation through 
mergers (diversity arguments).40 In our empirical study, we, therefore, analyzed the complaints in 
respect to the question to what extent the agencies used either innovation incentive or diversity argu-
ments for substantiating why the merger might have negative innovation effects. 
In the 323 markets with innovation concerns the agencies used innovation incentive arguments in 
roughly a third of all markets (105 markets: 32.5%; see Table 1). Although this percentage of markets 
with innovation incentive arguments increased from the first to the second sub-period (from 29% to 
44%), which is also confirmed as statistically significant in the econometric analysis 
(Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 23), it is still rather low, if one takes into account that these are the main 
arguments for innovation effects suggested by both economic theory and the Innovation Market Anal-
ysis. Our econometric study also confirmed that there were no significant differences of the use of 
innovation incentive arguments between both agencies (despite a higher percentage at the DOJ than 
the FTC; Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 23). From that perspective, the use of diversity arguments in 
overall 23 markets (7%) does not seem to be so small. However, the latter arguments have been 
mainly applied in the first sub-period 1995 to 2003, whereas afterwards they can be found only in sin-
gle cases.41  
 
3.4.3 Extent of Reasoning 
The most important result of our examination of the theories and reasonings in regard to innovation 
effects of mergers might be that the agencies in the majority of cases gave no specific reasonings why 
the mergers might lead to negative effects on innovation. In nearly two thirds of all merger cases with 
innovation concerns the agencies have not given any specific reasons why the mergers might have 
negative effects on innovation. Although the numbers in Table 1 seem to indicate that the DOJ has 
given more reasonings than the FTC and that in both agencies the share of inconcrete reasonings has 
decreased, in our econometric study we could not confirm these differences as statistically significant 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., CIba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997); United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-
2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 1998); Eli Lilly & PCS, Docket No. C-3594; INA Holding 
Schaeffler & FAG Kugelfischer, Docket No. C-4033; General Electric & Agfa, Docket No. C-4103; 
General Electric & Invision, Docket No. C-4119; U.S. v. Northrop Grumman Corp. and TRW Inc., 
1:02CV02432. 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civ. No. 98-00731 (D.D.C. complaint filed March 
23, 1998); United States v. Halliburton Co., Civ. No. 98-2340 (D.D.C. complaint filed Sept. 29. 1998); 
Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995); The Upjohn, Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996); Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 
F.T.C. 842 (1997); Pfizer Inc. and Warner-Lambert Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-3957 (June 19, 2000). 
41 The numbers of markets with diversity arguments were too small for carrying out an econometric 
analysis. 
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(Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 24, fn.23). But even in the second sub-period 2004 - 2008, the agencies 
have claimed in 53% of all markets negative innovation effects without giving any specific reasonings. 
This result might raise serious concerns about the quality of the assessment of innovation effects or, at 
least, about the transparency of the agencies in regard to their assessments. It might also be a sign for 
the still large extent of insecurity and uneasiness of the agencies about this kind of assessment. An-
other interpretation of the lack of specific reasonings would be that the agencies often use also in re-
gard to innovation effects presumptions about the negative innovation effects of mergers through an 
increase of firm concentration, which would unburden the agencies to give specific reasons in each 
case. In section 2.3 we saw that the use of presumptions about the innovation effects of firm concen-
tration has been discussed very critically. We will come back to this question in more detail below. 
 
3.4.4 Simultaneity of Claims of Price and Innovation Effects and the Problem of Presumptions 
Antitrust agencies challenge mergers, if the mergers lead to harm for consumers, which can consist of 
static price effects and/or innovation effects. In most challenged merger cases the agencies have 
claimed only price effects (264 of all 399 challenged mergers, see Table 1). It is now a very interesting 
result in our empirical study that the agencies tended to claim simultaneously static price effects when 
they claim innovation effects. In Table 1, it can be seen that in 84% of all markets in which the agen-
cies claim innovation effects they also allege static price effects. In this respect, we also could ascer-
tain clear differences between the agencies. The DOJ nearly always (99%) has claimed also static 
price effects, if they have mentioned innovation concerns, whereas the FTC has done this only in 77% 
of the markets. Additionally, the simultaneity of claims of price and innovation concerns increases from 
the first to the second sub-period. Both statements have been confirmed by our econometric tests as 
statistically significant (Kern/Dewenter/Kerber 2014, 24). This far-reaching simultaneity of claims about 
price and innovation effects of mergers is theoretically a surprising and also puzzling result, because 
the theoretical explanations how a merger would lead to higher prices and less innovation are very 
different and independent from each other. Increasing prices through mergers can be explained either 
through coordinated effects (based upon price collusion theory) or non-coordinated/unilateral effects 
(based upon non-cooperative game theory in oligopolistic settings). Both mechanisms are very differ-
ent from the mechanisms of innovation effects of mergers discussed in section 2.2. Therefore, the 
question emerges whether the agencies have really assessed price and innovation effects inde-
pendently, or whether they have strategically also claimed additionally static price effects in the cases 
in which they wanted to allege innovation concerns. Or, vice versa, that they sometimes might not 
have claimed innovation concerns, if they would not also have good arguments for alleging static price 
effects.42  
However, there might be also another reason for not providing specific reasonings about how a mer-
ger might lead to negative innovation effects. One possibility is that the agencies have used ex- or 
                                                 
42 This puzzling simultaneity is also confirmed by the fact that in all 135 challenged mergers with inno-
vation concerns, the agencies alleged only in 18 (from overall 341) markets solely price effects without 
innovation concerns. This is a surprisingly very low number. 
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implicitly presumptions about negative innovation effects through an increase of firm concentration. In 
section 2.3, we saw that in the academic discussion general presumptions about innovation effects 
have been viewed very critically. It is hard to ascertain from the complaints and decision and orders, to 
what extent the agencies have used presumptions. However, we should keep in mind that the safe 
harbour solution in the Antitrust IP Guidelines that no negative effects on innovation competition are 
expected, if there are at least four other independent entities that have the resources to innovate, en-
tails at least a presumption when no negative innovation effects might be expected. Since we have 
seen that the absolute level of firm concentration (either measured as number of firms or market 
shares and HHI) in the markets where the mergers were challenged also in regard to innovation con-
cerns were very high, it cannot be excluded that in a much more cautious way as in the IP guidelines 
the agencies have used implicitly a presumption that mergers with such a very high firm concentration 
might lead to negative innovation effects. The analysis, however, is still more complicated, because 
we have seen that the DOJ always and, to an increasing extent, also the FTC claimed simultaneously 
static price effects and negative innovation effects on the same markets. Therefore, we often cannot 
distinguish whether a certain decision of challenging the merger was based upon a presumption about 
the price and/or innovation effects. 
 
3.4.5 Competitive Assessment: A Path to More Cautiousness? 
Based upon all these results from our empirical study, we would suggest the following interpretation of 
the practices of the agencies: Firstly, the fact that the agencies often refrain from giving specific rea-
sonings why a merger should lead to negative innovation effects, shows a large degree of insecurity of 
the agencies about how innovation effects should be assessed. Secondly, the simultaneity of alleging 
also price effects if the agencies claim innovation concerns can be interpreted as the result of a strate-
gy of caution, because the price-effect arguments fit much better into the traditional antitrust approach 
than this new kind of innovation effects argument. Thirdly, this cautious way of taking innovation ef-
fects into account (with the safety net of claims about static price effects) also seemed to have in-
creased over time. This is confirmed, on one hand, by the increase of the share of alleged price effects 
in the second sub-period, but, on the other hand, also by the increase of the use of in mainstream 
economics much more well-established innovation incentive arguments in comparison to more innova-
tive evolutionary diversity arguments, which practically vanished in the second sub-period. A fourth 
conclusion refers to differences between both antitrust agencies. Our results here fit in rather well with 
our previous results in section 3.3 about approaches to market definition. Also here the DoJ was the 
more traditional, and therefore cautious agency, because it relied not only more on the product market 
approach but also more on well-established innovation incentive arguments, and they practically al-
ways claim also static price effects, if they have innovation concerns. The FTC, on the contrary, also 
moved over time into this more cautious traditional direction, but it was more innovative in the first sub-
period, and even between 2004 and 2008 the FTC had in a number of markets claimed innovation 
concerns without simultaneously alleging also price effects. Fifthly, we cannot not say much about the 
question whether the agencies implicitly used presumptions. However, the fact that in nearly all mar-
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kets, where the agencies have claimed innovation concerns in challenged merger cases, the level of 
firm concentration was high or very high, suggests that the agencies were very cautious about using 
strong presumptions about concluding negative innovation effects from the pure rise of firm concentra-
tion through the merger. They might have done so only in cases with very high concentration. 
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3.5 Decisions, Settlements, and Remedies 
What were the outcomes of the challenges of the mergers with innovation concerns? From the 135 
challenged mergers with innovation concerns (Table 1), 124 (91.8%) were settled by consent decrees 
between the merging parties and the agencies. It is particularly remarkable that between 1995 and 
2008 only four cases (3.0%) were litigated in court. In two of them the court granted the agency’s re-
quest for injunctive relief and consequently blocked the merger.43 In the other two cases the court did 
not follow the agency’s motion, i.e., the request for injunctive relief was denied.44 All of them were 
DOJ cases. Not one merger with innovation aspects that was challenged by the FTC was litigated in 
court.45 In another seven cases the DOJ tried to block the transaction, but the parties terminated/ 
abandoned the merger after the complaint was filed in court.46 After 2004 not one of the DOJ chal-
lenges to mergers with innovation concerns led to a termination through the parties, and the only liti-
gated case was lost in court. Although there are considerable differences between the final outcomes 
of merger cases at both agencies, we will not discuss them here in more detail, because they can be 
partly explained by the different proceedings in merger cases at both agencies.   
Nearly all cases in our sample of mergers with innovation concerns had been settled by consent de-
cree with structural remedies of different kinds. Since the remedies in a particular settlement were 
often related to more than one market (as defined in the complaint) or the agencies used rather gen-
eral terms like "the assets to be invested" leaving the relevant markets unspecified, we had to analyze 
the remedies on the level of merger cases instead of markets with innovation aspects. The most im-
portant remedy were divestitures. They can be found in 101 of all 124 settlements. In 20 settlements 
licensing of intellectual property rights was used. In only 22 of all settlements other kinds of remedies 
can be found. The numbers seem to suggest that divestitures have gained importance over time (but 
we have not tested this econometrically). In the most recent period 2004-2008 both the DOJ and the 
FTC required divestitures in 80% of the challenged merger cases as the sole remedy in their settle-
ments. For the entire period, only in 19% of the cases the agencies did not order divestitures but relied 
on other remedies. It is interesting that these were all FTC cases, whereas the DOJ always required 
                                                 
43 Permanent injunction was granted in U.S. v. Franklin Electric Co., Inc., et al. (00-C-0334). In U.S. v. 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj, Raflatac, Inc., Bemis Company, Inc. & Morgan Adhesives Company (03-C-
2528) the district court granted a preliminary injunction and the parties abandoned the transaction 
shortly thereafter. 
44 Injunctive relief was denied in: U.S. v. Engelhard, Corp. et al. (6-95-cv-45) and in U.S. and Plaintiff 
States v. Oracle Corporation (C-04-0807). 
45 To our knowledge, the only case with innovation aspects in which the FTC authorized staff to seek 
injunctive relief was Cytyc's proposed $429 million acquisition of Digene Corporation. However, the 
parties abandoned the transaction prior to the Commission's filing of the complaint in district court. 
Hence, we were unable to analyze the respective complaint and had to exclude this case from our 
study. 
46 The parties terminated the transaction in: U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, Complaint (April 27,1995); 
U.S. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman Corp., Complaint (March 23, 1998); U.S. v. 
Compuware Corp. and Viasoft, Inc., Complaint (October 29, 1999); U.S. v. WorldCom and Sprint 
Corp., Complaint (June 27, 2000); U.S. v. General Dynamics Corporation and Newport News Ship-
building Inc., Complaint (October 23, 2001); U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Echostar Communications 
Corp., et al., Complaint (October 31, 2002). In U.S. v. SGL Carbon Aktiengesellschaft and SGL Car-
bon LLC., Complaint (April 15, 2003), the DOJ dismissed all causes of action in the complaint, be-
cause the German company lost its bid in bankruptcy court to acquire Carbide/Graphite Group. 
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divestitures (partly in combination with other remedies). In comparison to divestitures licensing as an 
alternative (but perhaps also weaker) means for providing access of other competitors to critical re-
sources plays a significant but limited role for remedying competition problems (in overall 20 settle-
ments), and also a diminishing one (at least as sole remedy). The use of other remedies (e.g., the 
termination of contracts and agreements or the obligation to provide and disclose information) can be 
found in overall 22 settlements, but they seem to have declined over time (both in DOJ and FTC cas-
es). Although we could not ascertain in all of these cases, to what extent these remedies were innova-
tion-related, there are a considerable number of settlements, esp. in regard to pharmaceutical mergers 
(see next subsection 3.6), in which the divestitures and licensing requirements explicitly focussed on 
the protecting of innovation competition. 
 
 
3.6 Mergers in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Special Group of Cases 
The merger cases in the pharmaceutical industry are a particularly interesting and distinct group. First-
ly, the pharmaceutical industry is a very innovative industry, in which R&D is crucial (at least for origi-
nator firms). Secondly, due to the FDA regulations for market approval (with its extensive documenta-
tion requirements of the results of preclinical and clinical research) R&D projects for new drugs for 
certain diseases are well-defined and well-documented. This allows for a much better identification of 
relevant innovation competitors than in other sectors. Thirdly, due to the FDA regulations and patent 
protection of the ingredients barriers to entry for new innovating firms are high. Fourthly, during our 
investigation period a huge consolidation of the global pharmaceutical industry took place, with a large 
number of mergers leading to many merger reviews in the pharmaceutical industry (Comanor / Scher-
er 2013). In the U.S., these mergers were assessed exclusively by the FTC, which developed over 
time a relatively consistent way how to deal with pharmaceutical mergers and solve competition prob-
lems through settlements.  
From the overall 45 pharmaceutical mergers that the FTC challenged between 1995 and 2008 we 
could find innovation aspects in 23 merger cases by applying our criterion that innovation was either 
used in market definition and/or in the competitive effects analysis (leading to overall 63 markets with 
innovation aspects). To what extent was an innovation-specific approach used in regard to pharma-
ceutical mergers? In 61 (97 %) of the 63 markets with innovation aspects of the pharmaceutical mer-
gers (43 in period 1 and 20 in period 2), "research and development" was already mentioned in the 
market definition. 27 of these markets contained innovation aspects in both the market definition and 
the anticompetitive effects, whereas  only two of the 63 markets47 were defined  without referring to 
research and development, implying that the negative effects on innovation were exclusively claimed 
in the competitive effects analysis. The typical procedure was that the FTC did define relevant markets 
(with or without "research and development") according to products and/or R&D projects for pharma-
ceutical treatment of particular diseases (or groups of diseases).48 In the competitive assessment it 
                                                 
47 Both of them (Eli Lilly/PCS and Zeneca/Astra) falling into the earlier period of 1995-2003. 
48 In 47 of the overall 63 markets with innovation aspects (75%) the FTC simultaneously claimed price 
effects - in the second period even in 100% of the markets (in 20 out of 20 markets). Diversity argu-
ments were brought forward in 5 markets – all of them in the period before 2004. Incentive aspects 
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asked for the HHIs, market shares and/or number of actual competitors or other firms with relevant 
R&D projects.49 There are cases in which so far no current product (market) existed, whereas in other 
cases, one of the merging firms with a current product on the market bought another firm with a com-
peting drug in the pipeline. It is crucial that in many cases the FTC did explicitly claim in the competi-
tive effects analysis that the merger would impede innovation competition.  
All 23 challenged merger cases were settled with remedies. Over time, there is a clear shift of the 
remedies to divestitures. Whereas in the first period (1995-2003) licensing agreements (44%) and 
other remedies (30%) were still important in comparison to divestitures (75%), in the second period 
(2004-2008) the settlements relied exclusively on divestitures. The divestitures refer to the R&D pro-
jects of one of the merging firms, which have to be sold to another independent competitor. For these 
divestitures a clear and consistent practice developed, which is entirely compatible with an innovation-
specific approach. For the settlements in these cases ("decision and orders") the FTC developed a 
very detailed procedure (with a lot of precisely defined obligations of the merging firms) to ensure that 
the success of this divested R&D project cannot be compromised by any current or later action of the 
merging firms. This required the very precise identification and definition of all relevant assets (physi-
cal assets, human resources, intellectual property rights etc.), which are necessary for carrying out the 
R&D project. Crucial is (1) that the FTC intended with these structural remedies to maintain explicitly 
innovation competition and an additional independent competitor, and (2) that the remedy focussed 
entirely on the necessary specialized assets for innovation, which is exactly what would follow from an 
"innovation market" approach.  
Our objective in this article is not to analyze whether the FTC was right to challenge these pharmaceu-
tical mergers but to investigate their assessment approach. Important other studies of a group of (es-
pecially important) pharmaceutical merger cases, which are a subgroup of our sample, are Carrier 
(2008) and Kent (2011). Both analyze whether the FTC decisions to challenge were justified. For ex-
ample, Carrier (2008) came to the conclusion that in five of nine cases the FTC came to the correct 
decision, but that in four merger cases (Roche/Genentech, AHP/Cyanamid, Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, Pfiz-
er/Warner-Lambert) the FTC should not have challenged the mergers. Kent (2011) is even more criti-
cal. However, more important for our purpose is that their main objective is a critical examination of the 
"innovation market" approach. Both authors seem to be on the opposite ends of the discussion, with 
Carrier as the most prominent current supporter of the innovation market concept and Kent as a seem-
ingly fierce opponent to this concept. However, both agree that the specific characteristics of R&D 
processes in the pharmaceutical industry should be taken more into account. This refers primarily to 
the problem whether R&D projects in early (preclinical) stages (with its well-researched small proba-
bilities of success) should be considered at all in the merger reviews. Therefore Carrier (2008) pro-
posed a specific and distinct (five-step) assessment scheme for pharmaceutical mergers, which ex-
                                                                                                                                                        
were provided in 15 markets – again, all of them in the first period. In 47 of the overall 63 markets the 
FTC did either not include innovation in the competitive effects analysis (only in the market definition) 
or remained inconcrete – with respect to the second period even in 20 out of 20 markets.  
49 In 18 out of overall 63 markets the FTC relied on HHIs (15 in period 1 and 3 in period 2), in 23 on 
market shares (11 in period 1 and 12 in period 2) and in 33 on the number of significant competitors 
(23 in period 1 and 10 in period 2).   
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cludes all R&D projects in preclinical phases (due to its small success rates) and would include also 
the specific stage of the projects as an important part of the competitive analysis. This is also the main 
reason why he would not have challenged some of the mergers. Important for our discussion is that 
both the practice of the FTC of developing a specific approach how to deal with pharmaceutical mer-
gers as well as the specific proposal of Carrier (2008) for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry point 
into the same direction: Searching for sector-specific assessment approaches for innovation effects of 
mergers, which are better capable of taking into account the specific realities of innovation in particular 
industries. 
 
3.7  The Assessment of Innovation Effects in Merger Policy until 2008: A Synopsis  
The overall assessment of the extent and how the U.S. agencies assessed innovation effects of mer-
gers ends up in a rather mixed and very ambivalent result. Our (a longer period entailing) empirical 
study confirms the earlier claims of Gilbert (2008a) that innovation concerns have been regularly as-
sessed in a significant share of all challenged mergers. Even after the decision of the FTC not to chal-
lenge the Genzyme/Novazyme merger in 2004 as the so far only pure innovation merger case, which 
was claimed as a possible turning-point against the innovation market approach,50 the agencies did 
not seem to have diminished their efforts in regard to possible innovation concerns of mergers. We 
could also verify that the probability that a merger is challenged with innovation concerns increases 
with the innovation intensity of the respective industries. Therefore, despite all critique about the inno-
vation market concept the assessment of innovation effects has become an established part of the 
regular assessment procedures of the agencies in merger reviews in the period up to 2008. It is inter-
esting that there seem to be also no differences between the DOJ and the FTC in that respect. The 
record of the challenged cases in this period also shows that in a considerable number of settlements 
remedies were imposed that aim directly at innovation concerns and the maintaining of innovation 
competition. In regard to pharmaceutical merger cases, the requirement of divestitures of R&D pro-
jects (and all the necessary specialized assets), if the merger might lead to a (too large) reduction of 
parallel research paths in innovation competition, has also become a regular practice in this sector.  
However, neither our quantitative nor the other qualitative studies of the merger cases can support the 
thesis that the agencies succeeded in developing a clear and consistent approach during this period 
how innovation effects should be assessed. Especially in regard to the crucial question whether a 
traditional assessment approach based upon product markets or a more innovation-specific approach 
should be used, the case practice of the agencies showed a remarkable degree of variation, both be-
tween the agencies but also within the agencies. In most cases with innovation concerns the DOJ did 
not mention innovation in the market definition, but used the product market concept, and referred to 
possible negative innovation effects of the mergers only in the competitive effects analysis. But in 
many cases the DOJ also used the much more innovation-specific approach predominantly used by 
                                                 
50 In that respect, the opinion of FTC Commissioner Rosch (2009) about a change in regard to the 
application of the "innovation market" concept after the Genzyme/ Novazyme case did at least not 
affect the question whether the agencies took innovation effects into account. 
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the FTC, which already included research and development as relevant parameters of competition in 
the market definition, and then asked whether the merger might have negative effects on this competi-
tion. Based upon these differences in regard to market definition, it is not surprising that the DOJ near-
ly always claimed explicitly innovation effects in the competitive effects analysis in contrast to the FTC. 
Although these differences in regard to market definition between the agencies could be confirmed as 
statistically significant, other aspects about a more innovation-specific or traditional assessment ap-
proach proved as being less clear. For example, the more innovation-specific measure of the number 
of firms as concentration measure in contrast to traditional measures as HHI or market shares was 
used by both agencies. Both agencies also used to a similar extent more innovation-specific resource-
oriented barriers to entry. 
It seems to be particularly problematic that, in most cases, the agencies provided no specific reason-
ing why the mergers should lead to negative effects on innovation. Although most of the theoretical 
literature focusses on the negative effects on innovation through potentially lower innovation incen-
tives, reasonings about innovation incentives are mentioned only in a minority of markets with innova-
tion concerns. Other reasonings which are closer to evolutionary diversity arguments even seemed to 
practically vanish in the second sub-period 2004-2008. Although the use of innovation incentive argu-
ments has increased over time, esp. at the DOJ, the lack of providing specific arguments about the 
negative innovation effects in most of these markets raises serious questions about the depth of the 
investigation, the uncertainty of the agencies or the transparency of their deliberations. Overall, our 
results support the view that the agencies got more cautious over time, in particular, if we take into 
account that they increasingly claimed simultaneously innovation and price effects. 
 
 
 
4.  Innovation Effects of Mergers: Recent Discussions and Research Perspectives 
4.1 U.S. Merger Policy under the Obama Administration 
Since our empirical study included merger cases only until 2008, we have, in the meantime, five years 
more experience with merger cases. These additional five years simultaneously coincide with the ten-
ure of the Obama Administration, which took office in January 2009. At the same time, there was al-
ready a broad discussion between the U.S. antitrust agencies, lawyers, and the academia about the 
reform of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 1992), which led to the publication of new 
Guidelines in 2010 (DOJ/FTC 2010). In this section, we will briefly discuss, in a first step, to what ex-
tent the innovation assessment of mergers has changed in the last 5 years after 2008. In contrast to 
our econometric study for the cases before 2009, we can do this only in a more traditional, qualitative 
form by looking at several important cases in this period. In a second step, we will analyze the general 
recent discussion about assessing innovation effects of mergers in the context of the reform of the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. We will see that both in regard to the practice of the U.S. agencies and 
to the policy discussions about the assessment of innovation effects of mergers, no genuinely new 
developments have happened in the last five years. This disappointing result will be the starting-point 
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for our last section 4.2, in which we want to sketch some ideas about new research perspectives how 
competition authorities should deal with innovation effects of mergers. 
At the beginning of the Obama Administration, there was a broad discussion whether there would be a 
more active application of antitrust laws by the new administration, and what kind of changes might be 
expected (Harty 2010). The newly appointed officials at the Antitrust Division also raised expectations 
by promising a reinvigoration of antitrust policy in the U.S. After several years of antitrust under 
Obama, the opinions about such a development are very mixed. There seem to be some consensus 
that neither the fears in regard to more antitrust intervention nor the partly far-reaching hopes for a 
more active protection of competition through antitrust application were justified by the ensuing prac-
tice of the agencies. Whereas, e.g., Baker/Shapiro (2012) have claimed that the antitrust policy in the 
first term of Obama was more active than under the Bush administration, other scholars are much 
more skeptical about such a claim, and emphasize much more the continuity of antitrust application 
(Crane 2012a, 2012b). One of the offered reasons is that, in the meantime, the application of antitrust 
laws is done according to certain well-established technical standards, which lead to less political in-
fluences in regard to antitrust policy (Crane 2012a, Kovacic 2009). This can also be linked to the ar-
gument that, in the U.S. system, politically motivated changes in antitrust policy are difficult, because 
the agencies have to convince the (often conservative) courts. Whether some "reinvigoration" can or 
cannot be observed, is open to debate, but a very broad majority of antitrust scholars seem to agree 
that there has been no serious change in antitrust policy, neither generally nor in specific realms, in 
the last years.  
Is this also true for the assessment of innovation effects of mergers? In the following, we summarize 
briefly our analysis of four merger cases: Pfizer/Wyeth, Merck/Schering-Plough, Thoratec/Heartware, 
and AT&T/T-Mobile. The first two were very large pharmaceutical mergers, which were allowed by the 
FTC through settlements. In Pfizer/Wyeth51 the FTC explicitly defined 20 different product markets 
("manufacture and sale") in the field of animal health products, described the market structure by using 
mostly HHIs and market shares, and claimed generally for all these markets in the competitive effects 
analysis (in addition to a number of other competition problems, i.e. unilateral and coordinated effects, 
higher prices) that the "merged entity's incentives to pursue further innovation" would be reduced in all 
these markets (ibid., 8). This is a typical application of the traditional product market concept with the 
claiming of innovation incentive effects in the competitive effects analysis. The divestiture in the set-
tlement focusses very clearly on the necessary specialized assets ("animal health products assets") 
with the explicit objective "to ensure the continued use of such assets in the research, development 
and manufacturing of each of the Animal Health Products and/or Animal Health Pipeline Products ..." 
as well as "to create a viable and effective [independent] competitor [...] in the research, development 
and manufacture ... " [of these products].52 This can be found in the same way in the "complaint" and 
"decision and order" in the Merck/Schering-Plough case.53 The Thoratec/Heartware pharmaceutical 
                                                 
51 Pfizer/Wyeth, Complaint, Docket C-4267; for a discussion of the Pfizer/Wyeth and Merck/Schering-
Plough case, see Kent (2011) and Comanor/Scherer (2013).  
52 Pfizer/Wyeth, Decision and Order, 8. 
53 Merck/Schering-Plough, Complaint, Docket C-4268. 
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merger case was different. Here the problem was that Thoratec was a monopolist in the "LVAD" mar-
ket, which is "a life-sustaining technology for treating end-stage heart failure patients",54 and Heart-
ware had a competing, possibly superior product ("HVAD") in the later stages of clinical trials threaten-
ing the monopoly of Thoratec. This is a clear case of a monopolist buying a firm threatening its mo-
nopoly position. After the complaint Thoratec abandoned the merger. Also here the FTC defined prod-
uct markets and explicitly alleged that the merger would eliminate innovation competition.  
A very much discussed case in the mobile telecommunication industry was AT&T/T-Mobile.55 It is 
interesting that in this case also innovation played a large role, but in a very different way than in most 
other cases. In the U.S. market for mobile wireless telecommunication services there were four na-
tional providers with AT&T and Verizon as the market leaders, and Sprint as the next largest competi-
tors and T-Mobile as the smallest firm. According to the DOJ, T-Mobile improved its competitive disad-
vantage as the smallest provider in an industry with considerable network economies by embarking on 
a strategy of aggressive pricing and innovation. It developed aggressive pricing plans with lower rates 
than offered by AT&T and Verizon, and in a number of instances, T-Mobile was the first in introducing 
innovations (as, e.g., advanced HSPA+ technology, national Wi-Fi 'hot spot' access, Android handset, 
and different unlimited service plans) in the U.S. wireless industry and the network development. The 
DOJ concluded that the merger would "eliminate the important price, quality, product variety, and in-
novation competition that an independent T-Mobile brings to the marketplace" (ibid., 15). Although 
innovation is emphasized in this case, it is not about research and development but primarily about the 
introduction of new innovations, which is expected to be slowed down through the merger. The DOJ 
explicitly viewed T-Mobile as a "disruptive force" in this highly concentrated market, without which 
there would be higher prices and slower introduction of new innovations.56 Here innovation in form of 
new services and the investment in new (but already known) technology is deeply intertwined with 
price competition, and can also not be protected by IPRs. Although the DOJ defined product markets, 
they included in their "hypothetical monopoly" test not only the question for a profitable price increase 
but also for a profitable reduction in innovation (ibid., 7). Therefore innovation was included both in the 
market definition and in the competitive effects analysis. After the complaint the merger was aban-
doned.57 
Since we have not analyzed all cases since 2009, we have to be very careful with our conclusions. 
These examples do not contradict that the FTC and DOJ have changed their policies in regard to the 
extent of considering innovation effects, and in regard to the policy to use divestitures of necessary 
specialized assets for R&D for solving problems of innovation competition. However, it is very remark-
able that in all three of the pharmaceutical mergers the FTC used clearly the product market concept 
and only included the analysis of innovation effects in the competitive assessment part of the com-
plaint. This raises the question whether after 2008 there was a shift away from the innovation-specific 
                                                 
54 Thoratec/Heartware, Complaint, Docket C-9339; see also Shapiro (2012, 398). 
55 AT&T/T-Mobile, Complaint, No. 1-11-cv-1569 (filed Aug. 31, 2011). 
56 This resembles an argument about an "elimination of a maverick firm" through the merger. 
57 For a broad discussion of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger case see AAI (2011), Stucke/Grunes (2012) 
and Besen et al. (2012).  
41 
approach primarily used by the FTC until 2008, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (see sections 
3.3 and 3.6), and therefore a shift back to the traditional product market approach.58 However, an 
extension of our empirical study to the cases after 2008 would be necessary forgetting empirical evi-
dence for these claims. In the following section we will look whether such a view would fit to the recent 
U.S. antitrust discussion about innovation effects of mergers. 
 
4.2 Discussions of the Assessment of Innovation Effects in the Context of the Horizontal Mer-
ger Guidelines Reform 
The broad discussion about the reform of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) is particularly well 
suited for analyzing the current state of the debate of assessing innovation effects of mergers. First, an 
important part of the discussion about guidelines is the question whether certain practices of the com-
petition authorities applied in past cases are already accepted well enough to put them down into rules 
which give guidance for future merger reviews. Secondly, in the discussion of the U.S. guidelines very 
different groups participated, as, e.g., not only antitrust economists and lawyers in the academia but 
also law practitioners at law firms, the antitrust authorities themselves as well as policy-makers. There-
fore, the sources that can be used for summarizing this debate are very broad.59 In regard to our pa-
per, this discussion refers both back to our theoretical discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.3 in regard to 
our knowledge about innovation effects of mergers, and how antitrust authorities should deal with it in 
merger policy, as well as to our empirical analysis of the practices of the U.S. agencies in their merger 
reviews until 2008. The following paragraphs will provide for a brief summary of the most important 
arguments and opinions in this discussion. 
Generally in the discussion, there was a very broad agreement about the great importance of innova-
tion as part of market competition in terms of new products and cost-saving process innovations for 
the increase of wealth. Manifold concerns were articulated in regard to the danger that an over-
emphasis on price effects of mergers in the application of antitrust laws might hamper the innovation 
process. These concerns have come from very different angles: One important argument emphasizes 
the importance of innovation efficiencies worrying that short-term static price concerns might lead to 
the blocking of mergers that would spur innovation through various kinds of innovation-related efficien-
cies (e.g., AMC 2007, 56-60). From a very different perspective, scholars are concerned that the em-
phasis on short-term price effects leads to a tendency to overlook the potentially more dangerous 
long-term negative effects of mergers on innovation. It is also generally accepted that innovation ef-
fects might be much more important than short-term price effects, at least in innovation-intensive in-
                                                 
58 For example, Kent (2011) applauds the rejection of the "innovation market" approach in Pfiz-
er/Wyeth.  
59 See the report of the antitrust authorities DOJ/FTC (2006) about the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
the report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC 2007), the transcripts of the workshops 
in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project on December, 3 and 8, 2009 (FTC 2009a, 
2009b), as well as Carlton (2007, 2010), Gilbert/Rubinfeld (2010), AAI (2010), Hylton (2011), 
Hovenkamp (2011), Evans/Hylton (2008), Katz/Shelanski (2007a), Baker (2008), Sidak/Teece 
(2009), Rosch (2009, 2010), Shapiro (2010, 2012), Kent (2011), and Feng (2012).  
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dustries. The opinions are more divided on the question whether antitrust law should and can protect 
innovation competition through merger reviews. It is certainly only a small minority that thinks that we 
know so little about innovation processes and/or that innovation can come from such diverse sources 
(as Schumpeterian competition) that we can and/or need not protect innovation competition through 
merger reviews.60 However, the concerns of this minority that the antitrust authorities might hamper 
innovation more than foster it by actively attempting to intervene into mergers in order to protect inno-
vation competition, is acknowledged by most of the participants in the debate and the main reason for 
recommending a cautious (or very cautious) approach. But this does not lead to the conclusion for 
most of the scholars that the overall practice of the U.S. agencies in regard to the consideration of 
innovation concerns in their merger reviews since mid of the 1990s was generally wrong or over-
ambitious. Therefore, there was a broad support that the assessment of innovation concerns should 
be integrated more into the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines. However, much more controversial was 
the question how this should be done.  
Let us now first analyze the guidance given by the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines in regard to the 
assessment of innovation effects, and ask how well these guidelines reflect, on one hand, the practice 
of the antitrust agencies in their merger reviews, and, on the other hand, the more specific U.S. dis-
cussion about the reform of the guidelines in that respect. The first crucial question is about market 
definition and the question to what extent the innovation-specific approach that we came across in our 
empirical study has found its way into the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Although we have seen 
that overall the agencies have used innovation in the market definitions of the challenged mergers in 
about 70% of all markets with innovation concerns (FTC: 95%, DOJ: 41%), neither "innovation" nor 
"innovation markets" are mentioned once in the long chapter about market definition in the new guide-
lines. The entire market definition chapter is focussed only on the current products of the firms, i.e. the 
traditional product market approach with the usual hypothetical monopoly test. Innovation effects of 
mergers are adressed in two parts of the guidelines, firstly, in the section about efficiencies, where 
merger-specific efficiencies in regard to the innovation itself or for a better appropriation of innovation 
benefits are mentioned (balanced with some skepticism about the consideration of alleged cost-saving 
efficiencies in regard to R&D) (DOJ/ FTC 2010, 31). Secondly, negative innovation effects are 
adressed as part of the unilateral effects analysis of mergers in the competitive assessment part (see 
below). Therefore, the new guidelines are very clearly using exclusively the traditional concept of as-
sessing innovation effects by first defining product markets and only considering innovation effects in 
the competitive assessment analysis. In our empirical study, we saw that this was the predominant 
concept used by the DOJ, although it also used in many cases a more innovation-specific concept. It 
is very surprising that there is such a huge gap between the practice of the agencies, esp. the FTC, 
until 2008 and the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
What can be found about the assessment of possible negative innovation effects of mergers in the 
guidelines? They are dealt with in an own subsection 6.4 about "Innovation and Product Variety" 
(DOJ/FTC 2010, 23-24). The effects of mergers on product variety imply effects on the extent of prod-
                                                 
60 For arguments against this view, see Katz/Shelanski (2007a), Carrier (2008), Sidak/Teece (2009), 
and Shapiro (2012). 
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uct differentiation that consumers are offered in the market, with the well-known trade-off between cost 
advantages of fewer products and a better fulfillment of heterogeneous preferences through a higher 
degree of product differentiation. This is one dimension of non-price competition, but it is a matter of 
static product differentiation and not one of innovation.61 Therefore, for the question of the assess-
ment of negative innovation effects of mergers, only the first three paragraphs are relevant (DOJ/FTC 
2010, 23): 
 
"Competition often spurs firms to innovate. The Agencies may consider whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation 
competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that would prevail in the ab-
sence of the merger. That curtailment of innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue with an existing 
product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate development of new products.  
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least one of the merging firms is engaging in efforts to introduce new 
products that would capture substantial revenues from the other merging firm. The second, longer-run effect is most likely 
to occur if at least one of the merging firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new products in the future 
that would capture substantial revenues from the other merging firm. The Agencies therefore also consider whether a mer-
ger will diminish innovation competition by combining two of a very small number of firms with the strongest capabilities 
to successfully innovate in a specific direction.  
The Agencies evaluate the extent to which successful innovation by one merging firm is likely to take sales from the other, 
and the extent to which post-merger incentives for future innovation will be lower than those that would prevail in the ab-
sence of the merger. The Agencies also consider whether the merger is likely to enable innovation that would not otherwise 
take place, by bringing together complementary capabilities that cannot be otherwise combined or for some other merger-
specific reason. See Section 10." 
An analysis of these brief paragraphs leads to the following conclusions: The main argumentation is 
about the reduction of innovation incentives, either for continuing an already existing R&D project or 
starting a new one. However, it is mostly about potential competition in an already existing product 
market. The first effect, in which products in the pipeline of one of the merging firms would threaten the 
revenue from already existing products of the other merging firm, is in that respect not very different 
from the second "longer-run effect" about reduced incentives to start a new R&D project that might 
diminish the sale of current products of the other merging firm.62 Much more in line with an innovation-
specific assessment approach would be the following statement that the agencies "consider whether a 
merger will diminish innovation competition by combining two of a small number of firms with the 
strongest capabilities to successfully innovate" (ibid.). Here "innovation capabilities" are mentioned, 
but there is no hint, how the agencies should identify them. There is no reference to "specialized as-
sets" as, e.g., intellectual property rights, laboratories, know-how or experience. The more innovation-
specific concentration measure "number of firms" is used (and not the HHI or market shares), but it 
certainly remains unclear what a "very small number of firms" means (except the necessity of very 
high concentration). The problem, however, is that this sentence refers explicitly to the previous ones 
about the effects of innovation on the revenues of the other merging firm on an already existing prod-
uct market, and, therefore, has to be read as a potential competition argument. The same is true for 
the following sentence, emphasizing again the threats to the sales of the other merging firm.   
                                                 
61 Despite the use of the term product "variety", this also has nothing to do with the discussion about 
the benefits of "diversity" in regard to the benefits of having several sources of innovation or parallel 
research projects from an evolutionary economics perspective. For economic models about the prod-
uct variety problem in competition policy, see, e.g., Motta (2004, 331-333). 
62 For a deeper explanation using also the term "innovation diversion rates", see Shapiro (2012, 391-
394). 
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Overall, this text is unclear and inconsistent. Except this straightforward case of limiting the negative 
effects on potential competition on already existing markets, the guidelines give no clear guidance 
about the assessment of innovation competition. Not even the well-known group of cases is clearly 
covered, in which the firms compete with R&D projects for the development of a new product, which 
then would constitute a new product market (future market). There is no hint in regard to the protection 
of innovation competition between parallel research projects nor for protecting a diversity of sources of 
innovation. Since the Guidelines recommend only the traditional product market definition, it remains 
unclear how the agencies would deal with the problem that the incumbent firms on the product market 
might not be identical with the firms that compete in regard to innovation. All the other references to 
innovation in the Guidelines mention possibilities how innovation arguments can be used for defending 
the merger.63 Overall, the guidelines remain far behind the practice in the merger reviews of the U.S. 
agencies. Especially, the lacking guidance in regard to identify the relevant competitors in innovation 
competition, the missing analysis of necessary specialized assets as barriers to enter innovation com-
petition, the lack of any specific hint how to assess whether the merger between two of a very small 
number of competitors would diminish innovation competition (or whether the agencies would use a 
presumption for that), and the lack of talking about appropriate remedies (e.g., divestitures), as they 
have been well-established in the pharmaceutical merger cases, show that the guidelines do not re-
flect the already well-established practice of the antitrust agencies (as shown in our empirical study in 
section 3). Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the new guidelines neither give clear and con-
sistent guidance how innovation competition should be assessed and protected in merger reviews nor 
reflects the already wide-spread use of innovation-specific assessment approaches in the merger 
reviews of the U.S. agencies in the fifteen years before the reform. 
Do the guidelines correspond to the more specific Horizontal Merger Guidelines review discussion 
about the assessment of innovation effects? It certainly echoes the still very strong skepticism and 
opposition against the innovation market concept in the reform discussion,64  although there were also 
exceptions (as Pitofsky in FTC 2009a, 17).65 Even prominent proponents of an active merger policy 
for protecting innovation competition as, e.g., Katz/Shelanski (2007a) and Gilbert/Rubinfeld (2010), 
were reluctant in recommending actively the "innovation market" concept. In their analysis of the mar-
ket definition problem in regard to innovation competition, Katz/Shelanski (2007a, 41-43) develop a 
position that is very close to the "innovation market" concept, however, without endorsing it explicitly. 
Also Gilbert/Rubinfeld (2010) in their comment on the draft version of the guidelines make allusions to 
                                                 
63 See the last sentence in the quoted text, the other innovation efficiency arguments in section 10 of 
the Guidelines (DOJ/FTC 2010, 30), and the mentioning of the argument that positive effects from 
innovation competition might balance short-term price effects (DOJ/FTC 2010, 20).  
64 See, e.g., AMC (2007), Carlton (2007), Muris and Melamed in FTC (2009a), Salinger in FTC 
(2009b), and others who are generally concerned about overenforcement in regard to innovation as, 
e.g., Hylton (2011). Even the DOJ and FTC in their 2006 report on Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(DJC/FTC 2006) did not address the topic of innovation markets, although they mention cases where 
they used innovation markets.  
65 An active supporter is also Carrier (2008), who in his article not only defends the innovation market 
approach by using the theoretical and empirical results of innovation economics, but also develops 
an own specific version of the innovation market analysis for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. 
More radical in breaking with the traditional approach is Sidak/Teece (2009, 615-619). 
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the innovation market concept, but they also do not criticize the exclusive use of the product market 
concept.  
However, a closer look into the arguments reveals much more differentiated views. Since most of the 
scholars agree that merger reviews should look for possibly negative innovation effects, there is also a 
broad consensus about the necessity of identifying the relevant competitors in regard to innovation. In 
that respect, many would agree that the basic idea of the innovation market concept, to identify directly 
the innovation competitors, e.g., by asking for overlapping R&D projects or necessary R&D resources, 
is correct (see, e.g., Katz/Shelanski 2007a, 42). The question seems to be more, whether this should 
lead to a formal definition of innovation markets or whether the analysis of negative innovation effects 
can also be done either through a direct analysis of negative innovation effects of mergers66 or 
through using the concept of future markets (which, however, are also not mentioned in the new 
guidelines).67 The first solution of a direct assessment aligns very well with a much broader discussion 
in antitrust (also addressed directly in the new Guidelines, DOJ/FTC 2010, 7) that it might not be al-
ways necessary to stick to the traditional approach to first defining precisely the relevant markets be-
fore analyzing, in a second step, the competitive effects of the mergers. Although this seems to allow 
the agencies side-stepping the necessity of formally defining the markets, they somehow still have to 
identify the relevant competitors for analyzing the competitive effects of mergers (critical to this ap-
proach: Carlton 2010). On one hand, this general development makes the question of formally defining 
innovation markets less critical. On the other hand, it does not solve the problem that any competitive 
assessment requires the identification of the relevant competitors. Astonishing in this entire debate is 
that the (above-diagnosed) huge gap between the practice of the agencies in regard to innovation-
specific assessment approaches and the new Guidelines has not been discussed. 
Already in section 2.2 and 2.3, we have seen that one of the main critical questions is to what extent 
agencies can make presumptions from a higher firm concentration to negative innovation effects. In 
the reform discussion, there also was a broad consensus about the rejection of the use of general 
presumptions, claiming instead that innovation effects of mergers should be investigated through a 
case-specific, fact-dependent analysis. This reflects to some extent the opinion of Muris in the Gen-
zyme/ Novazyme case (Muris 2004), in which he even rejected a presumption in the case of a 2:1 
merger, and insisted on the specific analysis of the innovation effects in the particular case. We al-
ready mentioned that other scholars, e.g., Katz/Shelanski (2007a) have a different point of view by 
suggesting at least a weak (rebuttable) presumption in the case of a 2:1 merger in regard to innovation 
competition. However, for less extreme forms of concentration they also reject any presumption about 
the innovation effects of mergers and claim the necessity of a case-specific analysis. The guidelines 
give no guidance in regard to the use of presumptions. Beyond that problem, there is also a broad 
consensus in the U.S. discussion that innovation efficiencies should be taken into account.68 Although 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Melamed in FTC (2009a, 55), Salinger in FTC (2009b, 7). 
67 For example, Kent (2011) favours the "future market" concept in comparison with the innovation 
market concept in his analysis of pharmaceutical merger cases. 
68  See AMC (2007, 77), Gilbert/Rubinfeld (2010), Katz/Shelanski (2007a), Carrier (2008), Garza in 
FTC (2009a). 
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the guidelines have addressed explicitly innovation efficiencies in section 10 (DOJ/FTC 2010, 30), it 
might remain unclear whether they really will play a role in merger cases due to the well-known difficul-
ties of proving them.69 
Summarizing, in regard to innovation effects of mergers the new U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 
2010 did not embrace the innovation-specific approaches that have been developed until 2008 by the 
antitrust agencies, especially by the FTC but also partly by the DOJ, in their merger cases since the 
1990s. Instead, the Guidelines stick entirely to the traditional product market concept, implying that 
innovation is only considered in the competitive assessment part of the review. Also these parts of the 
guidelines remain sketchy, vague, and inconsistent, and offer no clear guidance how the agencies 
would protect innovation competition in merger cases. However, these guidelines reflect quite well the 
also very vague general opinion in the U.S. discussion about this topic, which acknowledges the prob-
lem and necessity of making such assessments, but simultaneously offers few specific advice how this 
should be done. In that respect, the entire discussion does not seem to have made very much pro-
gress since the proposal of the "Innovation Market Analysis" concept in the 1990s. Particularly striking 
is now the huge gap between the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines on one hand and the still existing 
Antitrust Guidelines about Licensing of Intellectual Property from 1995 with its clear inclusion of inno-
vation markets (Feng 2012).   
 
 
 
4.3 Perspectives for Future Research 
Starting-point of our analysis in this paper was the question how the U.S. antitrust agencies have as-
sessed innovation effects of mergers since the mid 1990s. We have seen that the agencies have used 
in many cases an innovation-specific approach for assessing innovation effects of mergers, which 
already considered innovation for identifying the relevant competitors. But our analysis also showed 
that they have not done this in a consistent way by also widely using a traditional product market ap-
proach or by not applying an innovation-specific approach consistently or offering only insufficient 
reasonings about the alleged negative innovation effects. In the last section it became also clear that 
this practice of an innovation-specific approach has not found sufficient approval for getting acknowl-
edged in the last reform of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, implying that the traditional product mar-
ket approach with its inherent problems in taking into account innovation competition still dominates 
the guidelines, which might also have led to a setback in regard to the practice of the U.S. antitrust 
agencies. Therefore, on one hand, we see a surprisingly strong tendency of many antitrust scholars to 
cling to the well-known and well-accepted (static) product market concept with its primary focus on 
price competition. On the other hand, we also see a broad consensus for taking innovation effects 
seriously and a lot of new cases in all fields of antitrust and competition law, in which the agencies try 
to consider innovation effects, also often with still unclarified new theories about harm and vague new 
                                                 
69 Vice versa, there was also critique that the consideration of the "ability of the merged firm to appro-
priate a greater fraction of the benefits resulting from its innovation is an efficiency" (DOJ/FTC 2010, 
30) might be problematic, because "it could create an open-ended efficiency argument for virtually 
any merger in a concentrated market" (AAI 2010, 12). 
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concepts. From that perspective, we strongly suggest that it is necessary to think about new and fresh 
perspectives in regard to innovation in competition law, about the concept of innovation competition, 
and to what extent traditional competition law concepts are really capable of dealing properly with the 
innovation dimension of competition (see, e.g., Drexl 2012). In the following, we want to outline three 
different avenues for further thinking and research that we suggest might be worthwhile to pursue. 
(1) Modern game-theoretic industrial economics has deepened the economic analysis of competition 
problems to a large degree and contributed a lot of valuable insights into the economic effects of many 
behaviors in market competition and now allows for a much more sophisticated economic analysis in 
specific cases, especially in combination with the many new empirical methods that can be applied. 
Whether these methods can fulfil the expectations they have raised, however, is open for debate. 
More important for the discussion about competition and innovation here is that this theoretical indus-
trial economics approach is only partly well suited for analyzing the specific problem of innovation 
processes. As long as the analysis is about incentives for investing in R&D in situations of limited un-
certainty and complexity with traditional profit-maximizing firms, this approach can contribute a lot to 
the analysis (as we have seen in section 2.2). However, in situations of high uncertainty and complexi-
ty with heterogeneous firms with different capabilities, and if we assume that the best solutions and 
research paths are not known, and creativity, knowledge, learning, and cross-fertilization are deemed 
as important, also other dimensions of innovation processes become very relevant, which cannot be 
dealt with within this paradigm. This is also the reason why in innovation economics different theoreti-
cal approaches are used, and the game-theoretic industrial organization literature represents only a 
(limited) part of the relevant literature. Overall, evolutionary approaches to innovation and other ap-
proaches as the "resource-oriented view" of the firm and strategic management literature in business 
administration (which are more compatible with evolutionary approaches than with industrial econom-
ics literature) are much more important for innovation research.  
This insight leads to the necessity that if competition policy wants to take into account more the effects 
of market structures or business behaviors on innovation processes, then it has to look much more 
into the results of research beyond the traditional industrial economics literature, and turn directly to 
the huge and rich literature on innovation research. This might not be easy, because this (often empir-
ical) literature is not only huge, but also not easily applicable to competition policy questions. But the 
general claim that we do know so little about innovation is (to a large extent) a myth, although we cer-
tainly know not enough how to make this literature about innovation usable for the application in com-
petition law. This also refers to the necessity to think anew about our concepts of competition and 
what we mean by innovation competition. A lot of the problems we have in the discussion about the 
innovation market concept and whether a merger might have negative effects on innovation, stem also 
from the (paradigmatic) problem that innovation competition is analyzed theoretically still too exclu-
sively from a traditional industrial economics perspective with its primary focus on innovation incen-
tives, whereas other dimensions and benefits of competition, as those from a Post-Schumpeterian 
perspective, the experimental character of searching for better problem solutions (according to a Hay-
ekian and evolutionary perspective), the importance of knowledge and (dynamic) capabilities, network 
effects and path dependencies, and the rich insights from innovation research tend to be ignored. 
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Many legal scholars in competition law still start with the idea that competition is about rivalry between 
firms for improving their products and services for the consumers. Perhaps it would be helpful to go 
back to Schumpeterian and Hayekian ideas about dynamic competition as an innovation-imitation 
process and as a process or parallel experimentation with new problem solutions and develop a new 
and clearer concept of innovation competition, with theoretical and empirical input from all the different 
approaches that do research about innovation and competition.70 
(2) It is a positive development that in antitrust proceedings the rigid scheme of defining the relevant 
markets first and then assessing the competitive effects on these markets is questioned despite its 
advantages for structuring the assessment process. From an economic perspective the definition of 
markets was always only a vehicle for identifying the set of relevant competing firms. In a concept of 
static competition, it was logical to use the set of current products and analyze their substitutability 
conditions from the demand (and the supply) side, in order to determine whether their suppliers have 
profitable possibilities for increasing prices, leading to the "hypothetical monopoly test" for determining 
the set of relevant competitors. As we have discussed in section 2.3, from a theoretical perspective it 
is clear that the set of relevant competitors in regard to innovation need not be identical with the set of 
relevant competitors in regard to price competition on an existing market with current products. There-
fore the attempts to cling to the product market concept for defining the relevant competitors for inno-
vation is theoretically deeply flawed. Since production and sale of products do not require the same 
resources and capabilities than innovation, a general assumption of such an identity cannot be de-
fended. Therefore using a product market concept might only be used as a first step in a pragmatic 
solution, which however requires further analysis for correcting the possible errors of such an ap-
proach. As we have seen from our discussion of potential competition and future market concepts as 
alternative possible solutions, this also would require the identification of actual and potential innovat-
ing firms (section 2.2.3). 
Therefore any real analysis of anticompetitive effects on innovation competition cannot avoid the iden-
tification of the relevant competitors for innovation. As a consequence, future research should focus on 
the question how and to what extent the firms can be identified, which innovate and/or have the capa-
bilities for innovation in certain fields of research or in regard to the solution of certain problems. In that 
respect, the "Innovation Market Analysis" nearly twenty years ago started to ask the right questions 
about "overlapping R&D" and about the existence of "specialized assets" as patents, laboratories, 
specific know-how and experience, which also can be interpreted as barriers to entry into innovation 
competition. In what direction should a new approach be developed? Both theoretically as well as from 
the experience in merger cases, two different levels of analysis can be distinguished in that respect: 
The first level is competition between firms with already existing R&D projects, which only requires the 
observability of these R&D projects. There is a general consensus that in the pharmaceutical industry 
their identification is rather easy through the regulatory requirements of the market approval processes 
                                                 
70 Some contributions to this discussion from an economic perspective are, e.g., Metcalfe (1998), 
Farrell (2006), Sidak/Teece (2009), and Kerber (2011) with many references. For a paradigmatic cri-
tique of the "Static-Ization of Antitrust" through static industrial organization theory, see, e.g., Ev-
ans/Hylton (2008, 238-240). 
49 
(e.g., in the U.S. by the FDA) (see, e.g., Carrier 2008). In other sectors this might be more difficult. 
More ambitious might be a second level, and that is the level of the resources, specialized assets, and 
capabilities for innovation in a certain area. This is also theoretically a most interesting avenue for 
further research (about "market definition"), because such a resource-oriented approach to the identi-
fication of the set of relevant competitors might provide a much better concept for assessing the long-
term effects of mergers on competition and innovation.71 For merger policy, this would imply the prob-
lem of maintaining a competitive structure in the sense of a multitude of independent sources for (so 
far unknown) future innovations.72 Such an approach depends to a large extent also on the develop-
ment of suitable empirical methods how innovation, innovation capabilities, and necessary specialized 
assets can be identified. Experts in innovation research (and in the "resource-oriented view" of the 
firm) should be able to contribute to its solution. However, it is a crucial question, in which sectors and 
to what extent it is possible to identify the relevant firms and where this might not be possible. But as 
with many other new approaches (as e.g., the merger simulation models for predicting future price 
changes post-merger), it is a matter of experience where and to what extent such an approach can be 
applied.   
(3) The third avenue for future research we want to propose might be the least controversial one, but it 
is very crucial for any progress in regard to the assessment of innovation effects of mergers. Already 
in section 2.3, we discussed briefly the necessity of developing a structured investigation and assess-
ment approach that is capable of dealing with the problem that the innovation effects of mergers might 
be very different under different circumstances, in different sectors, and under different appropriability 
conditions (perfect/imperfect IP protection) etc.. In regard to the assessment of mergers in regard to 
price increases competition authorities have developed distinctions between coordinated and non-
coordinated effects and further differentiations, each of which is treated differently in respect to what 
kind of assessment criteria are used, what has to be proved and to what extent ex- or implicit pre-
sumptions can be applied (and which empirical methods can be used for getting evidence). This has 
led to a structure of groups and subgroups of cases which are assessed differently in order to take into 
account that the mergers might have different effects on prices under different circumstances. The 
development of such a differentiated approach should also be the strategy of the competition authori-
ties in regard to innovation effects of mergers. First attempts for distinguishing between different case 
groups already exist (see Baker 2007, Katz/ Shelanski 2007a, 64-67, Kern/Mantilla 2014), and espe-
cially the merger cases in the pharmaceutical industry show that also more sector-specific approaches 
might be very promising (Carrier 2008). According to the "error cost" (or decision-theoretic) approach 
in law and economics, it is a matter of the relation between the welfare costs of an additional differen-
tiation between different case groups and the welfare costs through decisions errors in merger reviews 
(false positive / negatives) that should decide how differentiated such a system of classification of case 
                                                 
71 See also Sidak/Teece (2009, 616-618) who recommend the analysis of "capabilities" as proxies for 
the competitive positions of firms. Their argument is that "firms exhibit more stability in their capabili-
ties than in their products" (ibid., 616).  
72 According to Robinson (1999, 13) the basic idea of the DOJ in the Northrop/Lockheed defence 
merger case was "to maintain a number of firms with the capability of innovating to meet future na-
tional security challenges". 
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groups should be. Such a strategy would also allow for making progress in those industries and under 
those circumstances, where the problems of assessing innovation effects can be overcome. Further-
more, it would also allow to leave behind the outdated discussion whether a general relationship be-
tween market structure and innovation exists or whether we generally have enough knowledge about 
innovation for taking innovation effects of mergers into account.  
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Appendix: Methodology for the Classification of the Concentration Levels 
 
For the 242 markets with innovation aspects and quantitative concentration measures we encountered 
the problem that the agencies used three different measures (HHIs, market shares, number of com-
petitors), which - despite some theoretical links with each other - cannot directly be translated into 
each other. As a consequence, we consolidated the different kinds of concentration measures and 
assigned them to three different groups: “low and medium concentration”, “high concentration” and 
“very high concentration”. In order to derive adequate thresholds for distinguishing the three groups, 
we used the FTC’s “Horizontal Merger Investigation Data”.
73
 Here the FTC provided an overview on 
the post-merger HHIs on 1.055 markets in challenged merger cases within the period of FY 1996 to 
FY 2011, and sorted the HHIs into eight classes (0-1.799, 1.800-1.999, 2.000-2.399, 2.400-2.999, 
3.000-3.999, 4.000-4.999, 5.000-6.999, and 7.000+). On this basis we calculated the terziles in order 
to obtain the thresholds for our three groups (“low & medium”, “high” and “very high” concentration). 
As a result, the threshold which differentiates the first from the second terzile lies within class five 
(3.000-3.999), and that between the second and third terzile within class seven (5.000-6.999). As a 
consequence we derived the three classes HHI < 3.000 (low and medium), 3.000 ≤ HHI < 5.000 
(high), and HHI ≥ 5000 (very high). Since the HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individ-
ual firms’ market shares, the grouping of HHIs into “low & medium”, “high” and “very high” concentra-
tion also provides a rough guide for the respective grouping of market shares and the number of com-
petitors into these three groups. This led to the following classifications for market shares and number 
of firms: markets with low and medium concentration (HHI < 3.000, market shares < 45%, number of 
competitors > 4), markets with high concentration (3000 ≤ HHI < 5000,  45% ≤ market share < 70%; 3 
≤ number of competitors ≤ 4), markets with very high concentration (HHI ≥ 5000, market shares ≥ 70 
%, post-merger number of competitors ≤ 2, i.e. that the mergers lead to a duopoly or monopoly). In 
those rare cases in which we encountered contradictions in regard to the classification (e.g., a market 
appeared to be “very highly” concentrated in terms of the HHI, but solely “highly” concentrated in terms 
of market shares), we took the HHI as the dominant criterion. Please note that all markets in which the 
agencies used non-quantitative or inconcrete concentration measures could not be included in this 
classification. 
 
 
 
                                                 
73  See FTC, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data: Fiscal Years 1996 – 2011 (Jan. 2013), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130104horizontalmergerreport.pdf. 
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